Kumaran v. Nat'l Futures Ass'n

• Decision Date: 28 April 2023
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-3668,1:20-cv-3873-GHW,1:22-cv-8095-GHW
• Parties: SAMANTHA SIVA KUMARAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. SAMANTHA SIVA KUMARAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ADM INVESTOR SERVICES, INC., Defendant. SAMANTHA SIVA KUMARAN, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS R. KADLEC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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SAMANTHA SIVA KUMARAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

SAMANTHA SIVA KUMARAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ADM INVESTOR SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

SAMANTHA SIVA KUMARAN, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS R. KADLEC, Defendant.

Nos. 1:20-cv-3668, 1:20-cv-3873-GHW, 1:22-cv-8095-GHW

United States District Court, S.D. New York

April 28, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

In four cases now spread across two federal district courts, Samantha Kumaran and corporate entities that she controls have pursued-at length-claims against various defendants whom she alleges engaged in a comprehensive scheme to defraud her and others in the commodity futures market. This order responds to a total of six motions in three of those cases-Case Number 20-cv-3668 (the “3668 case”), Case Number 20-cv-3873 (the “3873 case”), and Case Number 22-cv-8095 (the “8095 case”).

In the 3668 case, Ms. Kumaran and Nefertiti Risk Capital Management LLC (“NRCM”) bring a motion for reconsideration for entry of judgment under Federal Rule 54(b), and for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) all related to this Court's prior order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants National Futures Associations (“NFA”), Tom Kadlec, Nicole Wahls, and Vilia Sutkus-Kiela. In the 3873 case, NRCM brings a motion for reconsideration of this Court's order mandating arbitration of its claims against Defendant ADM Investor Services, Inc. (“ADMIS”), while Nefertiti Asset Management, LLC (“NAM”) and Nefertiti Holding Corporation (“NHC,” and together with NAM, “Intervenors”) bring a motion for reconsideration of the Court's order denying intervention in that case. And in the 8095 case, Ms. Kumaran brings a motion to remand the case to state court or, in the alternative, to consolidate the case with the 3668 case.

For the reasons explained below, all of the motions in both the 3668 and 3873 cases are DENIED, and the motion to remand in the 8095 case is also DENIED-though the Court GRANTS Ms. Kumaran's alternative request to consolidate the 8095 case with the 3668 case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Southern District of New York Local Rule 6.3

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), within 28 days of an entry of judgment, a party may file “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment.” And Southern District of New York Local Rule 6.3 permits parties to, within 14 days of a court's order, file “a notice of motion for reconsideration or reargument” of that motion. “The standards set forth in both Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and Local Rule 6.3 are identical.” In re New York Comm. Bancorp, Inc., Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 156, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). To justify reconsideration, the moving party must be able “to point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Bartlett v. Tribeca Lending Corp., No. 18-cv-10279, 2019 WL 1595656, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2019) (noting that a party moving for reconsideration of a previous order must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it). “A motion to reconsider will not be granted where the moving party is merely trying to relitigate an already decided issue,” Padilla v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 636 F.Supp.2d 256, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), because “reconsideration of a previous order by the Court is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F.Supp.2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “The Second Circuit has stated that ‘[t]he standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied.'” Mahmud v. Kaufmann, 496 F.Supp.2d 266, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257) (alterations in original). Ultimately, “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within ‘the sound discretion of the district court.'” U.S. Bank Nat'lAss'n v. Triazz Asset Mgmt. LLC, 352 F.Supp.3d 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009)).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that, in specified circumstances, the Court may “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” “Relief under Rule 60(b) is generally not favored and is properly granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2010). Additionally, a “‘final order' within the meaning of the Rule ‘is one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.'” Abdell v. City of New York, 739 F.Supp.2d 450, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Nelson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 468 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); see also 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2852 & n.7 (3d ed. 2022) (collecting cases and noting that, after the 1948 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, only final orders are subject to Rule 60(b)).

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

In general, there is a “historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980). As a result, “in the federal district courts, the entry of a final judgment is generally appropriate ‘only after all claims have been adjudicated.'” Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, 642 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1991)). Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains an exception to this principle:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief-whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim-or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). To permit entry of final judgment on fewer than all claims, three elements must be satisfied:

(1) [there must be] multiple claims or multiple parties . . ., (2) at least one claim, or the rights and liabilities of at least one party, must be finally decided within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and (3) the district court must make “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay” and expressly direct the clerk to enter judgment.

Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation and emphasis omitted).

The “historic federal policy” noted above requires “that the court's power to enter such a final judgment before the entire case is concluded . . . be exercised sparingly.” Harriscom, 947 F.2d at 629. Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that “[a] certification under Rule 54(b) should be granted only if there are interests of sound judicial administration and efficiency to be served, or, in the infrequent harsh case,” where “there exists ‘some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.'” Id. (quoting Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987)).

Further, the Second Circuit has “repeatedly noted that the district court should not grant a Rule 54(b) certification if the same or closely related issues remain to be litigated” because “[i]t does not normally advance the interests of sound judicial administration or efficiency to have piecemeal appeals that require two (or more) three-judge panels to familiarize themselves with a given case in successive appeals from successive decisions on interrelated issues.” Novick, 642 F.3d at 311 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n light of the policy against piecemeal appeals, it is incumbent upon a party seeking immediate relief in the form of a Rule 54(b) judgment to show not only that the issues are sufficiently separable to avoid judicial inefficiency but also that the equities favor entry of such a judgment.” Id. at 314.

D. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), district courts may certify certain nonfinal orders to the court of appeals. But such certification is warranted only if (1) “[the] order involves a controlling question of law,” (2) “as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and (3) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) certification is thus “a rare exception to the final judgment rule” that “is reserved for those cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted litigation.” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1996); see also In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Secs. & Derivative Litig., 986 F.Supp.2d 524, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Interlocutory review [under § 1292(b)] is strictly reserved for exceptional cases and is especially rare in the early stages of litigation.”).

Moreover even if...