Krysl v. Treasurer of Mo.

• Decision Date: 01 October 2019
• Docket Number: ED 107591
• Citation: 591 S.W.3d 13
• Parties: Bruce KRYSL, Appellant, v. TREASURER OF MISSOURI as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

591 S.W.3d 13

Bruce KRYSL, Appellant,

v.TREASURER OF MISSOURI as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Respondent.

ED 107591

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO.

Filed: October 1, 2019

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer Denied November 4, 2019

Application for Transfer Denied February 4, 2020

OPINION

Lisa P. Page, Judge

Bruce Krysl ("Krysl") appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("the Commission") denying compensation. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

In 1994, Krysl was employed as a sculptor for the Veiled Prophets of St. Louis ("VP"), carving large characters for parade floats. Krysl’s job required him to perform repetitive strokes

while sculpting the characters. In 2012, Krysl was diagnosed with diabetes, requiring treatment for peripheral neuropathy in his upper and lower extremities, among other symptoms resulting from his diabetes. In 2013, he began to experience numbness and tingling in his right hand while sculpting and was ultimately diagnosed with severe right carpal tunnel syndrome. The parties stipulated his primary compensable occupational injury occurred on January 1, 2013. Krysl underwent surgery for carpal tunnel release and was released to full duty in 2015.

Krysl filed a claim for compensation on July 5, 2016. He settled his primary injury claim against VP in May 2017, leaving the claim against the Second Injury Fund ("the Fund"). Krysl’s claim against the Fund was heard by the administrative law judge ("ALJ") in February 2018. The ALJ awarded Krysl permanent partial disability. The Fund filed an application for review. The Commission reversed the ALJ’s award, finding that even though the primary occupational injury occurred on January 1, 2013, Section 287.220.3(1) RSMo (2016)¹ applied and precluded his claim for permanent partial disability against the Fund because Krysl filed his claim after January 1, 2014.

DISCUSSION

In each of his two points on appeal, Krysl contends the Commission erroneously interpreted Section 287.220 in denying his claim for compensation against the Fund. In both points, Krysl’s argument centers upon the fact that the parties stipulated his occupational injury occurred January 1, 2013. Thus, his claim, which was filed after January 1, 2014, did not preclude a claim against the Fund because the date of his injury was determinative.

Standard of Review

We review the Commission’s decision to determine whether it is "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." Cosby v. Treasurer of State as Custodian of Second Injury Fund , 579 S.W.3d at 205, quoting Article V, section 18 of the Missouri Constitution. In addition, Section 287.495.1 states, in relevant part, that we shall only review questions of law and we may modify, reverse, remand or set aside the award only upon the following grounds:

(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;

(2) That the award was procured by fraud;

(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award;

(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.

We review questions of law de novo. Cosby , at 206.

Analysis

Each of Krysl’s two points on appeal contend the Commission erroneously interpreted Section 287.220 in denying his claim for compensation against the Fund because the parties stipulated his occupational injury occurred January 1, 2013. Krysl argues the plain language of Section 287.220 compensates all injuries occurring prior to January 1, 2014, even though his claim was filed after that date. We agree.

The Commission found that because Krysl’s claim was filed after January 1, 2014, Section 287.220.3 precludes his claim for permanent partial disability ("PPD") against the Fund. This interpretation ignores the plain language of the statute and creates an unnecessary conflict within Section 287.220. Of greater concern, it also requires an impermissible addition of terms to arrive at the result. See Macon Co. Emergency Services Board v. Macon Co. Comm'n , 485 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 2016) ("This Court will not add words to a statute under the auspice of statutory construction.").

When interpreting statutes, we must ascertain the legislature’s intent by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms used and give effect to that intent where possible. Cosby v. Treasurer of State as Custodian of Second Injury Fund , 579 S.W.3d at 206. We consider the words in context and we must construe sections of statutes in pari materia to determine the meaning and scope of the language. Id.

