Kubik v. Kubik
Decision Date | 09 July 2004 |
Docket Number | No. S-03-765.,S-03-765. |
Citation | 683 N.W.2d 330,268 Neb. 337 |
Parties | Wayne KUBIK, individually and as a representative of Sand Creek Farms, Inc., appellant, v. Marvin KUBIK and Sharon Thompson, appellees. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
John H. Sohl, Wahoo, and Jaron J. Bromm, Senior Certified Law Student, of Edstrom, Bromm, Lindahl, Sohl & Freeman-Caddy, for appellant.
Michael A. Nelsen, of Hillman, Forman, Nelsen, Childers & McCormack, for appellees.
Wayne Kubik (Kubik) appeals from an order of the district court for Saunders County dismissing a derivative action he brought on behalf of Sand Creek Farms, Inc. (SCF), against his brother and sister who are the majority shareholders and directors of the corporation.
On December 3, 2002, Kubik commenced this derivative action on behalf of SCF against the majority shareholders and directors of SCF, Marvin Kubik and Sharon Thompson (collectively the defendants). In response to the original petition, the defendants filed an answer asserting various defenses, including the insufficiency of the alleged demand made upon them by Kubik. Kubik filed a reply generally denying the defenses asserted in the answer. The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment. In the district court's ruling on this motion, it noted that the action had been commenced under the code pleading rules which existed in this state prior to January 1, 2003, and that under those rules, our cases held that a motion for summary judgment was an inappropriate method for challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings. Accordingly, the district court treated the motion as a demurrer, sustained the demurrer, and granted Kubik leave to amend. Kubik then filed a first amended petition which is his operative pleading. We summarize here the factual allegations contained therein.
SCF was funded, organized, and incorporated by Edward and Blanche Kubik, husband and wife, in 1976. Edward died February 21, 1979, and Blanche died March 27, 1997. Kubik, Marvin Kubik, and Sharon Thompson are their only children. Marvin Kubik is a director of SCF and was elected as its president on or about March 19, 1998. Sharon Thompson is now and at all relevant times has been the secretary and treasurer of SCF. SCF has not held regular meetings of its shareholders, officers, or board of directors since before Blanche's death.
Kubik alleged that the following individuals are shareholders of SCF:
Shareholder Number of Shares Percentage of Shares Marvin Kubik 16,666 2/3 33.3 Wayne Kubik 14,612 2/3 29.2 Sharon Thompson 13,160 2/3 26.3 Sharon Thompson 1,240 2.5 (custody Vickie Thompson) Duane Thompson 1,840 3.7 Kellie A. Weston 1,240 2.5 Julie L. Bose 1,240 2.5 ______ ___ 50,000 100
Kubik further alleged on information and belief that without his prior knowledge, the number of outstanding shares was increased to 66,6662/3 shares, as evidenced by a January 1, 2002, domestic corporation occupation tax report, which is attached to the first amended petition. The record does not disclose who owns or controls the additional 16,6662/3 shares.
More than 90 days prior to filing this action, Kubik served a written demand upon SCF to take the following actions:
Kubik alleged that he had requested but had not received financial information from SCF and that he was removed as the registered agent of the corporation without a directors meeting, approval of shareholders, or his consent. He alleged that the corporation changed its name and filed new articles of incorporation without a board of directors meeting, approval of the shareholders, or his consent and that the defendants have accepted improper fees from the corporation, entered into improper long-term leases, and incurred "exorbitant legal fees to the detriment of the corporation's shareholders all without Board or Shareholder approval." Kubik further alleged that the defendants were in possession and control of the business and assets of SCF, that the defendants had utilized the corporation for various improper purposes "since at least March 19, 1998," and that irreparable harm would occur if the actions he demanded were not taken. Kubik sought appointment of a receiver and other relief, including compliance with the aforementioned demands.
At a hearing on this motion, the defendants argued that Kubik's demand was deficient. Kubik argued that the demand was legally sufficient and that he could not be more specific in his allegations because the defendants refused to hold shareholder meetings and/or give him the information he requested. The district court entered an order of dismissal, reasoning:
In the present case, a review of the Amended Petition and the demand attached thereto, it is clear that the demand made does not comport with the requirements set forth in [Association of Commonwealth Claimants v. Hake, 2 Neb.App. 123, 507 N.W.2d 665 (1993)]. Whether this case is treated as one filed before the adoption of Nebraska's new civil procedure rules — in which case the matter would be treated as a Demurrer or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or whether it is treated as one to which the new rules would apply — in which case it would be treated as a 12(b)(6) motion, the result is the same. Plaintiff has failed to allege that a demand, meeting the specificity requirements and giving rise to authority to sue was served upon the corporation. Given that the demand itself was attached to the Amended Petition, it appears unlikely that the Plaintiff would be able to amend the petition to cure the defect. Given this, the Amended Petition fails to state a claim. The matter is dismissed.
Kubik filed this timely appeal, which we moved to our docket on our own motion pursuant to our authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of this state. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995).
Kubik assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district court erred in dismissing the action.
Nebraska's new rules of pleading apply to "civil actions filed on or after January 1, 2003." Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 1 (rev.2003). Because this action was filed prior to that date, we treat this as an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing the action. In an appellate court's review of a ruling on a demurrer, the court is required to accept as true all the facts which are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences of law and fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the conclusions of the pleader. Rodehorst v. Gartner, 266 Neb. 842, 669 N.W.2d 679 (2003); Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 266 Neb. 601, 667 N.W.2d 244 (2003); Regier v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 264 Neb. 660, 651 N.W.2d 210 (2002). In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, a petition is to be construed liberally; if, as so construed, the petition states a cause of action, the demurrer is to be overruled. Rodehorst v. Gartner, supra; McCarson v. McCarson, 263 Neb. 534, 641 N.W.2d 62 (2002)
; Malone v. American Bus. Info., 262 Neb. 733, 634 N.W.2d 788 (2001). Whether a petition states a cause of action is a question of law, regarding which an appellate court has an obligation to reach a conclusion independent of that of the inferior court. Rodehorst v. Gartner, supra; Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 265 Neb. 423, 657 N.W.2d 634 (2003). When a demurrer to a petition is sustained, a court must grant leave to amend the petition unless it is clear that no reasonable possibility exists that amendment will correct the defect. Regier v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra; Northwall v. State, 263 Neb. 1, 637 N.W.2d 890 (2002).
A derivative action is a suit brought by a shareholder to enforce a cause of action belonging to the corporation. Sadler v. Jorad, Inc., 268 Neb. 60, 680 N.W.2d 165 268 Neb. 60, 680 N.W.2d 165 (2004); Association of Commonwealth Claimants v. Hake, 2 Neb.App. 123, 507 N.W.2d 665 (1993). Normally, to...
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