Krosnowski v. Ward

• Citation: 836 A.2d 143
• Parties: Dolores Barbara KROSNOWSKI, Administratrix of the Estate of Thaddeus Krosnowski, Deceased, Appellant, v. Stephen D. WARD, Bruce G. Roy, M.D., Robert E. Dee, M.D., Kisha Martin, M.D., Abington Primary Care Medicine, P.C., Abington Pulmonary and Critical Care Assoc., Ltd., Associates in Infectious Disease, Abington Memorial Hospital and Abington Memorial Hospital Foundation, Appellees.
• Decision Date: 06 November 2003
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

836 A.2d 143

Dolores Barbara KROSNOWSKI, Administratrix of the Estate of Thaddeus Krosnowski, Deceased, Appellant, v. Stephen D. WARD, Bruce G. Roy, M.D., Robert E. Dee, M.D., Kisha Martin, M.D., Abington Primary Care Medicine, P.C., Abington Pulmonary and Critical Care Assoc., Ltd., Associates in Infectious Disease, Abington Memorial Hospital and Abington Memorial Hospital Foundation, Appellees.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 8, 2003.

Filed November 6, 2003.

Shanin Specter, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Kim Kocher, Philadelphia, for Dee and Associates in Infectious Disease, appellees.

BEFORE: JOHNSON, FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE, STEVENS, ORIE MELVIN, LALLY-GREEN, BENDER, BOWES and GRACI, JJ.

OPINION BY ORIE MELVIN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant, Dolores Barbara Krosnowski, Administratrix of the Estate of Thaddeus Krosnowski, appeals from the orders of the trial court sustaining Appellees' preliminary objections to venue and transferring these consolidated cases to Montgomery County.¹ After careful review, we affirm.

¶ 2 The relevant facts as set forth in the complaint may be summarized as follows. In September 1999, Appellant's decedent, Thaddeus Krosnowski, was sixty-nine years of age when he was admitted to Abington Memorial Hospital for abdominal pain and underwent surgery for a perforated appendix. Mr. Krosnowski was admitted to the care of Dr. Stephen D. Ward who practiced with Abington Primary Care Medicine, P.C. During his hospital stay the decedent experienced numerous symptoms which were apparently unrelated to his surgery, including chest pain and fever. Mr. Krosnowski was evaluated by Dr. Kisha Martin (a resident at Abington Memorial Hospital), Dr. Bruce G. Roy of Abington Pulmonary and Critical Care Associates, Inc., and Dr. Robert E. Dee of Associates in Infectious Disease. On October 14, 1999, Mr. Krosnowski experienced an episode of respiratory distress and suffered a cardiac arrest. He died that same day. An autopsy determined the cause of death to be acute pulmonary embolus.

¶ 3 Appellant commenced this wrongful death and survival action on October 4, 2001 with the filing of a complaint in Philadelphia County, alleging professional negligence on the part of all of the Appellees in failing to diagnose and treat the decedent's pulmonary embolism. In response, Appellees filed preliminary objections challenging venue and moving to strike certain factual allegations.² After the filing of an amended complaint, Appellees reasserted their preliminary objections. The trial court sustained Appellees' objections to venue and transferred the cases to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.³ This timely appeal followed.

¶ 4 Appellant presents the following questions for our review.

1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING APPELLEES' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO VENUE OVER ABINGTON HOSPITAL WHERE MULTIPLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, INCLUDING DECISIONS BY THE SAME TRIAL JUDGE, HAVE REPEATEDLY ESTABLISHED THAT ABINGTON HOSPITAL IS SUBJECT TO VENUE IN PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, AND WHERE APPELLEES WERE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM OBJECTING TO VENUE IN PHILADELPHIA COUNTY?

2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN SUSTAINING APPELLEES' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS AND TRANSFERRING VENUE FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PHILADELPHIA COUNTY TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY BASED ON APPELLEES' CLAIM OF IMPROPER VENUE, WHERE PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED THAT ABINGTON HOSPITAL REGULARLY CONDUCTS BUSINESS IN PHILADELPHIA BY VIRTUE OF ITS CLOSE AFFILIATIONS WITH PHILADELPHIA-BASED HEALTHCARE INSTITUTIONS AND REGULARLY

PARTICIPATES IN ACTIVITIES IN PHILADELPHIA IN FURTHERANCE OF ITS MAIN CORPORATE OBJECTIVE?

Appellant's Brief at 5. We begin by noting our scope and standard of review which this Court recently set forth as follows.

