L'Heureux v. Hurley

• Decision Date: 08 August 1933
• Citation: 168 A. 8,117 Conn. 347
• Parties: L'HEUREUX v. HURLEY et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

168 A. 8

117 Conn. 347

L'HEUREUX v. HURLEY et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

August 8, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, Windham County; Ernest A. Inglis, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused to the plaintiff, Emma L'Heureux, a tenant, by the negligence of the defendants, James H. Hurley and others owners of a tenement house, brought to the superior court and tried to a jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed.

No error.

John B. Harvey, of Willimantic, for appellants.

Harry E. Back and Louis A. Woisard, both of Danielson, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and FOSTER JJ.

FOSTER, Judge.

The plaintiff claims from the defendants damages for injuries received by her in falling down a flight of stairs used by her in common with others in a building occupied by her as a tenant and owned by the defendants Hurley and Grant. Before trial, the action was withdrawn as to all defendants except Hurley and Grant, against whom the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. From the action of the court in overruling the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict and from certain portions of the charge to the jury, these defendants appeal.

On March 4, 1931, and since 1920, the defendants were the owners of a three-story building in Willimantic, known as the Bassett Block, facing north on North Main street and bounded on the west by Railroad street. Upon the ground floor were stores, one at the southeast corner of the streets occupied by the defendants as a hardware store, one next occupied by others as a clothing store, and one still further east by others as a restaurant. Between the hardware store and the clothing store was a stairway, known as the west stairway, leading to a common, public hallway on the second floor, upon which were rooms occupied as a barber shop, the office of a dentist, a studio of a photographer, and an apartment used by the latter and his wife as their home. A stairway ascended from the hall on the second floor to a common hallway on the third floor, and upon the third floor were rooms all vacant except one occupied by the photographer in his business. Immediately adjacent to the Bassett Block on the east was a building owned by others, known as the Union block. What was known as the east stairway ascended from Main street at the division line between the Bassett Block and the Union block. Such division line was in about the center of the stairway. The east stairway was used in common by the tenants of the Union block and by the plaintiff, a tenant of the Bassett Block, and terminated at a landing, from which to the left, access was obtained to rooms in the Union block used for business purposes. Upon the right, as one ascended the east stairway and reached the landing, was a door, upon the further side of which was a short fight of stairs ascending in a westerly direction to a hall, from which access was gained to an apartment, which had been occupied by the plaintiff as her home by a month to month lease for a period of years extending to a time prior to that upon which the defendants acquired ownership of the Bassett Block. The door, upon being opened as one descended the short stairway, swung to the right over the landing and away from the top of the east stairway, and there was attached to it a spring, which caused it to close when released. Over the landing was an electric light fixture, which, when used, illuminated the landing and the east stairway. At the top of the short flight of stairs leading to the plaintiff's apartment was an electric light controlled exclusively by the plaintiff. Upon the east side of the east stairway was a handrail that terminated at the second step down from the landing, and on the west side of the east stairway such a handrail extended about six inches up beyond the edge of the landing. For several years before the plaintiff was injured the electric light over the first landing was extinguished at 6:15 p. m. every night, except Saturday night. In the rear of the Bassett Block was an open, unoccupied plot of ground between the rear line of the building and the rear line of the lot, which was used by all of the tenants of the building as a place for the disposal of rubbish. On the evening of Wednesday, March 4, 1931, at about 8:15 o'clock, the plaintiff, in anticipation of a call of a friend, descended from her apartment the short flight of stairs, pushed open the door at the landing, released her hold upon the door, which swung shut, and groped her way over to the east side of the landing, reaching out with her right hand to find and grasp the handrail on the east side of the stairs. While so doing, she fell down the stairs and was injured. These facts are admitted or conceded by all of the parties.

Chapter 143 of the General Statutes (sections 2362 to 2367) deals with tenement and lodging houses. Section 2566 requires that " the owner of each tenement house shall provide for the lighting of all public halls at night." The plaintiff claims that the legal liability for her injuries rests upon the defendants, because they are the owners of a tenement house in which she had her home when she was injured, and that, in not properly lighting a public hall and stairway of such building, they were guilty of negligence that was the proximate cause of her injuries. The defendants claim that the building was not a tenement house under the law, and that the absence of light over the first landing at the top of the east stairway was a structural defect that existed at the commencement of the plaintiff's tenancy, and that the plaintiff, having knowledge of such defect, assumed the risk of injury that might result to her from it.

Chapter 143 of the General Statutes defines with precision and breadth a " tenement house." It is " any house or building, or portion thereof, which is rented, leased, let or hired out to be occupied, or is arranged or designed to be occupied, or is occupied, as the home or residence of three or more families, living independently of each other, and doing their cooking upon the premises, and having a common right in the halls, stairways or yards." General Statutes, § 2562.

It is true, as emphasized by the defendants, that at the time the plaintiff fell only she and the family of the photographer occupied the building as their homes. There were, however, vacant rooms on the third floor of the westerly part of the building, and the testimony of several witnesses, as well as personal inspection of the premises by the jury, warranted a finding that the building was arranged and designed to be occupied by three or more families, living independently of each other, and doing their cooking upon the premises. The plaintiff resided in the easterly part of the building, and the stairway down which she fell led to her apartment and not to any other residential apartment. This stairway was, however, outside of the plaintiff's apartment. Our statutes define a " public hall" as " a hall, corridor or passageway not within an apartment." General Statutes, § 2562.

In the case of Gibson v. Hoppman, 108 Conn. 401, 143 A. 635, 75 A.L.R. 148, the building was occupied by three tenants, and a hallway leading to the apartment on the top floor, which was occupied by only one tenant, was held to be a public hallway.

The defendants urge that the court erred in charging the jury that there was evidence in the case as to a common right in the yard at the back of the tenement, from which the jury might conclude that the building in question was a tenement house within the statute. A reference to the finding discloses that the plaintiff offered evidence to prove that the yard at the rear of the Bassett Block was for the common use of all of the tenements in the block; and that the defendants offered evidence to prove that the yard was used in common by all of the tenants of the building for dumping purposes, but that the plaintiff's access to the yard was by a back stairway different from that used by the other tenants of the building. The charge of the court must be tested by the finding. If we were to refer to the evidence on this question, it would be found from the testimony of the plaintiff and one of the defendants appearing in the record that such finding of the court was fully warranted.

Chapter 143 of the statutes defines a yard as follows: " A ‘ yard’ shall mean an open, unoccupied space, on the same lot with a tenement, lodging or boarding house, between the rear line of such house and the rear line of the lot." General Statutes, § 2562. The size of the yard, or the use to which it is put by the tenants, or their means of access to it, is immaterial. If the evidence brings the space within the statutory definition of a yard, and the yard was used in common by the tenants, then it becomes an element in determining whether the building falls within the statutory definition of a " tenement house." The charge of the court was correct upon this question.

Since the jury might reasonably have found this building to be a tenement house, there remains to be considered the duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiff as to the lighting of the first landing, the lack of which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This duty is fixed by statute. " The owner of each tenement house shall provide for the lighting of all public halls at night." General Statutes, § 2566. Liability of the defendants in this case for failure to perform this duty toward the plaintiff their tenant, may be escaped, if, under the law, the plaintiff assumed the risk incident to such violation, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory...