Kuntz v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 30 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00767-SHR-GBC |
| Parties | JASON KUNTZ, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE RAMBO)
The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant") denying the application of Jason Kuntz ("Plaintiff") for supplemental security income ("SSI") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§401-433, 1382-1383 (the "Act"), and Social Security Regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§404 et seq., 416 et seq. (the "Regulations").1 The Court reviews the ALJ's decision under the deferential substantial evidence standard. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence supports theALJ decision unless no "reasonable mind might accept [the relevant evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal citations omitted). "Stated differently, this standard is met if there is sufficient evidence 'to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.'" Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)). Plaintiff reported disability as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome and spine impairments, but underwent surgery for both within six months of his alleged onset date, and stopped receiving follow-up treatment within one month of his surgeries. Doc. 10. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have included mental health limitations, but the only medical opinion regarding mental indicated that the limitations were non-severe, Plaintiff did not receive treatment from a mental health specialist during the relevant period, and mental status examinations were normal. Doc. 10. Plaintiff asserts remand is necessary to consider his sleep apnea, but does not allege any specific limitations that arose out of his sleep apnea. Doc. 10. Plaintiff reported sleepiness due to sleep apnea in July of 2012, and within a month he had undergone a sleep study and been prescribed a CPAP titration machine. Doc. 10. The record contains no subsequent complaints. Doc. 10. The ALJ relied on a lack of objective medical evidence, including two medical opinions supporting the RFC, and Plaintiff's conservative treatment beginning seven months after the alleged onset date to find that Plaintiff could perform a range of sedentary work on a regular and continuing basis despite degenerative disc disease and diabetes. Doc. 10. The Court would not direct averdict in Plaintiff's favor. The Court recommends that Plaintiff's appeal be denied, the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed, and the case closed.
On October 22, 2012, Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB. (Tr. 130-41). On February 11, 2013, the Bureau of Disability Determination denied these applications, (Tr. 75-100) and Plaintiff requested a hearing. (Tr. 113-14). On November 12, 2013, an ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff—who was represented by an attorney—and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (Tr. 46-73). On November 27, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled and not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 8-27). Plaintiff requested review with the Appeals Council (Tr. 6-7), which the Appeals Council denied on April 1, 2015, thereby affirming the decision of the ALJ as the "final decision" of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-5). See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).
On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to appeal the decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 1). June 30, 2015, the Commissioner filed an answer and administrative transcript of proceedings. (Docs. 9, 10). On July 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the appeal ("Pl. Brief"). (Doc. 11). On August 10, 2015, Defendant filed a brief in response ("Def. Brief"). (Doc. 12). August 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief in reply ("Pl. Reply"). (Doc. 13). On September 10, 2015, the case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. The matter is now ripe for review.
To receive DIB or SSI, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act requires that a claimant for disability benefits show that he has a physical or mental impairment of such a severity that:
He is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner uses a five-step evaluation process to determine if a person is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If the Commissioner finds that a Plaintiff is disabled or not disabled at any point in the sequence, review does not proceed. Id. The Commissioner must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment from 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("Listing"); (4) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant'simpairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. Id. Before step four, the ALJ must also determine Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). Id.
The disability determination involves shifting burdens of proof. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the claimant's abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. See Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). The ultimate burden of proving disability within the meaning of the Act lies with the claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Specifically, the Act provides that:
An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require. An individual's statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all evidence required to be furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings), would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a disability.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i).
When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, the Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the denial. Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is a deferential standard ofreview. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence is "less than a preponderance" and "more than a mere scintilla." Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). "Stated differently, this standard is met if there is sufficient evidence 'to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.'" Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)).
Plaintiff was born in 1973 and was classified by the Regulations as a younger individual throughout the relevant period. (Tr. 22); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563. Plaintiff has at least a high school education and past relevant work as a ground maintenance worker, plastics production worker, and laborer in gutters construction. (Tr. 22). Plaintiff alleges onset on March 15, 2012. (Tr. 13). Plaintiff earned enough income to be insured2 through December 31, 2017. (Tr. 13). In connection with his application for benefits,Plaintiff reported and testified that he would be unable to work on a regular and continuing basis because he would need to take additional breaks to lay down throughout the day, had problems sleeping, had decreased concentration due to pain, blurred vision, and decreased interest and energy. (Tr. 48-65; 171-81).
Plaintiff alleges onset on May 15, 2012. (Tr. 13). On May 7, 2012, Plaintiff presented to primary care provider Dr. Kenneth Varano, D.O., with complaints of a swollen eye and hand pain. (Tr. 312). Plaintiff denied blurred vision....
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