L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. T.P. (In re D.P.)
| Decision Date | 19 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | S267429 |
| Citation | 14 Cal.5th 266,522 P.3d 645,303 Cal.Rptr.3d 388 |
| Parties | IN RE D.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.P., Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Megan Turkat-Schirn, Beverly Hills, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rita Himes for Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers Inc., East Bay Family Defenders and East Bay Community Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Aditi Fruitwala, Minouche Kandel; Elizabeth Gill ; and David Loy, Oxnard, for American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Emily Berger ; Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell Keiter for Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Law Office of Emily Berger and Thirteen Appellate Dependency Attorneys as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Mary C. Wickham, Los Angeles, and Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Laura E. Hirahara for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Lounsbery Law Office and Tate Lounsbery, El Cajon, as Amicus Curiae.
In 2019, T.P. (Father) and Y.G. (Mother) brought their infant son, D.P., to the hospital because they were concerned about excessive crying. A chest X-ray revealed that D.P. had a single healing rib fracture that the parents could not explain. In response, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a dependency petition claiming that D.P. and his five-year-old sister, B.P., were at risk of neglect. After reviewing the evidence, the juvenile court dismissed all but one of the counts brought by the Department. The court found that it had jurisdiction over D.P. under Welfare and Institutions Code former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), finding that "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child ...." (All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code; § 300 was amended, effective January 1, 2023, to include changes nonsubstantive to the issues here (Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1 ); unless otherwise indicated, we quote and analyze the 2023 version.)
D.P.’s parents challenged this jurisdictional finding on appeal. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction, finding that the parents had complied with their case plan and D.P. was no longer at risk. In response, the Court of Appeal dismissed the parents’ case, reasoning that because the juvenile court's jurisdiction had terminated, the case was moot. We granted Father's petition for review.
We conclude that Father's appeal is moot because Father, though asserting that the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding is stigmatizing, has not demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings. We further hold that the Court of Appeal has discretion to review Father's case even though it is moot. The Court of Appeal erred in reasoning that "[t]he party seeking such discretionary review ... must demonstrate the specific legal or practical negative consequences that will result from the jurisdictional findings they seek to reverse." ( In re D.P. (Feb. 10, 2021, B301135) 2021 WL 486159 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.) [nonpub. opn.].) We reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment dismissing the appeal and remand for the court to reconsider Father's argument for discretionary review.
In 2019, Father and Mother brought two-month-old D.P. to the hospital because he had been crying more than usual and seemed to have difficulty breathing. A chest X-ray revealed that D.P. had pneumonia as well as a single healing rib fracture that the parents, surprised by the latter finding, could not explain. A nurse practitioner who treated D.P. and performed a skeletal survey found no evidence of any other trauma or injuries to his body. The Department received a report alleging that D.P. was a victim of physical abuse and stating that his five-year-old sister B.P. might also be at risk. Following treatment for the rib fracture and for unrelated pneumonia and flu, D.P. was released to his parents. At that time, he was gaining weight and seemed happy.
Father and Mother are immigrants from Vietnam and China, respectively. Their household includes D.P. and B.P., as well as the children's maternal grandparents. The family has no prior child welfare history or criminal history. A social worker who interviewed B.P. found that she appeared healthy and well groomed, and B.P. stated that she felt happy and safe at home. The parents were cooperative with social workers and participated in various pre-disposition services including parenting classes and individual counseling. Nonetheless, because the timing of D.P.’s rib fracture meant that it must have occurred sometime after his birth while he was in the care of his parents, and because his parents could not offer a satisfactory explanation for the injury, the Department filed a petition alleging that D.P. was subject to "deliberate, unreasonable, and neglectful acts" at the hands of his parents, which placed him and his sister "at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, and physical abuse." The Department claimed the children were at risk of neglect and sought to have them removed from their parents’ care.
In the juvenile court, the Department presented testimony from Dr. Karen Imagawa, an expert in forensics and suspected child abuse. Dr. Imagawa explained that the type of rib fracture D.P. suffered is uncommon in healthy infants and has a "high degree of specificity for non-accidental/inflicted trauma." Because a healthy infant's ribcage is pliable, sustaining this type of injury would require significant compression or blunt force trauma. The parents introduced expert testimony from Dr. Thomas Grogan, a pediatric orthopedic surgeon and expert in child abuse forensics. Dr. Grogan explained that rib fractures like the one D.P. suffered are typically caused by compressive force. If a fist or object had been used to strike D.P., causing blunt force trauma, Dr. Grogan stated he would have expected to see multiple broken ribs and potentially some external marks or bruising. Because D.P. only had a fracture to one rib, Dr. Grogan believed the injury could be the result of someone, even D.P.’s five-year-old sister, picking him up incorrectly and applying too much pressure to his chest. However, Dr. Grogan could not rule out the possibility that the injury was the result of an intentional act. Both experts agreed that in the absence of any bruising, a caregiver would have no way of knowing that a child had a broken rib.
At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court dismissed the portions of the petition relating to D.P.’s sister because they were not supported by sufficient evidence. With respect to D.P., the juvenile court sustained a modified version of the former section 300, subdivision (b)(1) ( section 300(b)(1) ) count, which had alleged that "deliberate, unreasonable, and neglectful acts on the part of [D.P.’s] mother and father endanger the child's physical health, safety and well-being, create a detrimental home environment and place the child ... at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and physical abuse."
By its terms, current section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) applies where "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of ... [¶] ... the failure or inability of the child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child." A related provision, section 355.1, subdivision (a), provides: "Where the court finds, based upon competent professional evidence, that an injury ... sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, ... that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by subdivision ... (b) ... of Section 300."
In light of the expert testimony and the force required to cause D.P.’s injury, the juvenile court concluded the injury was of a sort that would generally not be sustained barring some neglect or harm to the child, and it thus found a prima facie case under section 355.1. This finding " ‘shift[ed] to the parents the obligation of raising an issue as to the actual cause of the injury.’ " ( In re D.P . (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 903, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, italics omitted; see Evid. Code, § 604.)
The juvenile court explained: Further, the court said that "I think this is — at its most — a possible neglectful act in the way this compression fracture occurred." But in light of the section 355.1 presumption, the juvenile court sustained the section 300(b)(1) count, though it struck the words "deliberate" and "unreasonable" because those words are "beyond what the evidence shows." With the count...
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