Kurn v. Reese. Adm'x.
Decision Date | 12 January 1943 |
Docket Number | Case Number: 29456 |
Citation | 1943 OK 15,133 P.2d 880,192 Okla. 78 |
Parties | KURN et al. v. REESE. Adm'x. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 MASTER AND SERVANT - Recovery under Federal Employers' Liability Act for death of railroad engineer barred where caused by his disobedience of standing rule of railroad.
A railroad engineer who, while operating his train, disobeys specific standing rules of his employer and is injured as a result thereof, is guilty of primary negligence, and no recovery can be had for such injury under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U. S. C. A. §§ 51-60).
Appeal from District Court, Garfield County; J. W. Bird, Judge.
Action to recover damages for wrongful death under Federal Employers' Liability Act by Pearl C. Reese, administratrix of the estate of Howard Reese, against J. M. Kurn et al., trustees of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.
J. W. Jamison, of St. Louis, Mo., and Cruce, Satterfield & Grigsby, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.
Ratner, McAlister & Mattox, of Parsons, Kan., and Simons, McKnight, Simons, Mitchell & McKnight, of Enid, for defendant in error.
¶1 This is an action for wrongful death prosecuted pursuant to the Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 51-60.
¶2 The deceased was a 1ocomotive engineer in the employment of the defendant railroad company. He drove his engine into defendant's railway yards at Winfield, Kan., and collided with the rear end of a train standing on the main line. His death resulted.
¶3 Certain allegations of negligence were directed at the crew in charge of the train ahead, but the cause was submitted to the jury wholly on the question of the comparative negligence of the deceased and that of his fellow servant, the fireman, as alleged in the respective pleadings of the parties. In this respect the plaintiff charged that the fireman was negligent in not maintaining a proper lookout, and in not warning the deceased of the presence of the train ahead, while defendant charged that the accident was the proximate result of deceased's own negligence in not obeying certain specific rules directly applicable in the particular case.
¶4 Judgment for $3,750 was rendered on the verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, charging error in the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict.
¶5 In actions of this general character the employee cannot recover if his injury is attributable wholly to his own act, but recovery is not barred by his contributory negligence. If the injury results in whole or in part from the negligence of another of the defendant's employees, the defendant is liable under the express terms of the act. The act not only abolished the fellow servant rule, but provides that the contributory negligence of the injured employee "shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee." Illinois Central Ry. Co. V. Skaggs, 240 U. S. 66, 36 S. Ct. 249, 60 L. Ed. 528. The inquiry, then, in the ordinary case is whether there was neglect on the part of the employer, and if the injury resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of another of its employees, the defendant is liable. Id.
¶6 Plaintiff concedes no act of negligence on the part of her intestate, but takes the position that the verdict is fully supported by the evidence of negligence on the part of the fireman, and is unassailable in view of the instructions whereby the question of the negligence of both the deceased and the fireman was left to the jury under the statute and general rule stated above.
¶7 On the other hand, the defendant says that due to the particular facts and circumstances of this case, it does not fall within the scope of the act permitting recovery for the negligence of a fellow employee notwithstanding the contributory negligence of the injured party. It is contended that the act of the deceased in violating a specific rule of the defendant company with reference to the mode of operation of the engine while within the yard limits constituted negligence and the sole and proximate cause of the accident, and sufficient to defeat the action; that under the evidence the question was one of law and should not have been submitted to the jury. Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U. S. 147, 45 S. Ct. 33, 69 L. Ed. 212. The company rule in question reads as follows:
¶8 It is admitted for the purpose of this appeal that the deceased engineer was operating under the above rule at the time of the accident. After entering the yards at Winfield his duty at all times was to drive his engine in such a manner as to be prepared to stop unless he knew or could see that the main track was clear.
¶9 In agreement with the statute, above, and the federal decisions, by which we are bound, the inquiry here is whether the evidence showed negligence of such character on the part of the fireman that the injury may be said to have resulted "in whole or in part" therefrom.
¶10 On the day of the accident the train on which the deceased was engineer entered the yards at Winfield on the main line from the south. The track at that point forms an S curve, making it impossible for the engineer and fireman to see any considerable distance ahead at any given time. It is readily seen that the view of the two men was alternately restricted as the train proceeded along the track. It was charged and proved that the fireman failed to keep a constant lookout ahead, and did not see the train standing on the main line until too late to permit a stop. The verdict is based upon this alleged negligence.
¶11 In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and many of the different Circuit Courts of Appeals, we must hold that the accident did not result in whole or in part from the acts of the fireman as aforesaid within the meaning of the statute.
¶12 In Van Derveer v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 84 Fed. 2d 979, the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the syllabus read as follows:
¶13 In the body of the opinion the following language is found:
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...in violation of his work rules was primary negligence, barring recovery. The defendant cites and relies on the case of Kurn v. Reese, Admr., 192 Okl. 78, 133 P.2d 880. This case is distinguishable and not controlling under the facts in the present case. In the cited case the plaintiff was t......
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