L.E.L. Const. v. Goode

• Decision Date: 05 November 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. 91CA1597,91CA1598,s. 91CA1597
• Citation: 849 P.2d 876
• Parties: L.E.L. CONSTRUCTION and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Petitioners, v. Janet GOODE, The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, and Director, Division of Workers' Compensation, Respondents. and CRESTED BUTTE SOUTH METROPOLITAN DISTRICT and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Petitioners, v. Bettie TRAVIS, The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, and Director, Division of Workers' Compensation, Respondents. . I
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 876

849 P.2d 876

40 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 621

L.E.L. CONSTRUCTION and Colorado Compensation Insurance

Authority, Petitioners, v. Janet GOODE, The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the

State of Colorado, and Director, Division of

Workers' Compensation, Respondents.

and

CRESTED BUTTE SOUTH METROPOLITAN DISTRICT and Colorado

Compensation Insurance Authority, Petitioners, v. Bettie TRAVIS, The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the

State of Colorado, and Director, Division of

Workers' Compensation, Respondents.

Nos. 91CA1597, 91CA1598.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. I.

Nov. 5, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 1992.

Certiorari Granted April 12, 1993.

Paul Tochtrop, Denver, for petitioners L.E.L. Const., Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority and Crested Butte South Metropolitan Dist.

Leventhal & Bogue, P.C., Bruce Kaye, Denver, for respondent Janet Goode.

Withers, Seidman & Rice, P.C., Gudrun Rice, Grand Junction, for respondent Bettie Travis.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., John D. Baird, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondents Industrial Claim Appeals Office and Director, Div. of Workers' Compensation.

Glasman, Jaynes & McBride, Ronald C. Jaynes, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Ass'n.

Herbert S. Schiff, Boulder, for amicus curiae Workers' Compensation Educ. Ass'n.

Susanna Meissner-Cutler, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Opinion by Judge BRIGGS.

In this consolidated appeal, we consider whether workers' compensation death benefits payable to the surviving spouse of a deceased worker can be offset by federal social security "mother's and father's insurance benefits." The Industrial Claim Appeals Panel affirmed the orders of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) prohibiting petitioners, L.E.L. Construction (employer of decedent Donnie L. Goode), Crested Butte South Metropolitan District (employer of decedent James C. Travis), and the Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA), from offsetting the workers' compensation benefits awarded to decedents' surviving spouses, Janet Goode and Bettie Travis (claimants), by the amount of their social security "mother's benefits." Also at issue are the Panel's award of benefits from date of death, with interest, to claimant Goode, and its conclusion that Travis' death arose out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm.

I. Mother's Benefits

Claimants' children receive social security "children's insurance benefits" because they are dependents of a decedent who qualified for social security benefits, and they have not attained the age of 18. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1988). Claimants themselves receive "mother's and father's insurance benefits" because they are widows of decedents who qualified for social security benefits and are mothers of decedents' dependent children less than 16 years of age. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1988).

"Children's" and "mother's and father's benefits" are payable without regard to the cause or circumstances of death. They are paid simultaneously, without reduction in either. However, if the surviving parent is employed, each dollar of his or her benefits is proportionately reduced for each corresponding dollar earned over a stated minimum annual income. 42 U.S.C. § 403(b) and (f) (1988).

The ALJ awarded claimants workers' compensation death benefits and concluded that the children's benefits, but not the mother's benefits, may be offset pursuant to Colo.Sess.Laws 1990, ch. 62, § 8-42-114 at 495 (now codified with changes at § 8-42-114, C.R.S. (1992 Cum. Supp.)). The Panel affirmed.

Petitioners assert the Panel erred in not offsetting mother's benefits under § 8-42-114. We disagree.

Section 8-42-114 provides:

In cases where it is determined that periodic death benefits granted by the federal old age, survivors, and disability insurance act or a workers' compensation act of another state or of the federal government are payable to an individual and the individual's dependents, the aggregate benefits payable for death pursuant to this section shall be reduced, but not below zero, by an amount equal to one hundred percent of such periodic benefits.

The purpose of the social security offset is to preclude a claimant from receiving duplicative benefits. Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 1140 (Colo.1988). If a social security benefit serves a purpose different than that of workers' compensation benefits, there is no offset because it would "not be consistent with the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act ... to protect employees who suffer injuries arising out of their employment and to give injured workers a reliable source of compensation." Engelbrecht v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 680 P.2d 231, 233 (Colo.1984).

