L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. J.E. (In re Alexandria P.)
Decision Date | 15 August 2014 |
Docket Number | B252999 |
Citation | 228 Cal.App.4th 1322,176 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | IN RE ALEXANDRIA P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.E., Defendant and Respondent; R.P., et al., Objectors and Appellants; Choctaw Tribe of Oklahoma, Intervener and Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent and Child, § 535.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Amy M. Pellman, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. (No. CK58667)
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, Lori Alvino McGill; Latham & Watkins, Pamela S. Palmer, Los Angeles, Stephanie N. Grace, San Diego, Ming M. Zhu, Menlo Park, for Objectors and Appellants.
Covington & Burling, Mark W. Mosier, David Schraub, Richard A. Jones, San Francisco, for Professor Joan Hollinger, Northern California Association of Counsel for Children, and Advokids as amici curiae on behalf of Objectors and Appellants.
John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Law Offices of Joanne Willis Newton and Joanne Willis Newton, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
Christopher Blake, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for minor Alexandria P.
Melissa L. Middleton for Intervener and Respondent.
This case involves the placement preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).1 At issue is whether the dependency court properly applied the ICWA in finding that the foster parents of an Indian child failed to prove good cause to deviate from the ICWA's adoptive placement preferences.
A 17–month–old Indian child was removed from the custody of her mother, who has a lengthy substance abuse problem and has lost custody of at least six other children, and her father, who has an extensive criminal history and has lost custody of one other child. The girl's father is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe, and the girl is considered an Indian child under the ICWA. The tribe consented to the girl's placement with a non-Indian foster family to facilitate efforts to reunify the girl with her father. The girl lived in two foster homes before she was placed with de facto parents at the age of two. She bonded with the family and has thrived for the past two and a half years.
After reunification efforts failed, the father, the tribe, and the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) recommended that the girl be placed in Utah with a non-Indian couple who are extended family of the father. De facto parents argued good cause existed to depart from the ICWA's adoptive placement preferences and it was in the girl's best interests to remain with de facto family. The child's court-appointed counsel argued that good cause did not exist. The court ordered the girl placed with the extended family in Utah after finding that de facto parents had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was a certainty the child would suffer emotional harm by the transfer.
De facto parents appeal from the placement order, raising constitutional challenges to the ICWA, which we hold they lack standing to assert. De facto parents also contend that the ICWA's adoptive placement preferences do not apply when the tribe has consented to a child's placement outside of the ICWA's foster care placement preferences. We disagree with their interpretation of the statutory language. De facto parents further contend the court erroneously applied the clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than preponderance of the evidence, a contention we reject based upon the overwhelming authority on the issue. Finally, de facto parents contend the court erroneously interpreted the good cause exception to the ICWA's adoptive placement preferences as requiring proof of a certainty that the child would suffer emotional harm if placed with the Utah couple, and failed to consider the bond between Alexandria and her foster family, the risk of detriment if that bond was broken, and Alexandria's best interests. We agree with this last contention and reverse the placement order because the court's error was prejudicial.
For clarity, we set forth the parties before turning to the facts and procedural history. The Indian child's name is Alexandria. De facto parents, Rusty and Summer P., are appellants seeking to reverse the placement order. The P.s are supported by amici curiae Joan Hollinger, Northern California Association of Counsel for Children, and Advokids, which filed a joint brief in support of reversal. Alexandria argues we should affirm the order directing her pre-adoptive placement with Ginger and Ken R., her extended family in Utah. Alexandria's father, the Department, and the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (tribe) have all filed briefs in support of affirmance as well.
Alexandria's mother is not Indian, has a history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine abuse, and lost custody of at least six other children before Alexandria was born. Alexandria's father, an enrolled member of the tribe,2 has a history of substance abuse and an extensive criminal history. He lost custody of Alexandria's older half-sister, Anna, an enrolled member of the tribe who currently lives in Los Angles with paternal step-grandfather, her adoptive parent. Alexandria is 1/64th Choctaw and meets the statutory definition of an Indian child.3
Alexandria was detained from her parents and placed with a foster family when she was 17 months old, based on concerns about her parents' ability to care for her in light of their histories of substance abuse, child welfare referrals, and criminal activity. Alexandria reportedly was moved to a different foster family after suffering a black eye and a scrape on the side of her face. 4 The P.s were Alexandria's third foster care placement, initially arranged in December 2011 as a “respite care” placement 5 that evolved into a long-term foster care placement. The P.s were aware that Alexandria was an Indian child and her placement was subject to the ICWA.
By the time Alexandria was placed with the P.s in December 2011, her extended family in Utah, the R.s, were aware of dependency proceeding and had spoken to representatives of the tribe about their interest in adopting Alexandria. The tribe agreed to initial foster placement with the P.s because it was close to father at a time when he was working on reunification. If reunification services were terminated, the tribe recommended placement with the R.s in Utah.
Alexandria's first months after being placed with the P.s were difficult. She was weepy at times, did not want to be held, and had difficulty differentiating between strangers and caregivers, indiscriminately calling people “mommy” or “daddy.” These behaviors were considered signs of a “reactive attachment, the disinhibitive type.” The P.s addressed Alexandria's attachment issues with consistency and loving care. They did not ask the social worker for a therapy referral, understanding the issues to be ones they could work out on their own. After a few months, Alexandria's behavioral issues resolved, and she formed a strong primary bond and attachment with the entire P. family, viewing the parents as her own parents and the P. children as her siblings.
On September 17, 2012, Alexandria began play therapy with Ruth Polcino, a therapist with United American Indian Involvement. Sessions took place weekly in the P. home. In a December 31, 2012 letter to the Department's social worker Javier, Polcino noted Alexandria's “happiness, playfulness, sense of safety, and positive rapport with her foster parents and siblings” and concluded that her consistent, loving experience in the foster home appears to have fostered a healthy and secure attachment. Notably, the letter concludes
An April 3, 2013 report notes the significant advancements made by Alexandria during her placement with the P.s, as well as her ability to form a healthy attachment to new caretakers:
Alexandria's father successfully complied with reunification services for more than six months, progressing to such an extent that he was granted unmonitored eight-hour visits. By June 2012, the Department reported a substantial probability he would reunify with Alexandria within the next six months. Shortly thereafter, however, father's emotional state deteriorated dramatically. He separated from his new wife, left California, and did not visit Alexandria after July 28, 2012. By September 2012, he had communicated to the Department that he no longer wished to continue reunification services.
Because Ginger R.'s...
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