L. L. Cohen & Co., Inc. v. Director General of Railroads
Decision Date | 04 January 1924 |
Citation | 247 Mass. 259 |
Parties | L. L. COHEN AND COMPANY, INC. v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
October 22, 1923.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., BRALEY, DE COURCY, CROSBY, PIERCE, CARROLL, & WAIT, JJ.
Jurisdiction. Federal Control of Railroads.
Director General of Railroads. Railroad. Practice, Civil, Amendment. Carrier, Of goods. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof.
If, during the time when the United States Director General of Railroads was in control of a railroad in this Commonwealth, an action for damages resulting from the conduct of the business of the railroad was brought in this Commonwealth against the railroad corporation instead of against the Director General of Railroads, an amendment may be allowed substituting the Director General of Railroads for the railroad corporation as defendant. Where it appears that the action above described was begun while the
Director General was in control of the railroad, Section 206 (a) of the Transportation Act of 1920 is not a bar to the allowance of the amendment above described, although it was not presented until more than two years after the termination of government control.
The Director General of Railroads in 1918 received a shipment described in the bill of lading as "one carload scrap iron" for transportation to
Pennsylvania. The shipper loaded the shipment into a "sideboard flat" car and different grades of the scrap iron were separated carefully in the car and, if it had not been reloaded, the shipment would have gone through to its destination without damage. While it was on the lines of a system other than that on which it started, a transfer of it became reasonably necessary and it was loaded into another car not adapted to the carriage of scrap iron. In the transfer, fine scrap was loaded on top and mixed in with other scrap so that the lading became unmarketable and worthless and the assignee refused to accept delivery. The shipper refused to accept return of the goods and brought an action against the
Director General of Railroads. By order of the trial judge, a verdict for the defendant was entered. Held, that
(1) The mere description in the bill of lading, "one carload scrap iron," did not necessarily import that the contents of the car could be mixed or mingled without damage;
(2) The shipper as one of the contracting parties had a right to judge for himself what arrangement in the car was best adapted for the carriage of his goods;
(3) The acceptance by the defendant of the carload with full knowledge on the part of his employees of the nature and arrangement of its contents well might have been found to charge him with notice that the division of the contents was not random but was made by the shipper with a definite design, and that the shipment should be handled accordingly;
(4) There was evidence for the jury that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was due to the failure of the defendant to provide a suitable car or to the negligence of his employees in unloading and reloading the shipment, or to both;
(5) If it was found that the goods were received for shipment in good order, the burden was on the defendant to prove that the damaged condition in which they arrived was due to causes for which he was not legally responsible;
(6) A verdict for the plaintiff would have been warranted.
CONTRACT for breach of a carrier's agreement safely and securely to convey a carload of scrap iron. Writ dated January 9, 1920.
The defendant described in the writ was "The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, controlled and operated by the United States Railroad Administration." The action was entered in the Superior Court on February 2, 1920. The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company on February 17 1920, filed an answer setting up a general denial and alleging contributory negligence of the plaintiff. On September 21, 1922, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike from the writ and declaration the name "New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company" and substitute therefor "James C. Davis, Agent, and the Director General of Railroads in possession and control of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, as party defendant." The motion was allowed by Callahan, J., and an order of notice to the new defendant was issued and was served upon him. On November 7, 1922, James C. Davis described in the motion, appeared specially and moved that the action be dismissed on the following grounds:
The motion was heard by Dubuque, J., and was denied. The defendant Davis alleged exceptions.
Thereafter the action was tried before Morton, J. Material evidence at the trial is described in the opinion. By order of the judge, a verdict was entered for the defendant. The judge then, at the request of the parties, reported the case to this court upon their agreement that, if the exception to the ruling by Dubuque, J., was sustained or, if this court sustained the ruling by Morton, J., the verdict for the defendant should stand; and if this court overruled the exception to the ruling by Dubuque, J., and sustained the plaintiff's exception to the ruling by Morton, J., a verdict for the plaintiff should be ordered in the sum of $400.
The case was argued at the bar in October, 1923, before Rugg, C.J., DeCourcy, Pierce & Jenney, JJ., and afterwards was submitted on briefs to all the then Justices.
L. Swig, for the plaintiff. A. W. Blackman, for the defendant.
DE COURCY, J. On December 13, 1918, the plaintiff shipped from Taunton Massachusetts, "one carload scrap iron," consigned to Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company, Coatesville, Pennsylvania. A reasonable time for delivery at said destination was not later than two months. The shipment was loaded into a "sideboard flat" car: that is, a flat car open at the top, with wooden sides and ends about four feet in height. The plaintiff placed at one end of the car sheet iron scrap, which was tied up in bundles; at the other end skeleton scrap, so called, which was tied up in bales; and in the middle of the car small particles, known as tack, or nail scrap. While the car was in transit and on the lines of the Pennsylvania system, it became reasonably necessary to transfer the contents. The iron was loaded into a battleship hopper car, which, it could be found, was...
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L.L. Cohen & Co. v. Davis
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