Kuvin v. Kuvin
| Decision Date | 08 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 62151,62151 |
| Citation | 442 So.2d 203 |
| Parties | Lawrence P. KUVIN, Petitioner, v. Kristina KUVIN, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
R. Fred Lewis of Magill, Reid & Lewis, Miami, for petitioner.
Sam Daniels of Daniels & Hicks, Miami, for respondent.
The husband petitions for review of Kuvin v. Kuvin, 412 So.2d 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), asserting that the decision conflicts with several of this Court's decisions, including Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The parties' twelve-year marriage produced two children, aged eleven and four. The husband, an attorney, was forty-seven at the time of the dissolution. The wife, aged thirty-six, did not work outside the home during the marriage except for a period of a year and a half before the birth of the second child.
The trial judge was presented with evidence that the wife could earn $250 a week as a legal secretary and had a $200 monthly income from farm property. The husband's net income was approximately $49,500, or $4,121.60 a month. The marital home was valued at approximately $213,000, with a $35,000 first mortgage and payments including taxes of $590 a month. The parties owned property in Colorado with $25,000 equity. The wife had separate savings of approximately $18,000, and there was a little under $7,000 in joint bank accounts.
The final judgment ordered a sale of the marital home, with equal division of the proceeds between the parties subject to the wife's receiving $20,000 from the husband's share as lump-sum alimony. The wife was also to receive most of the furniture as partial lump-sum alimony. The Colorado property was ordered sold, with the proceeds divided. The husband was ordered to pay $950 monthly in child support, $1,000 monthly for three years as rehabilitative alimony, and the balance owed on a home improvement loan. The wife appealed the award of rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony and the ordered sale of the marital home. The district court reversed on both points.
The reversal of the rehabilitative alimony award appears to elevate to a rule of law the proposition that a rehabilitable wife who is awarded custody of minor children and who desires to forego rehabilitation and remain at home has a right to do so if her former husband can afford to support her. In the words of the district court:
Mr. Kuvin maintained the home and approved his wife's role as wife and mother [during the marriage]. We see no reason to require Mrs. Kuvin to leave the home and children solely to gain support when Mr. Kuvin is well able to support Mrs. Kuvin and their children while the children are minors. Should Mrs. Kuvin decide to return to the labor market, the court may adjust the alimony upon application [3d DCA citations omitted].
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It is obvious that the legislature has never enacted laws requiring mothers of young children to work outside the home, either during marriage or upon its dissolution, when a husband is able to support his family. Mr. Kuvin approved his wife's decision to fulfill her obligations at home during the marriage, and he is able to continue to provide for his family. We therefore see no reason to order Mrs. Kuvin to seek outside employment.
Kuvin, 412 So.2d at 901-02. The husband's ability to support the wife is only part of the test. It is the role of the trial court to make a determination based not only on the ability of the husband, but also on the need of the wife and the best interests of the parties. As we said in Canakaris,
[t]he two primary elements to be considered when determining permanent periodic alimony are the needs of one spouse for the funds and the ability of the other spouse to provide the necessary funds. The criteria to be used in establishing this need include the parties' earning ability, age, health, education, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed during its course and the value of the parties' estates.
When a trial court awards rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony, it is a reflection of the court's optimism concerning the likelihood of future rehabilitation. ...
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