Kuehmsted v. Turnwall

• Decision Date: 11 January 1932
• Parties: KUEHMSTED v. TURNWALL et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

138 So. 775

103 Fla. 1180

KUEHMSTED v. TURNWALL et al.

Florida Supreme Court

January 11, 1932

En Banc.

Suit by James D. Turnwall and others against Albert Louis Kuehmsted. From a final decree for the complainant, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Pinellas County; T Frank Hobson, judge.

COUNSEL

Wilson & Bogue, of St. Petersburg, Loftin, Stokes & Calkins, of Miami, and Robert H. Anderson, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Austin L. Richardson, of St. Petersburg, for appellees.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

This is a suit in equity to annul a marriage for want of mental capacity on the part of the wife to enter the marital state. The bill of complaint was exhibited in the circuit court of Pinellas county, alleging in substance that appellees were 'the brother, sister, niece and nephew and only heirs at law of Julia B. Kuehmsted, deceased, with whom the defendant Albert Louis Kuehmsted, entered into a pretended marriage on October 19, 1923, and who died October 28, 1928; that at the time of the marriage, the deceased was of unsound mind and menory, insane and wholly incompetent and unable to understand or realize the marriage contract which was entered into willfully, fraudulently and maliciously by Albert Louis Kuehmsted with knowledge of the deceased's insanity and to defeat and defraud the complainants of their legal inheritance in her estate; that the deceased never recovered her mental capacity after the marriage ceremony but her insanity continued without a lucid interval from the time of the ceremony until the time of her death, and that the marriage was totally void and of no effect; that a will was filed in the office of the county judge which was purported to have been made by the deceased on the date of the marriage, by its terms leaving the major portion of her estate to the defendant and that the complainants had filed a petition in the county judge's court of Pinellas County to revoke the probate of said will. The bill prayed that the marriage be decreed to be totally null and void and of no effect.'

A demurrer challenging the equity of the bill was overruled whereupon answer was filed denying the charge of fraud against him and denying that Julia B. Kuehmsted was of unsound mind or insane or incompetent at the time of the marriage, and asserting that, on the contrary, she was mentally competent and understood and realized the marriage ceremony and the validity of the marriage. On the Issues thus made, testimony was taken and a final decree was entered finding the material allegations of the bill to be true and adjudicating the marriage to be null and void. From this decree the defendant appealed.

The basal question brought here for our determination may be stated as follows: Can a marriage alleged to be void for want of mental capacity be annulled by a court of equity after the death of one of the spouses, and may the heirs at law of the dead spouse maintain a bull in equity for that purpose?

The appellant declares for the negative of this issue and contends that, while either party to an invalid marriage may maintain a cause of action for its annulment at any time, no such right is recognized in any third person except where provided for in specific cases. To support his position the following authorities are relied on: Ridgely v. Ridgley, 79 Md. 298, 29 A. 597, 25 L. R. A. 800; In re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 P. 159, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 847, 132 Am. St. Rep. 952, 17 Ann. Cas. 91; Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864; Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S.W. 175; Niland v. Noland, 96 N. J. Eq. 438, 126 A. 530; 18 R. C. L. 447; 32 C.J. 730, and 38 C.J. 1353.

We have examined all these authorities and do not think they are decisive of the case at bar. True, some of them hold that third parties cannot bring a suit to annul a marriage, that such suits can be brought only at the instance of one of the spouses, but they all turn on statutes peculiar to the jurisdiction or else they were suits brought by parents to annual the marriage of a child because of incapacity by reason of tender years or other disability to contract the marital state, such marriages being generally held to be voidable only and not void. The rule seems to be general that voidable marriages may be subsequently ratified by the contracting parties.

Speaking technically, there is a vast difference between a decree annulling, and a decree dissolving, a marriage by divorce; the one being grounded on the fact that there was never a valid marriage, while the other concedes that a valid marriage in fact exists but dissolves it. Ridgley v. Ridgley, supra; In re Hollopeter, supra.

At the common law, the canonical disabilities of consanguinities, affinity, and impotence rendered the marriage voidable and not void, while insanity rendered it absolutely void. The voidable marriage is good for every purpose until avoided, it can be attacked only in a direct proceeding during the life of the parties, the parties cannot marry again unless diverced, their children are legitimate, the survivor is entitled to the rights of husband or wife, the wife is entitled to dower, and on the death of either party the marriage is good ab initio. 18 R. C. L. 447. This common-law rule not having been modified by statute is in force in this state, and while it has been said in some jurisdictions that the marriage of an insane person is an absolute nullity and no judgment or decree of nullity is necessary to restore the parties to their original rights, yet we approve the rule that the fitness and propriety of a judicial decision pronouncing the nullity of such a marriage is very apparent, and is equally conducive to good order and decorum and to the peace and conscience of the party. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 343; Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565; Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371, 26 Am. Rep. 774.

In Kent's Commentaries, vol. 2, p. 76, it is said that though marriage with an idiot or lunatic be absolutely void, and no sentence or voidance be absolutely necessary, yet, as well for the sake of the good order of society, as for the peace of mind of all persons concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.

In Orchardson v. Cofield et al., 171 Ill. 14, 49 N.E. 197 40 L. R. A. 256, 63 Am. St. Rep. 211, it was held that the marriage of an insane person was void, and not being good for any legal purpose,...