Cox v. Norfolk & C.R. Co.
Decision Date | 23 December 1898 |
Citation | 31 S.E. 848,123 N.C. 604 |
Parties | COX v. NORFOLK & C. R. CO. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, Halifax county; Norwood, Judge.
Action by J. S. Cox, administrator of N. L. Cox, against the Norfolk & Carolina Railroad Company. From a Judgment of Nonsuit plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Plaintiff sued to recover for the killing of his intestate on defendant's track. No one saw the accident, which occurred on a bright, moonlight night. A witness testified that he found the body of intestate about midnight, lying across the track; that he saw a train pass two hours before on defendant's road, but that he heard no bell or whistle, though only 200 yards from the train. Another testified that he examined the body as it lay on the track and that it was in the track, and near a public footpath that intestate could not go out of town in any way without crossing a railroad; that a person could easily be seen near the path, on the night of the accident, from the depot. An expert engineer testified that the body was found 250 feet from the depot; that there was no obstruction between the depot and the path; that, if a man was keeping a lookout, he could see a man on the track for 100 yards on a bright, moonlight night; that, if the train was moving 4 miles an hour, it could have been stopped in 15 feet, or, at 8 miles an hour, in 30 feet. The path was an old road before the town was laid off into streets, and had been used by foot passengers ever since. There was evidence that deceased had been drinking. It was admitted that intestate was killed by the train. Held sufficient to submit the question of negligence.
W. A. Dunn and Claude Kitchin, for appellant.
Thos. N. Hill, MacRae & Day, and David Bell, for appellee.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, as administrator of N. L. Cox, to recover damages for the negligent killing of his intestate by the defendant's engine. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, the defendant moved to nonsuit the plaintiff, under chapter 109 of the Laws of 1897. This is the act that has already given us so much trouble. It was doubtless intended by the legislature to save time and expense by cutting short an action devoid of merit, but its practical result is the very opposite. It gives the defendant two chances to one for the plaintiff, prolongs litigation, and may cause a palpable miscarriage of justice. As stated in Purnell v. Railroad Co., 122 N.C. 832, 835, 29 S.E. 953: --citing Sugg v. Watson, 101 N.C. 188, 7 S.E. 709. Now, however, the defendant, if his motion is overruled, can file his exception, and proceed with the case. In passing upon that exception, we would be compelled to ignore all the subsequent proceedings, including the additional evidence, the verdict, and the judgment. If we sustained the exception, the plaintiff must be nonsuited, even if the subsequent evidence of the defendant himself should show the plaintiff clearly entitled to recovery. If we overruled the exception, we must then proceed to review the case upon its merits. Thus, there would be practically two appeals, in one of which we might be compelled to nonsuit a plaintiff who had obtained a just judgment. We do not intend to criticise the legislature, but simply to call attention to the fact that the law in practical operation does not meet the public purposes of its enactment. While doing so, we still deem it our duty to enforce it.
The case as now before us presents the single question whether there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff's evidence must, for the present purpose, be accepted as true, and construed in the light most favorable for him. Avera v. Sexton, 35, N.C. 247; Hathaway v. Hinton, 46 N.C. 243; State v. Allen, 48 N.C. 257; Abernathy v. Stowe, 92 N.C. 213; Gibbs v. Lyon, 95 N.C. 146; Springs v. Schenck, 99 N.C. 551, 6 S.E. 405; Hodges v. Railroad Co., 120 N.C. 555, 27 S.E. 128; Collins v. Swanson, 121 N.C. 67, 28 S.E. 65; Cable v. Railroad Co., 122 N.C. 892, 29 S.E. 377; Whitley v. Railroad Co., 122 N.C. 987, 29 S.E. 783; Railroad Co. v. Lowell, 151 U.S. 209, 14 S.Ct. 281. It is well settled that, if there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence tending to prove the plaintiff's contention, it must be submitted to the jury, who alone can pass upon the weight of the evidence. State v. Shule, 32 N.C. 153; State v. Allen, 48 N.C. 257; Wittkowsky v. Wason, 71 N.C. 451; Spruill v. Insurance Co., 120 N.C. 141, 27 S.E. 39; Hardison v. Railroad Co., 120 N.C. 492, 20 S.E. 630; Anniston Nat. Bank v. School Committee of Durham, 121 N.C. 107, 28 S.E. 134; White v. Railroad Co., 121 N.C. 484, 27 S.E. 1002; Collins v. Swanson, supra; Eller v. Church, 121 N.C. 269, 28 S.E. 364; Cable v. Railroad Co., supra.
Applying these principles, we find the following evidence, which we think is certainly more than a scintilla, and which should have been submitted to the jury as tending to prove the negligence of the defendant. No one saw the killing, nor does it appear how long the deceased had been killed when found. Thomas Griffin testified: James Sills testified that P. E. Smith, admitted to be an expert engineer, testified: The witness was asked: "Would the manner in which this road was curved around prevent you from seeing him?" The witness answered: On the redirect examination, he stated that, "if the train were moving at a speed of 3 or 4 miles an hour, it could have been stopped in 15 feet; if 8 miles an hour, in double that distance." The plaintiff testified that the deceased was his brother, and he got some gentlemen on Monday night, and went out there, and R. M. Quidly testified that ...
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