Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company
| Citation | 121 N.W. 830,18 N.D. 367 |
| Decision Date | 29 April 1909 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Rehearing June 12, 1909.
Appeal from District Court, Wells county; Edward T. Burke, J.
Action by George E. Kunkel and others against the Minneapolis, St Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Lee Combs, George K. Shaw, and Alfred H. Bright, for appellant.
One walking along a railroad track with the railroad company's invitation as others are permitted to so walk is a licensee, for whose injury recovery cannot be had unless caused wilfully or by negligence so gross as to imply wilfulness. Heiss v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 72 N.W 787; C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Tartt, 64 F. 823, 827; Johnson v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 125 Mass. 75; Wright v. B. & M. R. R. 129 Mass. 440; Wright v. B. & M. R. R., 142 Mass. 296, 300; Sutton v. N.Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 66 N.Y. 243; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Silas D. Parsons, 42 Ill.App.Ct. 93; Chenery v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 160 Mass. 211; 22 L. R. A. 575; Daniels v. N.Y. & N.E. R. R. Co., 13 L. R. A. 248; Sheehan v. St. P. & D. Ry. Co., 76 F. 201; Ward v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 25 Ore. 433; 36 P. 166; Richards v. C. St. P. & K C. Ry. Co., 81 Ia. 42; 47 N.W. 63; Lingenfelter v. Baltimore & C., 154 Ind. 49; Burg v. C. R. I. & P. Ry., 57 N.W. 680.
Conjecture is not evidence. Marvin et al. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 47 N.W. 1123; Megow v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 36 N.W. 1099; Searles v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 101 N.Y. 661; 5 N.E. 66; Grant v. Penn. & N.Y. Canal & Ry. Co., 133 N.Y. 657; 31 N.E. 220; Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N.Y. 202; 11 N.E. 647; Babcock v. Fitchburg Ry. 140 N.Y. 308, 319; 35 N.E. 596; Orth v. St. P. M. & M. Ry. Co., 50 N.W. 363; Thomas, Negligence, p. 582; The Nellie Flagg, 23 F. 671; Kaveny v. The City of Troy, 15 N.E. 726; Asbach v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co., 37 N.W. 182.
Where the facts and conditions show, that if one had stopped to look with the care that the law imposes, he could have seen the approaching train, the presumption that the injured person, being dead, did his duty, is overcome. P. H. West v. N. P. Ry., 13 N.D. 221; 100 N.W. 254; C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Houston, 24 U.S. 542; Shalto v. Erie Ry Co., 121 F. 678; Freeman v. N. P. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 763; C. R. I. & P. v. Still, 19 Ill. 508; C. & G. W. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 141, F. 930; Guhl v. Whitcomb, Recvr., 85 N.W. 142; Bertelson v. C., M. & St. P., 40 N.W. 531; Reynolds v. G. N. Ry. Co., 69 F. 809; Steves v. Oswego & Syracuse Ry. Co., 18 N.Y. 422; Durbin v. Oregon & Nav. Co. Ry., 17 P. 5, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Withers, 77 P. 542; Van Winkle v. N.Y. C. & St. L. Ry., 73 N.E. 157; Morford v. C. I. & L. Ry. 63 N.E. 857; Rollins v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 139 F. 639; Carleson v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co., 105 N.W. 555.
Where there are two ways, one safe the other hazardous, to choose the latter is negligence. Gulf & C. R. Co., v. Mathews. 15 Tex. Ct. Rep. 957; 93 S.W. 1068; Coy v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 96 P. 468.
J. J. Youngblood and George A. Bangs, for respondent.
If a railroad company permits the use of a path across its tract for years, it assumes the duty of reasonable care in the operation of its trains up to and over such track, including such signals and watchmen as might be reasonably necessary. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Connolly, 109 N.W. 368; Bishop v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 4 N.D. 536; 62 N.W. 605; Coulter v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., 5 N.D. 568; 67 N.W. 1046; Johnson v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., 7 N.D. 284; 75 N.W. 250; Reifsnyder v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 57 N.W. 692; Schindler v. Co., 49 N.W. 670; Barry v. Milwaukee L. & S. V. W. Ry. Co., 92 N.Y. 289; 13 A. & E. R. Cas. 615; Byrne v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 10 N.E. 539; Swift v. Staten Island R. T. R. Co. 123 N.Y. 645; 25 N.E. 378; Troy v. Cape Fear & Y. V. R. Co., 99 N.C. 298; 6 S.E. 77; 6 A. S. R. 521; 34 A. & E. R. Cas. 13; Harriman v. Pittsburg C. & L. R. Co., 45 Oh. St. 11; 12 N.E. 451; 4 A. S. R. 507; 32 A. & E. R. Cas. 307; Taylor v. Co., 8 A. 143; 57 A. R. 446; 28 A. & E. R. Cas. 656; Kay v. Co., 65 Pa. 269; 3 A. R. 628; O'Connor v. Co. 155 Mass. 52; 15 A. & E. R. Cas. 362; Co. v. Trautman (Pa.) 6 A. & E. R. Cas. 117; Kelly v. Southern Minn. R. Co., 28 Minn. 98; 9 N.W. 588; Indiana B. & W. Ry. Co., v. Barnhart, 16 N.E. 121.
Backing a train over a railroad crossing without signals where there are a fierce raging blizzard and flying snow is negligence.
