L.E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt

• Decision Date: 20 April 1933
• Docket Number: 32284
• Citation: 60 S.W.2d 32,332 Mo. 749
• Parties: L. E. Lines Music Co., a Corporation, v. J. A. Holt et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

60 S.W.2d 32

332 Mo. 749

L. E. Lines Music Co., a Corporation, v. J. A. Holt et al., Appellants

No. 32284

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 20, 1933

Appeal from Greene Circuit Court; Hon. John Schmook, Judge.

Reversed.

C W. Hamlin for appellants.

(1) The following, among other things appear in the agreed statement of facts one F. C. Brown was registered as a transient guest at the defendant hotel and while there as such guest the plaintiff (now respondent) brought a radio and phonograph combination set and delivered the same to Brown at his room in said hotel. While the management of the hotel knew that the set had been delivered to Brown by respondent they did not know that it did not belong to Brown. I quote from the Agreed Statement of Facts, as follows: "That the defendant hotel knew that plaintiff delivered said radio set to Brown at his room in said hotel. Plaintiff left said set in possession of said Brown for purpose of demonstration but did not say anything to the management of said hotel or any one of the defendants herein, about the ownership of said set. That when Brown left the hotel he told the management that he would be back and that he was leaving his radio there for a few days when he would send the money, pay his bill and get his radio. Said management not knowing that the plaintiff, or any one else had or claimed any interest in said set permitted Brown to take away from said hotel all his other baggage." . . . That the property in controversy was, in fact, the property of the plaintiff and not that of Brown, but none of the defendants knew that fact until after Brown had left hotel. That the amount claimed by the defendant, hotel is a fair and reasonable charge for the services rendered to the said Brown. Under this statement of facts appellants claim that said hotel had then and has now a lien on the property in controversy to the extent of its claim and for cost. R. S. 1929, sec. 13090; Waters & Co v. Girard, 82 N.E. 143; Shaw v. Webb, 174 S.W 275; Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 72 N.W. 765; Baldwin Piano Co. v. Congress Hall Hotel, 243 Ill.App. 118; Keiffer v. Keough, 188 S.W. 44; Cook v. Kane, 2 P. 226; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 55 N.W. 56 (2) The tendency of modern legislation, including that of our own State is to make the innkeeper's lien coextensive with his liability, i.e., give him a lien on the goods for which he as such innkeeper would be liable if said goods were lost or destroyed; and no one can well doubt that the hotel would have been responsible if said radio set had been lost or destroyed while in the possession of said hotel unless due to the fault of the guest or a public enemy or act of God. Swanner v. Connor Hotel Co., 205 Mo.App. 329. Section 13090, R. S. 1929, in so far as it applies to the property upon which the Hotelkeeper may have a lien, etc., is as follows: "The keeper of any inn, hotel or boarding house, whether individual, partnership or corporation, shall have a lien on the baggage and other property in and about such inn brought to the same by or under the control of his guest or boarders for the proper charges due him from such guest or boarders for the accommodation, board and lodging, and for money paid for or advanced to them not to exceed the sum of two hundred dollars, and for such other extras as are furnished at the request of such guest," etc. I think that it will not be denied that every provision in the old section except as above quoted is in the part of the new that I have quoted. It was evidently the purpose of the Legislature in enacting the new section which is now Sec. 13090, R. S. 1929, to extend the lien, making it apply to other property in the hotel under the control of the guest, as well as his own property and leave out "the wages of the guest." This the Legislature had a right to do. In the case of State, etc., Bothwell ex rel. Gray v. Schuster, 285 Mo. 399, states the general proposition of law. [State ex rel. Wagner v. Patterson, 207 Mo. 129, 105 S.W. 1048; State ex rel. Hulsey v. Clayton, etc., 226 Mo. 292; Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 72 N.W. 765.]

