Kshatrya v. Texas Workforce Com'n

• Decision Date: 29 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 05-00-01685-CV.,05-00-01685-CV.
• Citation: 97 S.W.3d 825
• Parties: Bakulesh KSHATRYA, Appellant, v. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION and Riddle Technologies, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

97 S.W.3d 825

Bakulesh KSHATRYA, Appellant, v. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION and Riddle Technologies, Inc., Appellees.

No. 05-00-01685-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

January 29, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Brian P. Sanford, Sheils, Winnubst, Sanford & Bethune, Richardson, for Appellant.

Alicia Sienne Voltmer, Dallas, Pilar Nicole Galwardi, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for Appellee.

Before Justices WHITTINGTON, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.

Opinion By Justice WHITTINGTON.

Bakulesh Kshatrya appeals the trial court's order granting the Texas Workforce Commission's and Riddle Technologies, Inc.'s pleas to the jurisdiction. The order dismissed Kshatrya's claims asserted under section 61.051 of the Texas Labor Code and struck his amended petition asserting common law claims for fraud and breach of contract. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 61.051 (Vernon 1996). In two issues, Kshatrya contends the trial judge erred in concluding Kshatrya's failure to file suit in the county mandated by the labor code deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and in dismissing his breach of contract and fraud claims. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Kshatrya worked for Riddle as a senior developer. Riddle terminated Kshatrya effective December 31, 1998. When Riddle failed to pay him a year-end bonus, Kshatrya timely filed a wage claim with the TWC. Following an investigation, the TWC concluded Kshatrya was not entitled to the bonus. Kshatrya timely requested a hearing to contest the preliminary order. The TWC affirmed the preliminary order.

Thereafter, Kshatrya filed suit in the 134th Judicial District Court in Dallas County to appeal the TWC's order. Kshatrya named both the TWC and Riddle as defendants in his suit. See TEX. LAB CODE ANN. § 61.062(c) (Vernon 1996). The TWC filed its original answer and a plea to the jurisdiction. The TWC alleged the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Kshatrya's suit because, as an agency of the state of Texas, the TWC was immune from both suit and liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The TWC claimed it had not waived its immunity to be sued because Kshatrya did not bring suit in the county in which he lived (Collin County) as required by the statute. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 61.062(d) (Vernon 1996).

Riddle then filed its answer, plea to the jurisdiction, and special exceptions. In its plea to the jurisdiction, Riddle alleged that, although Kshatrya timely filed his suit, he failed to exercise reasonable diligence in serving Riddle. Riddle argued Kshatrya's lack of reasonable diligence to serve the company rendered the suit untimely and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.

On August 15, 2000, Kshatrya filed a response asserting his failure to file in the proper county did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and the defendants waived any complaint regarding venue by failing to move to transfer venue. He also asserted Riddle's complaint that he failed to timely serve the company did not raise a question of jurisdiction, but rather the affirmative defense of limitations. He argued Riddle's plea should be denied as an "improperly, prematurely filed motion for summary judgment" because a plea to the jurisdiction was not the proper manner to raise limitations. Kshatrya also filed an amended petition adding common-law claims for fraud and breach of contract against Riddle.

That same day, the judge signed an order striking Kshatrya's claims for breach of contract and fraud and dismissing his appeal of the TWC order for want of jurisdiction. The order stated:

On the 15th day of August 2000, there came to be heard Defendant Texas Workforce Commission's Plea to the Jurisdiction and Riddle Technologies' Special Exceptionc and Plea to the Jurisdiction regarding the failure of Plaintiff to file in the proper county for judicial review pursuant to the Texas Labor Code § 61.062. After hearing the pleadings, evidence, and arguments of the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to comply with sections of the Labor Code necessary to give this Court jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction to decide the Payday Law wage claim which Plaintiff has against Defendants Texas Workforce Commission and Riddle Technologies. Accordingly, Plaintiff s suit should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and Plaintiff's Amended Petition asserting fraud & breach of contract claims related to wages should be stricken. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff, take nothing against Defendants Texas Workforce Commission and Riddle Technologies and that Plaintiffs Amended Petition is stricken and that Defendant Texas Workforce Commission's Plea to the Jurisdiction and Riddle Technologies' Special Exceptions and Plea to the Jurisdiction be, and is hereby SUSTAINED, and this case in its entirety is dismissed with prejudice for want of jurisdiction.

(Language in bold represents handwritten portions of order.) This appeal followed.

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

In his first issue, Kshatrya contends the trial judge erred in granting the TWC's and Riddle's pleas to the jurisdiction. Under this issue, Kshatrya argues that whether he filed suit in the proper county under the statute is an issue of venue, not jurisdiction. He claims that because neither the TWC nor Riddle filed a motion to transfer venue, both have waived any complaint regarding improper venue. In response, the TWC argues that when, as in this case, the State is a defendant, "[t]he sovereign immunity doctrine dictates that statutory prerequisites are jurisdictional." Thus, the TWC argues that Kshatrya's failure to file suit in the county of his residence, a requirement under section 61.062(d) of the labor code, deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Riddle did not file an appellate brief, but by letter informed the Court it joined and adopted the TWC's brief.

Both the TWC and Kshatrya rely on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000). At issue in Dubai Petroleum was whether the plaintiffs had successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court in a wrongful death suit filed under section 71.031 of the civil practices and remedies code. Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 73. At the time suit was filed, the code allowed an aggrieved party to file suit if three statutory prerequisites existed. Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 73-74. The defendants in Dubai Petroleum argued one statutory requirement was not fulfilled and, therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case. After the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, the case was appealed to the supreme court. Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 74.

The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment reversing the trial court's dismissal. In so doing, the supreme court noted that, although the traditional approach had been to dismiss for want of jurisdiction when a party failed to comply in all respects with mandatory and exclusive statutory provisions, "the resulting practical difficulties suggest underlying logical flaws." Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 76. The court reasoned, "[I]t seems perverse to treat a judgment as perpetually void merely because the court or the parties made a good-faith mistake in interpreting the law." Noting that "the modern direction of policy is to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the supreme court overruled law that `characterized [a] plaintiff's failure to establish a statutory prerequisite as jurisdictional.'" Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 76. In the case at bar, Kshatrya contends the supreme court's ruling supports his position that the mandatory venue statute in section 61.062 is not jurisdictional. However, the TWC argues the venue statute is jurisdictional because, unlike the section at issue in Dubai Petroleum, section 61.062 involves the waiver of sovereign immunity, an issue not raised or addressed by the supreme court.

"Jurisdiction" deals with the power of a court to determine an action involving a particular subject matter as between the parties and render a certain judgment. See Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75; Nat'l Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Tex. 315, 320, 167 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (1943). A district court has jurisdiction in a case because the particular claim raised in the case is within its constitutional jurisdiction or because jurisdiction has been mandated by the Legislature. See TEX CONST. art. V, § 8 (jurisdiction of district court "consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body."); Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75 (same). We presume all claims "fall within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has provided that they must be heard elsewhere." Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of a proceeding. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.1993); In re Powers, 974 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding). Moreover, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error which an appellate court must review anytime it appears. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443.

In contrast, venue deals with the propriety of prosecuting a suit involving a given subject matter and specific parties in a particular county. See Nat'l Life, 167 S.W.2d at 1025. The plaintiff files suit in any permissible county or, in the case of mandatory...