Kuykendall v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 07 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 9:20-CV-00221-TH |
| Parties | JAMES SAMUEL KUYKENDALL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Plaintiff, James Samuel Kuykendall (“Kuykendall”) requests judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration with respect to his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. This action is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review hearing if necessary, and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.[1] The undersigned finds that the administrative law judge's decision lacks reversible error and is supported by substantial evidence, and therefore recommends affirming the decision denying benefits.
United States district courts may review decisions of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. 42 U.S.C § 405 (2018). The scope of judicial review is limited, however, to determining whether (a) the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and (b) the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). When the Commissioner applies proper law and his decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Reviewing courts, therefore, give the Commissioner's decisions great deference. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. Courts may not re-weigh evidence, try issues de novo, or substitute their judgments for those of the Commissioner. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1995). A court cannot reverse the Commissioner simply because the court might have decided the case differently in the first instance. Elfer v. Texas Workforce Commission, 169 Fed.Appx. 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2006); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995) (). Rather, it is for the Commissioner to weigh evidence and resolve conflicts. See Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295; Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990).
When the Commissioner fails to apply correct principles of law, or when “substantial evidence”[2] does not support the Commissioner's decision, the governing statute authorizes a reviewing court to enter, upon the pleadings and the transcript of the record, a judgment modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. See 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Thus, courts have power to remand for further administrative proceedings, or they may direct the Commissioner to award benefits without a rehearing. Ordinarily, courts remand for further administrative proceedings to address and cure deficiencies. See, e.g., Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir. 2000).
Kuykendall filed his application for Disability Insurance Benefits in April 2019, alleging he had been unable to work since June 28, 2012.[3] (Tr. 14, 150-51.) Kuykendall submitted a disability report to the agency on or about June 11, 2019, and listed the following conditions: migraine headaches, a lumbar spine problem, sciatica, kidney disease, diabetes mellitus, high blood pressure, sleep apnea, depression, a breathing problem, and high cholesterol.[4] (Tr. 169.) The Disability Determination Services (DDS) for the State of Texas denied Kuykendall's application initially and on reconsideration (concluding that the medical evidence in file is insufficient to establish diagnosis prior to date of last insured), and Kuykendall requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 66-81, 95-96.) Represented by legal counsel, Kuykendall appeared and testified at the hearing before ALJ William Sharp on April 28, 2020. (Tr. 31-65.) A vocational expert also appeared and testified at the hearing. (Tr. 56-64.) On June 2, 2020, ALJ Sharp issued the decision finding that Kuykendall had not been disabled on or before December 31, 2018 (his date of last insured (“DLI”)).[5] Kuykendall requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council, which was denied, thereby prompting this appeal. (Tr. 2-5.)
Kuykendall was 48 years old at the time of his alleged onset of disability and was 55 years old when his Title II insured status expired. (Tr. 23, 39, 150, 195, 207.) He was self-employed as a swimming pool cleaner, at least through October 2013. (Tr. 16, 23, 36, 160.) This work constitutes “past relevant work.”
As a threshold matter, ALJ Sharp determined that Kuykendall last met the insured status requirements of the Act on December 31, 2018. (Tr. 16.) He utilized the five-step sequential analysis model specified by regulations and approved by courts in reaching his decision denying Kuykendall's application.[6] At Step One, ALJ Sharp determined that Kuykendall engaged in substantial gainful activity from June 28, 2012 through October 31, 2013, but there was a continuous 12-month period after October 31, 2013 when he did not engage in substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 16.) At Step Two, ALJ Sharp found that Kuykendall had degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with sciatica, headaches, diabetes mellitus, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, depression and an adjustment disorder that were “severe,” meaning that these impairments interfered or would be expected to interfere with his ability to work for a twelve-month period (duration requirement). (Tr. 15, 16); see Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Relevant to the points of error raised by Kuykendall, ALJ Sharp determined that his left foot bunion was not a “severe” impairment. (Tr. 17.) ALJ Sharp determined at Step Three that Kuykendall's impairments were not presumptively disabling because they did not meet or equal the severity criteria of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Listings). (Tr. 17.) At Step Four, ALJ Sharp assessed Kuykendall's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determined he could perform the exertional demands of medium work, including:
(Tr. 20); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). ALJ Sharp determined that Kuykendall's capacity for medium work was further restricted, in that he:
(Tr. 20.) Consequently, ALJ Sharp determined that Kuykendall could not perform his past relevant work as a swimming pool cleaner. (Tr. 23.) However, at Step Five, relying on the vocational expert's identification of representative occupations that an individual with Kuykendall's vocational profile and RFC could perform, he determined that Kuykendall was not disabled because there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he could perform (hand packager, warehouse worker, and/or dietary aide). (Tr. 23-25.)
Kuykendall is proceeding pro se in this case. Therefore, the undersigned ordered the Commissioner to file the initial brief regarding any potential issues on appeal. The brief analyzes ALJ Sharp's findings at each step and asserts that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Kuykendall was not disabled prior to his DLI. (Doc. No. 19.)
Kuykendall filed his response brief claiming that certain medical evidence was not properly considered by ALJ Sharp. Namely, the disabling effect of his West Nile Virus diagnosed in 2012, “Hashimotos” diagnosed in 2019, dizziness, “breathing issues,” chronic migraines, and “big toe fusion.” He also disputes ALJ Sharp's finding that he can engage in physical heavy lifting with frequent walking, bending, stooping, and stair climbing. (Doc. No. 23, p. 3.)
Kuykendall filed this federal action pro se, which imposes an additional layer of consideration for the court. As this and other courts have recognized, a lay plaintiff is unfamiliar with legal terms of art such as “substantial evidence” and lacks expertise in the rules governing Social Security regulations. See Lockridge v Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-4135-BN, 2014 WL 1255745, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2014); Washington v. Barnhart, 413 F.Supp.2d 784, 791 (E.D. Tex. 2006). Moreover, no statute, regulation, or court decision prescribes a precise analytical model for pro se actions...
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