A trial court's ruling on venue will not be disturbed if the decision is reasonable in light of the facts. Mathues v. Tim-Bar Corp., 438 Pa.Super. 231, 652 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa.Super.1994). A decision to transfer venue will not be reversed unless the trial court abused its discretion. Id. A plaintiff's choice of forum is given great weight, and the burden is on the party challenging that choice to show it is improper. Masel v. Glassman, 456 Pa.Super. 41, 689 A.2d 314, 316 (Pa.Super.1997).

Borger v. Murphy, 797 A.2d 309, 312 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 570 Pa. 680, 808 A.2d 568 (2002). However, "if there exists any proper basis for the trial court's decision to grant the petition to transfer venue, the decision must stand." Estate of Werner v. Werner, 781 A.2d 188, 190 (Pa.Super.2001) (citation omitted). The Rules of Civil Procedure make specific provision for venue in pertinent part as follows.

Rule 1006. Venue. Change of Venue

(a) Except as otherwise provided by Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule, an action against an individual may be brought in and only in a county in which the individual may be served or in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose or in any other county authorized by law.

(b) Actions against the following defendants, except as otherwise provided in Subdivision (c), may be brought in and only in the counties designated by the following rules: ... corporations and similar entities, Rule 2179.

(c) An action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants, except actions in which the Commonwealth is a party defendant, may be brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against one of the defendants under the general rules of Subdivisions (a) or (b).

Pa.R.C.P. 1006, 42 Pa.C.S.A.⁴ Instantly, because several corporations are party defendants, Rule 2179 is also applicable. That Rule provides in relevant part as follows.

Rule 2179. Venue

(a) Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly or by subdivision (b) of this rule, a personal action against a corporation or similar entity may be brought in and only in (1) the county where its registered office or principal place of business is located;

(2) a county where it regularly conducts business;

(3) the county where the cause of action arose; or

(4) a county where the transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose.

Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. There is no dispute that the alleged malpractice occurred in Montgomery County and that all of the individual Appellees maintain their offices and residences in Montgomery County. It is further undisputed that the sole basis for determining that venue may be proper in Philadelphia County depends on whether Abington Memorial Hospital regularly conducts business there.

¶ 5 Our Supreme Court's decision in Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, 525 Pa. 237, 579 A.2d 1282 (1990), provides substantial guidance for our resolution of this issue. In Purcell, the Court reviewed the question of whether venue in that medical malpractice suit was properly laid in Philadelphia County where Bryn Mawr Hospital, the situs of the alleged negligence, was located in Montgomery County. That determination turned on whether Bryn Mawr Hospital's contacts with Philadelphia County were sufficient to compel it to defend itself there. The Court explained that such business contacts must be evaluated based on their "quality" and "quantity." Id. at 244, 579 A.2d at 1285 (quoting Shambe v. Delaware and Hudson Railroad Co., 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755 (1927)). "`Quality of acts' means those directly, furthering or essential to, corporate objects; they do not include incidental acts. Quantity means those acts which are `so continuous and sufficient to be general or habitual.'" Id. at 244, 579 A.2d at 1285 (citing Shambe, 288 Pa. at 248, 135 A. at 757.) For corporate acts, "those in `aid of a main purpose' are collateral and incidental, while `those necessary to its existence' are `direct.'" Id.

¶ 6 The Supreme Court further explained that each case must rest on its own facts. Id. The plaintiff in Purcell asserted the following as evidence that Bryn Mawr conducted business in Philadelphia County: it had contractual relations with residency programs of Philadelphia teaching hospitals, recruited and employed medical students from those teaching hospitals, advertised in Philadelphia telephone directories and a Philadelphia newspaper, purchased goods and services from Philadelphia County businesses, and derived a percentage of its income from Philadelphia residents. Bryn Mawr did not, however, have a branch clinic or other such presence in Philadelphia County. After consideration of the nature of these business contacts, the Supreme Court concluded that venue was not proper in Philadelphia County because none of the contacts was more than incidental.

¶ 7 In the case at bar, Appellees noted in their preliminary objections that Appellant's amended complaint made no reference to any contact by any party with Philadelphia County and further asserted that all of the Appellees were located in Montgomery County. In response, Appellant pointed to several categories of contacts by Abington Memorial Hospital which she claimed are sufficient to confer venue in Philadelphia: (1) an affiliation with Children's Hospital of Philadelphia (the "CHOP connection"); (2) an affiliation with Philadelphia County medical schools; (3) advertisement as a Philadelphia healthcare provider including website promotion; and (4) its filing of civil claims in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. In addition, Appellant argued that this very issue had been decided against Abington Memorial Hospital in numerous other lawsuits filed against it in Philadelphia County. These are the same arguments which Appellant makes in the context of her two issues on appeal. We address these issues in the order presented.

¶ 8 First, Appellant argues that multiple decisions by the various judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County have repeatedly ruled that Abington...