The primary goal of workers' compensation benefits is to relieve claimants of the adverse economic effects caused by industrial injuries and fatalities. Higgs v. Western Landscaping & Sprinkler Systems, Inc., 804 P.2d 161 (Colo.1991). To achieve that goal, death benefits serve as "a substitute for the support previously provided by the deceased worker." Wilson v. Jim Snyder Drilling, 747 P.2d 647, 652 (Colo.1987).

Although all social security benefits necessarily result in some relief from the adverse economic effects caused by industrial injuries and fatalities, they do not all serve as a substitute for the support previously provided by the deceased worker. In Wilson v. Jim Snyder Drilling, supra, the court concluded that, because the purpose of cost-of-living increases in social security death benefits was to maintain the buying power of social security payments and not to provide additional benefits for a particular injury, an offset was not necessary to prevent double payment.

We have previously determined that social security "widow's benefits" are likewise not offset against death benefits. Larimer County School District Poudre R-1 v. Industrial Commission, 727 P.2d 401 (Colo.App.1986). "Widow's benefits" are payable to the surviving spouse at age 60, without regard to the cause or circumstances of the husband's death. They replace support the deceased would have been expected to provide in later life and serve more as a substitute for retirement than disability or death benefits. Thus, no offset is necessary to avoid a duplication of benefits.

The claimants, who have not challenged the offset of the "children's benefits," apparently concede that the purpose of such benefits is to replace the loss of income that had been provided by the deceased worker and thus can properly be offset against workers' compensation death benefits to avoid a duplication of benefits. However, they argue that "mother's and father's benefits" serve a different purpose and thus, like cost-of-living increases and widow's benefits, do not constitute "periodic death benefits" under § 8-42-114. We agree.

A number of amendments, including § 402(g), were added to the Social Security Act in 1939 to afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975). The Supreme Court in Weinberger nevertheless found that Congress enacted § 402(g) for a specific purpose.

[Section] 402(g), linked as it is directly to responsibility for minor children, was intended to permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care of children....

That the purpose behind § 402(g) is to provide children deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the personal attention of the other could not be more clear in the legislative history.

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U.S. at 648-649, 95 S.Ct. at 1233, 43 L.Ed.2d at 525.

In Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 2767, 61 L.Ed.2d 541 (1979), the Supreme Court concluded that "mother's and father's benefits" are primarily for the surviving parent, not the children, and upheld the exclusion from benefits of unwed mothers. However, the court reaffirmed that § 402(g) "was intended to permit women [and now men] to elect not to work and to devote themselves to care of children.... 'Mother's insurance benefits' were intended to make the choice to stay home easier." Califano v. Boles, supra, 443 U.S. at 288, 99 S.Ct. at 2772, 61 L.Ed.2d at 548.

We are persuaded that "mother's and father's benefits" are not intended to serve as a substitute for the income lost from the deceased worker. Rather, they are more in the nature of a replacement for income the surviving spouse is unable to earn because of choosing to stay home with dependent children. This makes the choice to stay home easier, so that children deprived of one parent can be provided with the personal attention of the other.

We also give deference to the interpretation of the offset statute by the Division of Workers' Compensation. As the administrative officials charged with the enforcement of the statute, their experience and conclusions are influential in shaping our decision. See Larimer County School District Poudre R-1 v. Industrial Commission, supra.

We therefore hold that "periodic death benefits" in § 8-42-114 do not include federal social security "mother's and father's insurance benefits." Offsetting "mother's and father's insurance benefits" against workers' compensation death benefits is not necessary to avoid double payment. See Giaquinto v. Major Sanitation, Inc., 89 A.D.2d 66, 456 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1982) (offset required for state survivor's benefits does not include "mother's benefits" because "such a payment is distinguishable from a survivor's benefit."). As our supreme court noted in reaching its similar conclusion in regard to cost-of-living increases for death benefits, this result better protects workers and provides them with a more reliable source of income. Wilson v. Jim Snyder Drilling, supra.

II. "Retroactive" Award

As to claimant Goode, the ALJ ordered that her benefits be calculated from the date of her...