Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority
| Decision Date | 19 January 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 33624,33624 |
| Parties | Betty Jane KRUPP, Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Licastro & Wisowaty, Peter Fitzpatrick, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., and John A. Doyle, Chicago, for appellant.
Thomas C. Strachan, Jr., Werner W. Schroeder and James E. Hastings, Chicago, for appellees.
The circuit court of Cook County held the defendant, Chicago Transit Authority, in contempt for its refusal to comply with an order directing it to answer certain interrogatories before trial, and imposed a fine of $100 as punishment. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment and we allowed leave to appeal because the case presents an important question of practice.
Plaintiff, Betty Jane Krupp, sued the Chicago Transit Authority to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence in operating one of its street cars. The defendant answered, denying negligence and alleging contributory negligence. Plaintiff then submitted eleven written interrogatories of which defendant answered nine but refused to answer the following two: No. 10: 'What are the names and addresses of all witnesses in possession of the defendant who were occurrence witnesses to plaintiff's injury as alleged in plaintiff's complaint.' No. 11: 'What are the names and addresses of all persons in possession of the defendant who witnessed plaintiff's injured condition subsequent to the accident until she was removed from defendant's streetcar.'
Because the parties have disagreed as to the meaning of these interrogatories, it is important to determine at the outset just what information was sought. The defendant refers to the interrogatories in question as calling for 'the names of the other party's witnesses,' and the Appellate Court in its opinion adopted this interpretation. We think it is incorrect. While interrogatory No. 10 refers to 'witnesses,' and interrogatory No. 11 to persons who 'witnessed,' neither inquity seeks the names of those persons whom the defendant intends to call as witnesses at the trial of the case. Interrogatory No. 10 requests the names of 'occurrence witnesses' and interrogatory No. 11 the names of 'persons * * * who witnessed plaintiff's injured condition * * *.' Fairly read, the interrogatories use the term 'witness' in the primary sense of those who have personal knowledge of the event and not in the technical sense of those who are to be called to testify at the trial. The distinction is that which was drawn by this court in drafting the present Rule 19-4. (Compare Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chapter 110, par. 58, with par. 101.19-4.) Questions which might arise if there was an attempt to obtain by discovery the "work product of the lawyer", Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388, 91 L.Ed. 451, are therefore not involved.
The defendant first justifies its refusal to answer on the ground that there is no provision in the Civil Practice Act or in the Rules of Court which specifically authorizes these interrogatories. It contends, therefore, that the discovery sought was not authorized by statute or rule. It argues that the limitations which historically governed the allowance of discovery in equity are controlling in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary like that contained in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for discovery by interrogatories of the 'identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.' 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 26(b).
Section 58 of the Civil Practice Act of 1933 as originally enacted contained two paragraphs. (Smith-Hurd Stat.1933, chapter 110, par. 182.) The first paragraph dealt with the discovery formerly available in equity by bill for discovery or by interrogatories in a bill for relief. As to that kind of discovery it did away with the requirement of a separate suit and of interrogatories in the bill, and it provided that discovery of that kind could thereafter be had by motion filed in the cause in which the matter sought to be discovered would be used. The second paragraph dealt with discovery not theretofore available. When these interrogatories were filed it read: 'Discovery of documents which are or have been in the possession of any other party to the action may be had, admissions as to any fact may be requested and answers to written interrogatories may be required of any other party, and the deposition of any other party or of any person may be taken at such times and under such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by rules.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chapter 110, par. 182.) The italicized clause was added by amendment in 1941.
In our opinion the scope of the discovery authorized by section 58(2) was not confined to that which was historically available in equity. The legislature treated separately the old discovery and the new. (See Smith-Hurd Ill.Ann.Stat., Historical and Practice Notes following chapter 110, par. 182.) Moreover, the discovery rules which the court adopted after the act became effective are almost identical with those which had been enacted by the General Assembly as a schedule of rules which formed a part of the original statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chapter 110, pars. 259.17-259.19.) In substance and in a host of particulars those rules went far beyond the limits of classical discovery in equity, and they show that there was no intention that the discovery contemplated should be restricted to those limits. It could hardly have been intended, we think, that when discovery by interrogatories addressed to the other party was authorized by the 1941 amendment to section 58(2), it was to be circumscribed by limitations not applicable to the other forms of discovery previously authorized by the same subsection.
We see no overriding significance in the fact that no rule relating to discovery by interrogatories was adopted by this court after the 1941 amendment. Discovery by deposition may...
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