Krumsick v. Krumsick

Decision Date12 February 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-954,86-954
Citation12 Fla. L. Weekly 491,502 So.2d 95
Parties12 Fla. L. Weekly 491 Martin K. KRUMSICK, Appellant, v. Cheryl Lynn KRUMSICK, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Addison E. Walker, St. Cloud, for appellant.

Nancy Y. Smith of Brinson, Heller & Smith, P.A., Kissimmee, for appellee.

COBB, Judge.

Martin K. Krumsick appeals a dissolution judgment, contending that the trial court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony, in denying him a special equity in the marital home, and in its arbitrary disposition of personal property. We find no merit as to the first two points, but reverse, in part, as to the third.

There was a sharp dispute at trial in regard to personal property. The husband had inherited numerous items from his mother's estate; Cheryl Krumsick claimed a number of these items had been given to her as gifts, either by Martin or his mother. Specifically, the wife testified, contrary to her husband, that Martin had given her a mink coat, a diamond ring and a 1975 Mercury automobile as gifts. Both parties submitted various and lengthy lists of personal property that each claimed. With the exception of the mink and the diamond ring, the trial court refused to divide the personal property, stating:

THE COURT: I'm not here to divide up every teaspoon in the house. If you folks can't agree on division of these things, I think I will just arbitrarily order all of the personal property sold to the best bidder and the proceeds split. This is ridiculous that two grown folks can't agree on every two-bit thing that's involved.

The trial judge carried through with this promise in his final judgment, which provided:

12. The Respondent shall have the sole ownership of the diamond wedding ring and mink coat given to her by the Petitioner.

* * *

* * *

14. The personal property located at the marital home and the motorcycles and the vehicles acquired during the marriage shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, if the parties cannot agree upon a division of that property within thirty (30) days of the date of this Final Judgment.

We affirm the award of the ring and the coat to the wife, since she testified that they were gifts to her and the trial court apparently believed her. See Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So.2d 629 (Fla.1982). On the other hand, we reverse the trial court's order in regard to the remaining personalty referred to in Paragraph 14 of the judgment.

A circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to partition...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT