L.H. v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 03 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.1:14-CV-00126 |
| Citation | 356 F.Supp.3d 713 |
| Parties | L.H., a Minor Student, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HAMILTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Jessica F Salonus, The Salonus Firm, PLC, Jackson, TN, Justin S Gilbert, Gilbert McWherter Scott & Bobbitt, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff.
Michael K. Markham, Office of the Attorney General, Martin Douglass Trimiew, Leitner, Williams, Dooley, and Napolitan, Nashville, TN, D. Scott Bennett, Mary C. DeCamp, Bennett & DeCamp, PLLC, Chattanooga, TN, for Defendant.
Before the Court is a motion filed by Plaintiffs for attorney's fees and costs. (Doc. 252.) Defendant has responded (Doc. 255), and Plaintiffs have replied (Doc. 258). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART the motion by Plaintiffs for attorney's fees and costs. (Doc. 252.) Accordingly, the Court will ORDER Defendant to pay Plaintiffs $342,545.75 in attorney's fees and $6,703.75 in costs, totaling an amount of $349,249.50 .
Also before the Court is a motion filed by Plaintiffs to file a supplemental declaration regarding Plaintiffs' petition for attorney's fees. (Doc. 262.) Because the Court considered Plaintiffs' requested rate to be reasonable based on memoranda filed regarding Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs, the Court will DENY AS MOOT Plaintiffs' motion to file a supplemental declaration regarding Plaintiffs' petition for attorney's fees. (Doc. 262.)
L.H. is a fifteen-year-old boy with Down Syndrome. From 2009 to 2013, L.H. attended Normal Park Elementary School, a public school operating under the Hamilton County Department of Education ("HCDE"). In May 2013, L.H.'s parents rejected the individualized education program ("IEP") which had been developed by HCDE, instead deciding to enroll him at The Montessori School of Chattanooga ("TMS") for the 2013-2014 school year, L.H.'s third grade in school. L.H. has remained at TMS through the eighth grade.
While L.H. received his education at TMS, his parents filed a complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. , which requires states that receive federal funds to provide a "free and appropriate education" (a "FAPE") to every disabled child. Plaintiffs also brought claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504"), and other causes of action. (Doc. 64.) In November 2015, this Court granted a motion by HCDE to sever Plaintiffs' IDEA claims from their other claims. (Doc. 121.) In December 2015, this Court approved a settlement agreement entered into between Plaintiffs and then-Defendant the Tennessee Department of Education ("TDOE"). (Doc. 138.) TDOE paid the sum of $65,000.00 into a special needs trust for the benefit of L.H, $75,000.00 to reimburse Plaintiffs D.H. and G.H. for expert and attorneys' fees, and $45,000.00 to Gilbert, Russell, McWherter, Scott & Bobitt, PLC, for attorneys' fees incurred to that date. (Doc. 112 at 2-3.) HCDE was, afterwards, the only remaining Defendant. Ultimately, on the merits of Plaintiffs' IDEA claims, this Court determined that placement in accord with HCDE's 2013 IEP was more restrictive than necessary—and therefore improper. (Doc. 173.) This Court also determined that L.H.'s alternative private placement at TMS did not satisfy the IDEA, so L.H.'s parents were not entitled to reimbursement. (Id. )
Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed that placement in accord with HCDE's 2013 IEP was more restrictive than necessary. (Doc. 249.) The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found, however, that the educational program at TMS satisfied the IDEA and that L.H.'s parents were therefore entitled to reimbursement. (Id. ) The appellate court accordingly observed that Plaintiffs' claims under the ADA and Section 504 were "redundant" and therefore pretermitted those claims in the appeal. (Doc. 294 at 4, n.1.) A mandate issued October 4, 2018.1 (Doc. 259.)
Plaintiff now moves this Court for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Eastern District of Tennessee Local Rule 54.2. (Doc. 252.) Plaintiffs request attorney's fees of $378,831.25, plus costs of $6,703.75, for a total of $385,535.00. (Id. at 2.)
Our legal system generally requires each party to bear his or her own litigation expenses and attorney's fees, regardless of whether he or she wins or loses. Fox v. Vice , 563 U.S. 826, 832, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011). "Indeed, this principle is so firmly entrenched that it is known as the ‘American Rule.’ " Id.
In certain types of cases, however, Congress has authorized courts to deviate from this rule by shifting the winning party's attorney's fees to the losing party. See Burlington v. Dague , 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992) (). Cases brought under the IDEA are among those special instances where courts may shift attorney's fees: "[i]n IDEA proceedings, the district court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to ‘a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.’ " Somberg on behalf of Somberg v. Utica Cmty. Sch. , 908 F.3d 162, 178 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) ). In the Sixth Circuit in particular, district courts are required to award attorney fees to a prevailing party under the IDEA where no special circumstances militate against such an award. Wikol ex rel. Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 360 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2004). The burden is on the non-prevailing party to make a strong showing of special circumstances which may warrant a denial of fees. Déjà Vu v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville , 421 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2005).
Here, Plaintiffs are unquestionably the prevailing party in their IDEA case. This Court entered judgment for Plaintiffs on August 9, 2017. (Doc. 212.) On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this finding, further finding that Plaintiffs were also owed monetary reimbursement for amounts spent on L.H.'s education at TMS. Because full relief was given under the IDEA, this Court is required to award attorney's fees. Wikol , 360 F.3d at 611. Defendant has not otherwise argued that special circumstances warrant the blanket denial of a fee award. Id.
The initial estimate of a reasonable attorney's fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. See Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ; Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). This amount is referred to as the "lodestar." Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y of Treasury , 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000). "Generally, a ‘strong presumption’ favors the prevailing lawyer's entitlement to his lodestar fee." Id. at 349-50 (citing City of Burlington v. Dague , 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992) ; Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air , 478 U.S. 546, 564, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) ). Thus, modifications to the lodestar are proper only in certain "rare" and "exceptional" cases, supported by both "specific evidence" on the record and detailed findings by the district court. Del. Valley Citizens' Council , 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088.
The lodestar can, however, be adjusted in consideration of other factors, such as the time and labor involved in the case, the novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly, among others. See Blanchard v. Bergeron , 489 U.S. 87, 94, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989). Those factors were first listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. , 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), and have since been adopted by the Supreme Court as appropriate for district courts to consider. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434 n.9, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The twelve Johnson factors are:
488 F.2d at 717-19. The most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained. See Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).
The Sixth Circuit presumes that the lodestar amount—the reasonable hourly rate times the number of hours worked—amounts to a reasonable fee. EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC , 899 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2018). In order to aid the Court in a determination of the lodestar value, Plaintiffs have submitted declarations by counsel involved in this matter, Justin Gilbert and Jessica Salonus, a timesheet detailing their rates, hours, and tasks worked, and the declarations of Hill Rivkin, Dean of the University of Tennessee College of Law in Knoxville, and Donna Mikel, an attorney in the Chattanooga, Tennessee region.
"[D]etermining an appropriate ‘market rate’ for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult." Blum , 465 U.S. at 806 n.11, 104 S.Ct. 1541. Because of this, "[t]o inform and assist the court in the exercise of...
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