Kuria v. BMLRW, LLLP

• Decision Date: 05 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1D12–0592.,1D12–0592.
• Citation: 101 So.3d 425
• Parties: Monica KURIA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Freddie Smith, III, Appellant, v. BMLRW, LLLP, a Florida limited partnership, Flagship Property Management, Inc., a Florida corporation, and BMLRW Manager, Inc, a corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

101 So.3d 425

Monica KURIA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Freddie Smith, III, Appellant,

v.BMLRW, LLLP, a Florida limited partnership, Flagship Property Management, Inc., a Florida corporation, and BMLRW Manager, Inc, a corporation, Appellees.

No. 1D12–0592.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 5, 2012.

Richard A. Staggard of Farah & Farah, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Wm. J. Sheppard, Elizabeth L. White, Matthew R. Kachergus, and Bryan E. DeMaggio of Sheppard, White & Kachergus, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee BMLRW, LLP; Diane G. Cassaro of Stone, Glass & Connolly, LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellees.

WOLF, J.

In this appeal of a final summary judgment order, appellant (Personal Representative of the Estate of Freddie Smith, III) challenges the trial court's finding that section 768.075(4), Florida Statute (2007), shields property owners from liability in a negligence action for injury to a person who is committing a felony on the property without requiring any “causal nexus” between the felony and the injury. Based on the plain language of the statute, we affirm.¹

On January 4, 2008, Freddie Smith, III, while at an apartment complex owned and operated by the Appellees, was engaged in the commission of operating a “chop shop” in violation of section 812.16, Florida Statutes, and dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.019, Florida Statutes, both felonies. Mr. Smith was fatally shot at the apartment complex. His estate subsequently brought a negligence action alleging that the Appellees failed to provide adequate security measures and that those failures were a direct and proximate cause of Mr. Smith's death.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the basis of section 768.075(4), Florida Statutes, which provides:

A person or organization owning or controlling an interest in real property, or an agent of such person or organization, shall not be held liable for negligence that results in the death of, injury to, or damage to a person who is attempting to commit a felony or who is engaged in the commission of a felony on the property.

Appellant challenges the trial court's order, arguing that the Legislature intended to provide liability protection only in those cases where the person's injury arose out of the commission of the felony despite the plain language of the statute itself. For support, Appellant points to the title of the enacting general law which describes the provision in relevant part as “amending s. 768.075, F.S.; ... providing immunity from certain liability arising out of the attempt to commit or the commission of a felony.” Ch. 99–225, Laws of Fla.

The standard of review on an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000). Statutory interpretation is a question of law and also subject to de novo review. GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla.2007).

Appellant asks this court to look beyond the face of the statute and infer a legislative intent contrary to the plain language of ...