Krutko v. Franklin Cnty.
| Decision Date | 26 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:11-cv-610 |
| Parties | ROBERT M. KRUTKO, Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's remand order issued upon resolution of Defendants' interlocutory appeal. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 31, 2012, (Doc. 34). On June 13, 2013, this Court denied that motion with respect to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C.") § 2744 against jail guards Tressa Lawler, Carol Turner, Teresa Hatzer, Kristopher Koller, John Penix, and Jeffrey Harrow (collectively, the "Deputies"), finding the Deputies were not protected by qualified or state law immunity. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit vacated the Court's ruling as to the Deputies and remanded the case to this Court to conduct an "individualized analysis," assessing the culpability of each of the Deputies individually. (Doc. 46). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff, Robert M. Krutko ("Krutko" or "Plaintiff"), was incarcerated in Franklin County Corrections Center II ("FCCCII") from November 4, 2009 to February 13, 2010. (Doc. 34 at 3). Plaintiff's original action was brought against the following Defendants: (1) FranklinCounty, Ohio; (2) Franklin County Sheriff Zach Scott; (3) Franklin County Director of Public Facilities Management James Goodenow; (4) the Deputies, employed by FCCCII, sued in their official and individual capacities; and, (5) Mental Health Liaison, Douglas Hahn, also employed by FCCCII. (Second Am. Compl., Doc. 30). The Deputies are the only remaining Defendants. (Opinion and Order, Doc. 43). From November 17 to November 20, 2009, Plaintiff was held in an area of FCCCII called "1 South 9," colloquially known to staff and inmates as "the Hole." (Doc. 30 at 3). The Hole is a temporary holding cell designed, for the purpose of infectious disease control, as a negative air flow space. It is also used to house inmates with other medical or mental health issues. (Doc. 34 at 3).
Plaintiff avers that on one of the days, unspecified, while he was in the Hole, the toilet in the cell "rapidly began to overflow with sewage and human excrement." (Doc. 38 at 4). As the toilet overflowed, spewing sewage onto the wall and floor of the cell, Plaintiff was asleep on the floor of the cell. (Id.). He was awakened by the shouts of his two cellmates, but by the time he arose, "most of his body and clothing were covered with the sewage." (Id.). The three inmates pounded on the door for help as the sewage rose to nearly two inches in certain areas of the cell.
Plaintiff alleges the Deputies - jail guards Lawler, Turner, Hatzer, Koller, Penix, and Harrow - came to the cell door multiple times and cursed, laughed, and insulted the three inmates as the cell filled with sewage. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 26; Doc. 38 at 4). He also claims the Deputies did not release him from the cell for approximately 25 minutes following the overflow, and did so only after the cellmates pushed the sewage under the cell door into the hallway. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 28-29; Doc. 38 at 4). Once Plaintiff was removed from the cell, he was transferred to another cell that smelled of excrement. (Doc. 38 at 4). He maintains that he begged the guards for a shower or soap, requests that were denied. Instead, he only was brought a new smock towear. After he retched, which he attributes to being covered head-to-toe in excrement, he was transferred to the medical department where he was again denied soap and permission to shower. (Id.). After "about five or six days," Plaintiff was returned to the general population and was allowed to shower for the first time since the incident occurred. (Id. at 5).
Defendants' records from the facility do not corroborate Plaintiff's account in multiple instances. First, Defendants' maintenance records do not show any instance of a plumbing malfunction in "1 South 9" on the dates indicated by Plaintiff. Second, Defendants' records show Plaintiff spent only three days in the Hole, from November 17 to November 20, when he was returned to the general population. (Doc. 34-2 at ¶ 7). Third, Defendants' records contain no mention of Plaintiff spending "about five or six days" in the "medical department," or any other specialized unit on or about the dates in question. Fourth, although Plaintiff's pleadings allude to "constant sewage back-ups" and "[Defendants'] policy and custom of not thoroughly cleaning the cells . . . after sewage backups and overflows," Plaintiff neither cites specific examples nor provides evidence of those allegations. (Doc. 30 at 5).
Plaintiff brought claims against the Deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his conditions of his confinement in violation of his constitutional rights, and negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of Ohio law.1
On August 31, 2012, the Deputies moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is barred by qualified immunity and his state law tort claims are barred by Ohio statutory immunity. (Doc. 34). In an opinion issued on June 13, 2013, the Court denied the Deputies' motion on both grounds, holding that the Deputies' alleged actions violated Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights and constituted reckless conduct. See Harlowv. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03.
On May 16, 2014, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its Opinion, (Doc. 46), vacating this Court's Opinion and Order denying qualified immunity and Ohio statutory immunity for the Deputies (Doc. 43). The Court of Appeals held that this Court "failed to assess the individual culpability of each defendant" and thus remand was necessary in order for this Court to "set forth with precision the basis for its decision" to deny the Deputies qualified and state law immunity. (Doc. 46 at 4). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held that this Court must identify the evidence demonstrating each Deputy's indifference to Krutko's position to show that each individual had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. (Id.).
Accordingly, on August 20, 2014, the Court ordered the Parties to submit briefing addressing the issues of qualified immunity and Ohio statutory immunity, including, specifically, "whether each individual defendant had a sufficiently culpable state of mind." (Doc. 49) (quoting Doc. 46 at 4). The parties submitted simultaneous cross-briefs on September 10, 2014, followed by simultaneous response briefs filed on September 24, 2014. This matter is now ripe for review.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A fact is deemed material only if it "might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law." Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).
The nonmoving party must then present "significant probative evidence" to show that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1993). The suggestion of a mere possibility of a factual dispute is insufficient to defeat a movant's motion for summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986)). Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, "if the dispute is about a material fact that is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The necessary inquiry for this Court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether 'the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52). In evaluating such a motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the opposing party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251; Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995).
Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits submitted in support of, or in opposition to motions for summary judgment include facts based on personal knowledge, and that personal knowledge "must be evident from the affidavit." Reddy v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 137 F.Supp.2d 948, 956 (S.D. Ohio 2000). Affidavits at the summary judgment stage also may not rely upon inadmissible hearsay because inadmissible hearsay "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact." North American Specialty Ins. Co. v. Myers, 111 F.3d 1273, 83 (6th Cir. 1997).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed in his favor, demonstrate the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). The...
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