Bailey v. Co., 107 Mass. 469; Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan. 426; Co. v. Proctor, 14 Kan. 37; McWilliams v. Co., 31 Mich. 274; Robinson v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 48 Cal. 409; Linfield v. Co., 10 Cush. 564; Co. v. Garry, 58 Ill. 85; Co. v. Ebert, 74 Ill. 399; Eaton v. Erie Railway Co., 51 N.Y. 544; Barry v. Co. 92 N.Y. 289; MaGinnis v. The New York C. & H. R. Ry. Co. 52 N.Y. 215; McGovern v. The N.Y. C. & H. R. Ry Co., 67 N.Y. 417; 2 Thompson on Negl., Sec. 1571.
The law presumes that one, who suffered death by a railroad accident was at the time of it in the exercise of due care. Cameron v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., 8 N.D. 124; 77 N.W. 1016; Co. v. Landrigan, 191 U.S. 461; Cooley on Torts (3rd Ed.) 1428, et seq; McWilliams v. Co., 31 Mich. 274; Tiepel v. Hilsendegen, 44 Mich. 462, 7 N.W. 82; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Morgan, 22 P. 995; Shaber v. St. Paul, Minn. & M. Ry. Co., 9 N.W. 575; Salter v. The Utica and Black River R. R. Co., 59 N.Y. 631; Mares v. N. P. R. Co., 3 Dak. 336, 21 N.W. 5; Johnson v. The Hudson River Ry. Co., 20 N.Y. 65, 75 A.D. 375; Co. v. Spike, 121 F. 44, 57 C. C. A. 384; Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co., 78 Mich. 271, 44 N.W. 270; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Nowicki, 46 Ill.App. 566; 148 Ill. 29; Schum v. Co., 107 Pa. 8, 52 A. R. 468; Cox v. Co., 123 N.C. 604, 31 S.E. 848; Cox v. Wilmington, 74 Pen. 162, 53 A. 569; C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gunderson, 174 Ill. 495, 51 N.E. 708; B. & O. S.W. Ry. Co. v. Then, 159 Ill. 535; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Fennimore, 99 Ill.App. 174, 199 Ill. 1, 64 N.E. 985; Steele v. N. P. Ry. Co., 57 P. 820; Dalton v. C. R. I. & P. Ry Co., 73 N.W. 349; Little v. Grand Rapids St. Ry. Co. 44 N.W. 137; Keim v. Co., 90 Mo. 314, 2 S.W. 427; 7 West. Rep. 144.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if it establish the probability of Plaintiff's theory. 1 Greenleaf on Ev. 13a; U. S. Y. Co., v. Conoyer, 59 N.W. 950; Affirming Same Case, 56 N.W. 1081; Co. v. Cox. (Tex.), 55 S.W. 354, re-hearing denied in 56 S.W. 97; Co. v. Kine (Tex.) 54 S.W. 240; Hughes v. Co., 104 Ky. 774, 48 S.W. 671; Norfolk Beet Sugar Co, v. Burnett, 75 N.W. 839; Duerst v. Co., 63 S.W. 827; Union Bridge Co. et al., v. Teehan, 60 N.E. 533.
CARMODY, J. ELLSWORTH and FISK, JJ., concur. MORGAN, C. J., not participating. SPALDING, J. (dissenting.)
This is an action brought by minor children, who are represented by a guardian, and by adult children to recover damages for the death of their father, Wm. A. Kunkel, whom it is claimed was negligently struck and fatally injured by one of defendant's trains. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and submitted the question of its liability to the jury. There was a verdict for plaintiffs, and judgment accordingly. The court denied defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thereupon judgment was duly entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant. From which judgment this appeal was taken.
The defendant's main track passes through the city of Fessenden in a general east and west course, the depot being situated on the north side thereof and about the center of the city. Next south of the main track is the passing track, and south of that the house track. The depot and most of the platform is situated between Fifth and Sixth avenues, which are located north of the track. The residence portion of the city is mostly northeast of the depot, and constitutes what is called the "North Side." The business portion of the city is mostly southwest and on the south side of defendant's tracks, and constitutes what is called "South Side." The streets of the city run east and west parallel with defendant's tracks and the avenues north and south. The highway running at right angles and about 125 feet west of defendant's depot is Fifth avenue and Maple avenue, one being a continuation of the other; the part north of the railroad tracks is called "Fifth Avenue," and the part south of said tracks is called "Maple Avenue." These two avenues are connected across defendant's tracks and right of way, and the crossing kept open. This is the main business street of the city. The depot grounds are 300 feet wide, and on either side running east and west is a street known as "Railway Street." About four or five years ago the road supervisor built a walk, bridge, or stile from the northeast or residence portion of the city nearly along the east line of Sixth avenue where the same intersects Railroad street, crossing a piece of low ground to the east end of the depot platform and mostly on defendant's right of way. It was mostly used by pedestrians passing between the depot and the residence portion of the city.
The public generally for several years previous to the time the accident occurred had traveled daily across and along the defendant's tracks or right of way in said city of Fessenden; the usual route being about as follows: From the east line of Sixth avenue where the same intersects Railroad street across the stile or bridge hereinbefore mentioned across the right of way to a point near the east end of the depot platform; thence west along the platform to some point west of the depot; thence diagonally across the tracks and depot grounds to the northeast corner of Maple avenue. Sometimes they would walk...
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