Kuhlman v. Baker

• Decision Date: 01 January 1879
• Citation: 50 Tex. 630
• Parties: JOHN KUHLMAN v. W. R. BAKER.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

50 Tex. 630

JOHN KUHLMAN

v.W. R. BAKER.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1879.

APPEAL from Harris. Tried below before the Hon. James Masterson.

January 10, 1874, Kuhlman sued Baker in the District Court of Harris county, alleging his purchase of land in April, 1856, of Baker, for which he took a quit-claim deed, believing it to be a warranty; that the title to the land had failed, and his recent discovery that his deed from Baker was not a warranty. The petition was adjudged defective, on demurrer. The opinion of the court sets out sufficiently the allegations of the petition discussed by the court.

Goldthwaite & Turner, for appellee.

I. The petition shows no diligence. Not one act of prudence, such as characterizes an ordinarily prudent man in the management of his business, was ever performed by the plaintiff in this matter. The records of the county are open and accessible to all.

The demand is a stale one, and as such is barred in equity. More than seventeen years have elapsed since this purchase was made. It appears on the face of the pleadings that this quit-claim deed was made, executed, and delivered to plaintiff on the 22d of April, A. D. 1856, and that this suit was filed on the 10th of January, A. D. 1874.

It has been said by John Voet that controversies are limited to a fixed period of time, lest they should be immortal, while men are mortal. (J. Voet, ad. Pand., lib. 5, tit. 1, sec. 53, p. 328.)

Laws thus limiting suits are founded on the noblest policy. They are statutes of repose, to quiet title, to suppress frauds, and to supply the deficiency of proofs arising from the ambiguity and obscurity or the antiquity of transactions. The statutes of limitations seem to be applicable equally in law and in equity. (Story's Confl. of Laws, sec. 576; 2 Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 1520, and cases cited; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet., 61;Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet., 62; White v. Parnther, 1 Knapp, 179; Peyton v. Stith, 5 Pet., 485;Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Pet., 405;Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet., 177.)

Equity recognizes a defense founded on the mere lapse of time and the staleness of the claim, where no statute of limitations governs the case. (2 Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 1520; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch., 93;DeCouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch., 190;Murray v. Coster, 20 Johns., 576;Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat., 481;Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat., 489;Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason, 143.)

The principle on which the court refuses its aid seems to be the danger and injustice which may be the effect, rather than the presumption of a fact.

Courts of equity have at all times, upon general principles of their own, even where there was no statutable bar, refused relief to stale demands where the party has slept upon his rights for a great length of time; and where a bar has been fixed by statute to the remedy in a court of law, the remedy in a court of equity has, in analogous cases, been confined to the same period. (Marquis of Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Jac. & W., 151, and cases cited; Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Peters, 405; Smith v. Clay, 3 Bro. Ch., 640, per Lord Camden.)

In the case last cited the court says: “A court of equity, which is never active in relief against conscience or public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands where the party has slept upon his rights or acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting the court is passive and does nothing; laches and neglect are always discountenanced; and, therefore, from the beginning of this jurisdiction there was also a limitation of suit in this court.”

II. The plaintiff seeks to relieve his case from the embarrassment of antiquity, by alleging fraud and deceit on the part of the defendant.

The earlier authorities held that in cases of fraud the statute of limitations did not commence to run until the discovery of the fraud. This rule has been relaxed, and now the settled law of England and of this country seems to be, that in such cases the statute commences to run from the time when the fraud might have been discovered by the use of reasonable diligence. This rule is founded in reason. The law will not assist a man who is capable of taking care of his own interest, except in cases in which he has been imposed upon by deceit, against which ordinary precaution could not protect him. (Per Lord Winford, in the House of Lords; Blachford v. Christian, 1 Knapp, 77; 1 Story's Eq. Jur., secs. 236, 237.)

The plaintiff does not assign any reason why the discovery of the defect of title was not made, or could not have been made, sooner than the March Term, 1873, of the District Court of Harris county, nor could any be assigned. He had the records before him. There was nothing in the nature of the case to prevent a discovery, but everything facilitated it. An investigation of the records at any time within seventeen years would have shown it; and the failure to resort to so obvious a means can but be regarded as attributable solely to the plaintiff's own negligence. The discovery of a fact susceptible of being so readily ascertained ought to have been sooner made. The negligence of plaintiff in a case of this kind may put it out of the power of the defendant to have recourse upon his vendor, and to permit a recovery against him in an action after such a lapse of time might work an irreparable injury, which might have been avoided had a discovery been earlier made. (Smith v. Fly, 24 Tex., 353;Munson v. Hallowell, 26 Tex., 475;Ripley v. Withee, 27 Tex., 14;Hudson v. Wheeler, 34 Tex., 356.)

Admitting the fact that the plaintiff was an ignorant and illiterate man, we insist that the very slightest attention to his own interest, the most ordinary prudence which characterizes a man in his dealings with others would have induced him to have the records examined and the titled to the land investigated.

“It has been beautifully remarked, with respect to the emblem of Time, who is depicted as carrying a scythe and an hour-glass, that while with one he cuts down the evidence which might protect innocence, with the other he metes out the period when innocence can no longer be assailed.”

We respectfully submit that the demurrer and exceptions were properly sustained in the court below.

Frank W. Henderson, for appellant.--The only question, as I conceive, to determine, is whether plaintiff's demand was barred by the statute of limitations. I think not; for his cause of action did not arise until his eviction, March, 1873, and the statute of limitations began to run only from that time, a period within two years prior to the institution of this suit.

Where the elements of accident, fraud, mistake, undue influence, imposition, or surprise, and the like, enter into the case, a court of equity will grant relief, even where the relief sought is based upon a mistake of law. (1 Story's Eq. Jur., title MISTAKE, sec. 120.)

It is a well-established principle, that under circumstances of fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, imposition, inequality of the contracting parties, surprise, &c., the statute of limitations begins to run only from the date of the discovery; and in this case, besides alleging the above circumstances, plaintiff alleged that he did not know of the fraud and fraudulent representations that had been practiced upon him until the March Term, 1873, of the District...