Krutili v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Butler Dist

• Decision Date: 15 September 1925
• Docket Number: (C. C. No. 366.)
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: KRUTILI. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BUTLER DIST.

129 S.E. 486

KRUTILI.

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BUTLER DIST.

(C. C. No. 366.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Sept. 15, 1925.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, School District.]

Case certified from Circuit Court, Hancock County.

Action by Nick Krutili by William Krutili, his next friend, against the Board of Education of Butler District. After sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's declaration, the trial court certified its ruling. Affirmed.

Ramsay & Wilkin, of Wellsburg, for plaintiff.

Jay B. Levy, of Weirton, for defendant.

WOODS, J. Nick Krutili, an infant under the age of 21 years, by William Krutili, his next friend, sues in the circuit court of Hancock county the board of education of Butler district in said county in trespass on the ease for damages sustained by him while he was attending and a pupil in the high school of said district situate in the town of Weirton, over which said board had charge and control, which injuries were alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The declaration substantially states that the defendant is a body politic and corporate under the laws of the state of West Virginia, and as such has general control and supervision of the public schools and their property in said Butler district, and that it was its duty to keep this property in such condition as to be safe for the children attending the school as pupils thereof; that in maintaining said Weirton high school the said defendant used a certain planing machine for the purpose of planing and smoothing boards in connection with its manual training department of said school; that, while plaintiff was performing his duties as a student in said school, and while engaged in the work and labor in the manual training department of said school, as he was required so to do as such pupil, the defendant did negligently furnish the plaintiff a machine known as a "planer" which had a dangerous knife or knives that were not protected by a mantle or a guard; that by reason thereof, while planing a board under the direction and instruction of the principal of said school, and without fault on the part of said plaintiff, but because of the improper and insecure condition of said machine, the said plaintiff's left hand was caught and thrown against the knife or knives of said machine, by reason whereof his left hand was cut and lacerated, and certain of his fingers cut off, and for this alleged negligence in causing said injury the plaintiff brings his suit. The defendant demurred to this declaration, which demurrer was sustained. On joint application of the parties this ruling was certified to this court. But one point of law was made on the demurrer: That the defendant in maintaining its manual training department was in the exercise of a governmental function and an agent of the state, and as such is not liable to the things complained of in the declaration.

The general rule in this country is that a school district, municipal corporation, or school board is not, in the absence of a statute imposing it, subject to liability for injuries to pupils of public schools suffered in connection with their attendance thereat, since such district, corporation, or board, in maintaining schools, acts as an agent for the state, and performs a purely public or governmental duty imposed upon it by law for the benefit of the public, and for the performance of which it receives no profit or advantage. Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray (Mass.) 541; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am Rep. 332; Lane v. Woodbury, 5S Iowa, 462, 12 N. W. 478; Ernst v. West Covington, 116 Ky. 850, 76 S. W. 1089, 63 L. R. A. 652, 105 Am. St. Rep. 241, 3 Ann. Cas. 882; Weddle v. School Commissioners, 94 Mid. 334, 51 A. 289; Daniels v. Board of Education, 191 Mich. 339, 158 N. W. 23, L. R. A. 1916F, 468; Bank v. School District, 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814; Harris v. Salem School District, 72 N. H. 424, 57 A. 332; Finch v. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St. 37, 27 Am. Rep. 414; School District v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600, 42 Am. Rep. 627; Wixon v. Newport, 13 R. I. 454, 43 Am. Rep. 35; Juul v. School District, 168 Wis. 111, 169 N. W. 309, 9 A. L. R. 904.

As a case involving the liability of school authorities in their official capacity for injuries to pupils, it is a case of first impression in this state. However, we have the guidance of cases wherein principles were announced that makes our course plain here. The rule announced respecting the nonliability of school districts to individuals for injuries brought about in the performance of governmental functions applies to other municipalities such as cities and towns as well. The exemption of the government from liability is based on the theory of sovereignty. The acts of the government were those of the king. In our state, instead of the king being the sovereign, the powers of government reside in all the citizens of the state. The idea was also that certain things worked for the good of the many, and the welfare of the few must be sacrificed in the public interest. The decisions in this state deal with the liabilities of cities and towns. In Brown's Adm'r v. Town of Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S. E. 707, 11 L. R. A. 121, the town was sought to be held liable in damages for the death of a prisoner incarcerated in the municipal jail by reason of a fire caused by the negligence of the officers and employees of the city. The court held:

"As to the powers and functions of a town of a public governmental character, it is not liable for damages caused by the wrongful act or negligence of its officers or agents therein."

The rule stated by Dillon on Municipal Corp., § 966, was quoted approvingly by Judge Brannon in his opinion:

"These municipal corporations, unlike private ones, are organized, not for gain, but for the public weal, as important instrumentalities in government, and they are supported by the taxation of their people, and should not be made liable for the acts of their officers, done in performance of purely governmental powers for the benefit of the public, and not for their private benefit; for otherwise it would be impossible to say where their liabilities would end, or how onerous would be the burden laid upon those who sustain their existence. It seems to be well settled that they are not liable by implication for such acts done in their public capacity, as governing agencies, in the discharge of duties for the public or general * * * benefit."

This case was approved and followed by this court in Ritz v. City of Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993, 43 L. R. A. 148. There the court expressly stated that cities were not liable in such cases "unless some statute, either directly or by implication, gives a private remedy." In Shaw v. City of Charleston, 57 W. Va. 433, 50 S. E. 527, 4 Ann. Cas. 515, this court gave sanction to the general principles of law announced in Brown v. Town of Guyandotte, supra, and in consonance therewith held that a municipal corporation is not liable for injuries to a person occasioned by the unsanitary condition of its prison, while he was confined therein for a violation of a city ordinance. The maintenance of a prison was held there to be an exercise of a purely governmental power of the municipality. That boards of education are subject...