Gorman & Randall and Arch A. Johnson for respondent

(1) It is admitted that the radio set upon which the hotel claims a lien for its unpaid board bill was the property of plaintiff and not the property of the guest. Under the law in Missouri the hotel had no lien on this property for the unpaid board bill of its guest. Sec. 3199, R. S. 1929; Wyckoff v. Southern Hotel Co., 24 Mo.App. 382; Mercer v. Lowery, 193 Mo.App. 106. (2) Section 3199, R. S. 1929, restricted and changed the common-law rule which gave to a hotel or innkeeper a lien on property brought into the hotel by a guest or under his control without regard to the ownership of such property. Sec. 3199, R. S. 1929; Wyckoff v. Southern Hotel Co., supra; Mercer v. Lowery, supra. (3) Section 13090, Revised Statutes 1929, enacted in 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 351), which seeks to incorporate in the law of Missouri the common law rule giving to hotel or innkeeper a lien on property under the control of the guest whether owned by him or not, is in violation of Sec. 1, Article 14, of the Constitution of the U.S. prohibiting the states from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and Sec. 10 of Article 1, of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting the enactment of any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and Section 30 of Article 2, of the Constitution of Missouri providing that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. 14th Amendment Fed. Const., sec. 1; In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125; Art. 1, Sec. 10, Const. of U.S.; Const. of Mo., Art. 2, Sec. 30; Const. of Mo., Art. 2, Sec. 4; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163.

Westhues, C. Cooley and Fitzsimmons, CC., concur.

OPINION

WESTHUES

Respondent, plaintiff below, filed this suit in replevin against appellants, defendants below, to recover a Majestic radio. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri, defendants appealed. The appeal was granted to the Springfield Court of Appeals. Plaintiff filed a motion to have the cause transferred to this court on the ground that a constitutional question was involved. The Court of Appeals so decided and transferred the case here.

The case was submitted to the circuit court upon an agreed statement of facts, the substance of which is as follows Defendants operated the Kentwood Arms Hotel in Springfield, Missouri. Plaintiff was a dealer in radio sets. Brown, a guest in defendants' hotel, had plaintiff deliver the radio in question to his room for demonstration purposes on the pretext of contemplating purchasing the same. Shortly thereafter Brown left the hotel for parts unknown. He paid a part of his hotel bill and informed the hotel management that he would send the balance due of $ 43.70, and then send for or get his radio. The agreed statement of facts further recites:

"Said management knowing that said radio was still in the room and would be good for his bill and not knowing that plaintiff or any one else had or claimed any interest in said set permitted said Brown to take away from said hotel all his other baggage. Sometime after Brown had left the hotel, aforesaid, plaintiff's representatives appeared at the hotel and demanded possession of said radio set and then informed the management that said radio set did not belong to Brown but was the property of the plaintiff. The hotel refused to deliver said property to plaintiff but informed plaintiff's agent that it was holding the said set for the balance due it by the said Brown. . . .

"That the property in controversy was, in fact, the property of the plaintiff and not that of Brown, but none of the defendants knew that fact until after Brown had left the hotel. That the amount claimed by the defendant hotel is a fair and reasonable charge for the services rendered to the said Brown."

Defendants, at the trial, claimed that they had a valid lien on the radio for the balance due, by Brown, by virtue of Section 13090, Revised Statutes 1929. Plaintiff's sole contention, at the trial, was that Section 13090 in so far as it attempted to grant a lien in the hotel's favor on property not belonging to the guest, was in violation of Section 30, Article 2, of the State Constitution and in violation of Section 10, Article 1, of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff offered appropriate declarations of law raising the constitutional question. The trial court refused these declarations but entered a judgment for plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that it was confronted with this situation. [1] The plaintiff raised the constitutional question in the lower court and received a judgment in its favor. Therefore, there was no adverse ruling against plaintiff. However, if the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment it would necessarily hold Section 13090 constitutional, and if it affirmed the judgment of the circuit court it would hold the section unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals, therefore, decided that a constitutional question was inherently involved in the case and that, therefore, they were without jurisdiction, citing Schildnecht v. City of Joplin, 327 Mo. 126, 35 S.W.2d l. c. 36, where the court en banc said:

"Where a case is such that no judgment can be rendered therein without deciding a constitutional question, or, in other words, when it must be said the trial court necessarily determined such a question, the decisions hold this court will entertain appellate jurisdiction on constitutional grounds though the record does not affirmatively show the point was made specifically and in terms below."

In the case before us plaintiff asserted his right of possession to the radio on the sole ground that the...