L. C. v. United States
| Decision Date | 20 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 5:21-cv-00124-GFVT |
| Parties | L.C., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant United States' motion to dismiss Plaintiff L.C.'s assault and battery claims and negligent confinement claim. [R. 26.] For the reasons set forth herein, the United States' motion to dismiss will be GRANTED.
In portions of 2019 and 2020, Plaintiff L.C. was an inmate at the Federal Medical Center, Lexington. [R. 1 at 6.] While at another facility, L.C. completed the majority of her required Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). Id. L.C. was informed that to complete the RDAP program, she would be required to complete the “Aftercare” portion of the program at FMC Lexington. Id. L.C.'s Aftercare class, which began in August 2019, was taught by Defendant Hosea Lee. Id. Mr. Lee was a BOP employee who worked in the Psychology Services Department as an RDAP instructor at FMC Lexington. Id. at 2.
During the Aftercare class, L.C. alleges that Mr. Lee began giving her “inordinate and inappropriate attention, ” including making sexual remarks and comments. Id. at 7. Between August and October 2019, Mr. Lee sexually assaulted L.C. in his office closet, allegedly raping her on at least three occasions and forcing her to perform oral sex upon him at least twice. Id. at 8-9. L.C alleges that she did not report Mr. Lee's actions because she feared retribution. Id. at 10.
On Friday, November 22, 2019, an inmate at FMC Lexington reported to a BOP employee that Mr. Lee had made inappropriate sexual comments to her following her graduation from the RDAP program. [R. 28-3 at 2, 4.] That same day another inmate also informed a BOP employee that Mr. Lee had been “bringing packages of cigarettes to inmates for sexual favors.” Id. at 11. The BOP began an investigation, and on November 25, Mr. Lee was banned from FMC Lexington and informed that “an allegation of misconduct ha[d] been made against [him].” Id. at 9.
As part of the investigation, L.C. was interviewed and stated under oath that she had only met with Mr. Lee on one brief occasion, that she had “never been sexually involved with Lee in any way, ” and that she did not think Mr Lee was the “type of person who would do something inappropriate with an inmate.” [Id. at 13; see also R. 1 at 10.] On January 15, 2020, Mr. Lee resigned from his position, and two days later, L.C. admitted that Mr. Lee had sexually abused her. [R. 1 at 10; R. 28-2 at 7.] In February 2020, L.C. was transferred to a different facility for a couple of months before returning to FMC Lexington. [R. 1 at 10; R. 28-2 at 7.]
On May 8, 2021, L.C. filed this suit in federal court and brought (1) an Eighth Amendment claim against Mr. Lee; (2) assault and battery claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act; and (3) a negligence claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. [R. 1 at 12-17.] The United States filed a motion to dismiss on September 10, 2021, specifically asking the Court to dismiss L.C.'s assault and battery claims and the negligent confinement portion of the negligence claim. [R. 26.] L.C. responded on October 1, and the United States replied on October 15.[1] [R. 29; R. 30.]
The United States is seeking to dismiss L.C.'s assault and battery claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and L.C.'s negligent confinement claim under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [R. 26 at 4.] Rule 12(b)(1) “provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” and challenges “the sufficiency of the pleading itself (facial attack) or the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction (factual attack).” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 598 (6th Cir. 1994)).
A facial attack “goes to the question of whether the plaintiff has alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, and the court takes the allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(1) analysis.” Id. “A ‘factual attack,' by contrast, is advanced when the movant contests the alleged jurisdictional facts by introducing evidence outside the pleadings.” Gaetano v. United States, 994 F.3d 501, 505 (6th Cir. 2021). With a factual attack, Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “In its review, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts.” Id. (citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990)). “An assertion of sovereign immunity constitutes a factual attack on the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.” B.A. v. United States, 2021 WL 4768248, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 12, 2021) (citing CHS/Community Health Sys. v. Med. Univ. Hosp. Auth., 2021 WL 96404, at *2-3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2021)); see also Durham v. Martin, 388 F.Supp.3d 919, 929 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) () (citing Hornberger v. Tenn., 782 F.Supp.2d 561, 564 (M.D. Tenn. 2011)).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The Court, however, “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (quoting Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court explained that in order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Courier v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Products, 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009).
Moreover, the facts that are pleaded must rise to the level of plausibility, not just possibility; “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability ... stop[ ] short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 557). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The United States must waive sovereign immunity before it can be sued. Milligan v. United States, 670 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2012). The Federal Tort Claims Act, “was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort.” Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 506 (2013) (citing Richards v United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962)).
“The Act gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for ‘injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission' of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)) (emphasis added). “The extent of governmental tort liability is ‘determined in accordance with the law of the state where the event giving rise to liability occurred.'” Milligan, 670 F.3d at 692 (quoting Young v. United States, 71 F.3d 1238, 1241 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Under Kentucky law, “the focus is consistently on the purpose or motive of the employee in determining whether he or she was acting within the scope of employment.” O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 383 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Papa Jon's Int'l v. McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44, 56 (Ky. 2008)). An intentional tort committed by the employee may be within the scope of his or her employment if “its purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the master's business.” Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Ky. 2005). “[T]o be within the scope of employment, the conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized.” Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky. 2000). B.A., 2021 WL 4768248, at *2.
The United States argues that L.C.'s “claims for assault and battery (and retaliation)[2] are not covered by the FTCA because they were not committed by an employee acting within the scope of his employment.” [R. 26 at 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)).] If this is true, then the United States is covered by sovereign immunity. L.C. responded that Mr. Lee's actions were within the scope of his employment under Kentucky law.[3]
The recent decision in B.A. v. United States is persuasive. B.A. filed suit against the United States and BOP Officer Brian Goodwin for claims that arose from an alleged sexual assault that occurred while she was housed at FMC Lexington. B.A., 2021 WL 4768248, at *1. The United States filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was “protected by sovereign immunity because the alleged sexual assault did not occur within the scope of Defendant Goodwin's employment.” Id. The court agreed, granting the motion to dismiss “because the alleged sexual assault was not within the scope of Goodwin's...
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