L.H. v. Schwarzenegger
| Decision Date | 19 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH.,CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH. |
| Parties | L.H., A.Z., D.K., and D.R., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated juvenile parolees in California, Plaintiffs, v. Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor, State of California, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This is a class action brought by a class of juvenile parolees in California who claim that defendants' policies and practice deny them their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and assistance of counsel. They also allege violation of their statutory rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Defendants include the Governor of the State of California and various persons and entities administering California's juvenile parole system.
Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on two alternative grounds. First, plaintiffs seek that the Court find, as a matter of law, that defendants violate plaintiffs' due process rights by failing to conduct two hearings prior to revocation of parole. Alternatively, plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on the grounds that, if a single hearing is sufficient to revoke plaintiffs' parole, defendants violate plaintiffs' due process rights by failing to hold such a hearing promptly. Plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring that defendants hold probable cause hearings for all juvenile parolees within ten calendar days of the parolee being taken into custody for revocation proceedings. The court grants the plaintiffs' motion on the issue of whether the defendants violate the plaintiffs' due process rights, but the court denies the motion as to injunctive relief.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS1
Currently, there are approximately 2,775 juveniles on parole in California. Decl. of Maria Morris ("Morris Decl.") Ex. L, ¶ 4. The certified plaintiff class consists of juvenile parolees in or under the jurisdiction of California, including all juvenile parolees with disabilities as defined in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, who are (1) in the community under parole supervision or are at large, or (2) in custody in California as alleged parole violators and who are awaiting revocation of their parole, or (3) in custody after having been found in violation of their parole and returned to custody. Order Granting Class Certification, Feb. 28, 2007.
A juvenile parolee may have his parole revoked based on the determination that he has committed a new crime or that he has failed to abide by the other terms and conditions of parole. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4982. Prior to revocation, the parolee can be arrested and detained pending the Juvenile Parole Board's determination that there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of parole, or "when a violation of parole has been established." Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4978(b)(1).
A parolee may have his parole revoked based upon his having violated the terms of his parole, even when the parolee has not been accused of a new crime. California regulations refer to this as a "technical violation" of parole. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4982(a)(2). The defendants' regulations do not provide for a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the conduct comprising the technical violation did in fact occur. SUF ¶ 10; Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 14:16-15:16, Exh. C, Decl. of Sarah Laubach ("Laubach Decl.") (admission of defendant Division of Juvenile Justice).
Once a parolee has been taken into custody for a technical violation, California regulations require that a hearing occur within sixty days to determine whether the parolee has violated a condition of his or her parole. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4978(c) (1); SUF ¶ 13. This 60-day period can be extended upon written justification. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4978(e)(2); SUF ¶ 15; cf. Decl. of Gay Grunfeld ("Grunfeld Decl.") Exh. A, B, F, G, L.
More than half of all juvenile parole revocation proceedings in recent years have been for technical violations. SUF ¶ 6. From 2004-2006, approximately 75 percent of parole revocation proceeding for technical violations resulted in the parolee being continued on parole or discharged from parole; in other words, technical violations led to a parolee's parole being revoked in only one-fourth of the cases. SUF ¶ 9.
When the parolee faces revocation based on new criminal charges, defendants' regulations provide for a preliminary hearing to determine that there is probable cause to believe that the parolee committed the crime. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4981. The juvenile parolee may be detained while this determination is made. SUF ¶ 1. After the parolee is detained, the parolee's parole agent prepares a detention report, which identifies the reasons for the detention. Depo. of Marco Reyna2 ("Reyna Depo.") 31:1-31:5, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. This report is then reviewed by a Supervising Parole Agent. Reyna Depo. 31:8-31:12, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. If the Supervising Parole Agent decides to place a parole-hold on the parolee, within forty-eight hours the parolee is given notice of the allegation against him. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 4:19-4:20, Exh. C, Laubach Decl. (admissions of defendant Division of Juvenile Justice). The parolee is able to waive his appearance at the probable cause hearing. Reyna Depo. 25:2-25:17, Exh. E, Laubach Decl.
When the parolee is given notice of the allegation of the law violation, the parolee is also given a "Parolee Probable Cause/ Violation Detention Hearing Waiver Feedback" form. Defendant's Reponse to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 16:9-16:11, Exh. C, Laubach Decl. (admissions of defendant Division of Juvenile Justice). This form presents the parolee with two options: that the parolee waives "a probable cause/detention hearing and a timely violation hearing for any law violations," stating that the parolee understands the waiver is not an admission of guilt. Alternatively, the parolee can request a detention hearing before the Youth Authority Board. Decl. of Maria Morris ("Morris Decl.") Exh. D. Parolees are not represented by counsel when given this form. Reyna Depo. 70:10-70:12, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. If the waiver form is not returned postmarked within five calendar days, the parolee is deemed to have automatically waived his right to appear at the probable cause hearing. Morris Decl. Exh. D.
If the parolee waives his appearance at the probable cause hearing, a hearing officer from the Juvenile Parole Board determines whether the parolee should be detained pending adjudication of the new crime with which the parolee has been charged. Reyna Depo. 31:16-31:24, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. The hearing officer bases his determination on the report offered in support of the parole-hold. Id. Defendant concedes that in these situations, where the parolee has waived his appearance at the probable cause hearing, "California ... does not conduct an actual hearing." Defs.' Opposition at 10; cf. Reyna Depo. 25:2-25:6, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. ( that if the parolee signs the waiver, he is "waiving [his] rights to a ... probable cause detention hearing").
Very rarely does a juvenile parolee invoke his right to appear at the probable cause hearing; as defendants concede, only when the parolee invokes this right does the hearing actually occur. SUF ¶ 18; Defs.' Opposition at 10. Neither party has described for the court in detail the process and procedures that exist at these probable cause hearings.
After the parolee has been detained for a law violation, California regulations allow sixty days for a probable cause hearing. SUF ¶ 12; Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4978(c)(1)(B). This period may be extended upon written justification being presented to the hearing officer. SUF ¶ 14; Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, 4978(c) (2); cf. Decl. of Gay Grunfeld Exh. H, I.
III.
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.1995).
Under summary judgment practice, the moving party [A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Partners v. The United States
...Pa. Aug. 11, 2009) (recognizing that a city council resolution is "unquestionably a matter of public record"); L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2007) ("[T]he Senate Report is a public record...."). The Joint Statement, which is publicly accessible via Love Field......
-
UPF Corp. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.
...to be based only upon document review and not his personal knowledge, the declaration must be excluded. See L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 519 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1078-79 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (explaining a declaration offered by the defendants was "flawed" because the declarant's statements were not "base......