Section 287.220 governs the compensation and payment of claims and was amended in 2013 to limit claims against the Fund effective January 1, 2014. Section 287.220.2 unequivocally allows compensation for claims filed against the Fund in, "[a]ll cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability due to injuries occurring prior to January 1, 2014 ...." (emphasis added). The language in Section 287.220.3(1) specifically limits Fund liability for "[a]ll claims against the second injury fund for injuries occurring after January 1, 2014, and all claims against the second injury fund involving a subsequent compensable injury which is an occupational disease filed after January 1, 2014." (emphasis added).

It is the distinction between accidental injury and occupational disease that is crucial to the interpretation of Section 287.220. Unlike an accidental injury, occupational diseases accrue over time. An occupational disease does not become a compensable injury until it causes the employee to become disabled, meaning it affects the employee’s ability to perform ordinary tasks and harms his earning ability. See Garrone v. Treasurer of State of Missouri , 157 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (internal citations omitted). An employee can experience significant symptoms of an occupational disease well before it becomes a compensable injury. Id. In fact, an employee could even be substantially treated for an occupational disease but unless it becomes disabling prior to January 1, 2014, Subsection 287.220.3(1) precludes Fund liability.

The plain terms of Section 287.220.2 exclude "[a]ll cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability due to injuries occurring prior to January 1, 2014 ...." (emphasis added). It does not distinguish between accidental injuries and occupational disease. However, the legislature then specifically uses the term "subsequent compensable injury" in its limitation of Fund liability for occupational disease in Section 287.220.3(1). See Macon Co. Emergency Services Board , 485 S.W.3d at 355 ("It is presumed that each word, clause, sentence and section of a statute will be given meaning and that the legislature did not insert superfluous language."). Thus when considering occupational disease, these two phrases, in conjunction with the term "all cases" in subsection 2 clearly indicates the legislature’s intent to include compensable occupational diseases occurring prior to January 1, 2014, which by their very nature could result in a claim filed after January 1, 2014.² Thus, all claims for any existing injuries due to occupational disease that were not a disabling "subsequent compensable injury" before January 1, 2014, are barred. The plain language of subsection 3(1) simply, if less than artfully, limits the Fund’s liability for all claims for any injuries, both accidental and occupational, which occurred after January 1, 2014.³

Moreover, and of greater concern, the Commission’s conclusion effectively inserts the terms "except for occupational disease " in subsection 2 and "regardless of the date of injury" into Section 287.220.3(1) which neither the Commission nor this court can do. See Macon Co. Emergency Services Board , 485 S.W.3d at 355. Not only does the Commission’s interpretation ignore the use of "subsequent compensable injury" by the legislature and but also requires the addition of words not contained in the statute.⁴ This contradicts the basic rules of statutory interpretation and our primary function to ascertain legislative intent from the language used in the statute. Anderson ex rel. Anderson , 248 S.W.3d 101, 106 (2008).

All parties unequivocally stipulated Krysl’s occupational disease occurred on or about January 1, 2013. Thus, based upon the plain language of Section 287.220, the Fund’s liability in this case should be governed by Section 287.220.2. Although Krysl filed his claim for injury due to occupational disease after January 1, 2014, he sustained a compensable injury prior to this date resulting in his PPD. Therefore, his claim against the Fund was not precluded by Section 287.220.3, and the Commission erred in denying benefits on this basis.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Commission is reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the ALJ’s award of permanent partial disability benefits.

Philip M. Hess, P.J., concurs.

Kurt S. Odenwald, J., concurs in separate concurring opinion.

Kurt S. Odenwald, Judge, concurring.

This appeal requires statutory interpretation of legislative amendments related to Missouri’s system of workers' compensation. I write separately to underscore the challenges of adhering to legislative intent in light of ambiguous or otherwise unclear language that has appeared in several legislative amendments to the workers' compensation statutes since 2005. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether Bruce Krysl ("Krysl") is entitled to recover partial permanent disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund ("the Fund") due to his work-related carpal tunnel syndrome

. Our responsibility is to apply the law to the facts before us. Applying the law in this matter requires our review of two sections of the same statute, which we hold allows Krysl to recover from the Fund. As this Court correctly notes, the two subsections at issue appear to be in conflict under the interpretation applied by the Labor and...