L. & N.R. Co. v. Morgan's Administrator

Decision Date05 October 1928
Citation225 Ky. 447
PartiesLouisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Morgan's Administrator.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

1. Master and Servant. Neither Ky. Stats., secs. 820b1-820b3, relating to liability of carriers in intrastate commerce for negligent injury to their servants, nor Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA, secs. 51-59; U.S. Comp. Stats., secs 8657-8665) withhold defense of assumption of risk, except in cases where negligence consists in failing to observe some statutory requirement enacted for safety of employees.

2. Master and Servant. — Defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk is not withheld in actions under either Ky. Stats., secs. 820b1-820b3, relating to liability in intrastate commerce for negligent injuries to servant, or Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA, secs. 51-59; U.S. Comp. Stats., secs. 8657-8665), unless defendant and its injured servant were engaged in intrastate or interstate commerce.

3. Commerce. — Member of railroad construction crew engaged exclusively in blasting operations in constructing a new track, when killed by a flying rock which struck him on the head as result of explosion, held not engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce within Ky. Stats., secs. 820b1-820b3, or Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA, secs. 51-59; U.S. Comp. Stats., secs. 8657-8665) and defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were therefore available to employer.

4. Master and Servant. — Experienced member of railroad construction crew engaged exclusively in blasting operations had duty to protect himself from dangers incident thereto, including seeking a place of safety during blasting operations, unless his duties required him to remain at dangerous place where he was injured.

5. Master and Servant. — It was not the duty of the foreman of a railroad construction crew to warn an experienced employee of danger of flying debris in blasting operations, except, perhaps, to give him timely information that explosion was to be made.

6. Negligence. — Where plaintiff's pleadings specified negligence on which he sought recovery, he was confined to such specifications.

7. Master and Servant. — That superintendent, in general charge of railroad's construction work, directed moving from one place to another of wire which set off explosives in blasting operations, held not to constitute an assurance of safety of either the length of the wire or the place where it was directed to be moved, as basis for submission of such issues to jury, in action for death of employee from explosion.

8. Master and Servant. — To authorize instruction on doctrine of assurance of safety, there must be an assurance of safety by one standing in position of vice principal to injured servant, and the safety of assurance by vice principal must relate and apply to the thing or place with which or at which employee was required to perform his service, and then only when servant was so required at time of injury.

9. Master and Servant. — In action for death of member of railroad construction crew struck by rock during blasting operation, evidence held insufficient to take case to jury on issues of failure to furnish reasonably safe place, implements, and appliances, failure to adopt and promulgate reasonable methods, and rules of doing work, or using excessive amount of explosives in making particular blast causing death.

10. Trial. — Instruction should be confined to issues of negligence raised by pleadings.

Appeal from Harlan Circuit Court.

WOODWARD, WARFIELD & HOBSON, ASHBY M. WARREN, J. C. BAKER, JOHN C. ADKINS and LOW & BRYANT for appellant.

O'REAR, FOWLER & WALLACE and B.B. GOLDEN for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE THOMAS.

Reversing.

William Morgan was accidentally killed on April 11, 1925, while in the employ of appellant and defendant below, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, and in which employment he had been engaged for about three months as a member of what is called in the record a "powder or blasting crew." It consisted of three persons viz., decedent, plaintiff, his father, and one Aaron Napier, the latter being foreman thereof. For a month or six weeks the crew was exclusively engaged in blasting rock to make room for the construction of a second or double track of defendant's railroad at a point in Harlan county, and deceased was killed by a flying rock striking him on the head as a result of an explosion. His father, the appellant and plaintiff below, qualified as his administrator and brought this action against defendant in Harlan county to recover damages for his son's death, which the petition as amended averred was brought about by the negligence of defendant in these particulars: (1) Failure to furnish decedent a reasonably safe place, safe implements and appliances in and with which to perform his work; (2) failure to adopt and promulgate reasonable methods and rules for carrying on the work; and (3) excessive amount of explosives used in making the particular blast that caused decedent's death. It was also averred that defendant was negligent in certain other specified particulars, but all of which were but parts of the general charge in the petition as to the unsafe place, tools, implements, etc., at which and with which deceased was required to perform his duties.

The answer was a denial with pleas of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, each of which was controverted, and upon trial the jury, under the instructions submitted to it by the court, returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $10,000, which the court declined to set aside on defendant's motion for a new trial, and from the judgment rendered thereon it prosecutes this appeal.

Neither our statute relating to liability of carriers engaged in intrastate commerce for negligent injuries to their servants (sections 820b1, 820b2 and 820b3 of our present statutes, nor the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA, secs. 51-59; U.S. Comp. Stats., secs 8657-8665), applying to carriers engaged in interstate commerce, withhold the defense of assumption of risk, except in cases where the negligence consisted in failing to observe some statutory requirement enacted for the safety of employees of such carriers; nor is the defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk, withheld from defendant in actions under either the state or the federal statute, unless defendant and its injured servant were engaged in commerce either intrastate or interstate, as was pointed out in the case of Idol v. L. & N.R.R. Co., 203 Ky. 81, 261 S.W. 878.

On page 810, sec. 467, vol. 1, of Roberts on Federal Liability of Carriers, the text says that an employee of a carrier who is engaged in original construction work (as distinguished from repair work, although the latter may consist in substantial physical additions to old or prior instrumentalities used in commerce) is not engaged in commerce, nor are its servants employed therein so engaged so as to deprive the carrier of the common law defenses of contributory negligence, or assumption of risk, or any other defense withheld by employers' liability statutes either federal or state. Many cases are referred to in that text wherein it was held that original construction work, as distinguished from repair work of the character indicated, came under neither the federal nor the state statute, if any upon the subject, and that in actions for injuries sustained by the servant so engaged all common-law defenses are available. See, also, the Idol case, supra; Young v. Norfolk & Western Railroad Co., 171 Ky. 510, 188 S.W. 621, and Thompson v. C.N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 165 Ky. 256, 176 S.W. 1006, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1266. Under those authorities it is quite clear that neither the defendant nor the deceased at the time he was killed was engaged in either interstate or intrastate commerce, and that the two affirmative defenses relied on herein were available to defendant, and which does not seem to be questioned by learned counsel for plaintiff — and which brings us to a consideration of the case on its merits.

The particular task in hand at the time of the accident was the blasting of a sheaf of rock from the foot of a hill or mountain for a distance of about 80 feet and of a thickness of from about 10 to 15 feet. On the day before the explosion another crew, whose duty it was to do so, had bored 8 holes along the line of the far side of the sheaf to be blown away, and they were 8 feet apart and of a depth of from 10 to 20 feet. The process employed was to "spring" those holes before putting in the explosive for the final blast, and it was done by exploding a small amount of powder or dynamite in each hole so as to enlarge it to the capacity of receiving the necessary amount of explosives to throw away the sheaf. On the morning of the explosion Napier and the deceased put into each hole the explosive for the final blast as they had theretofore done in similar undertakings. Before that was done, however, one Wade, who had the general superintendency of the entire construction work, had disputed with Napier as to the necessary quantity of explosive that should be put into at least some of the holes; but the evidence, at most, shows only a difference in judgment between Wade and Napier as to the required quantity. However, the latter testified, without contradiction, that he did not follow Wade's advice, although he possibly slightly increased the quantity of explosive in some of the holes above what he thought was necessary, but it is extremely doubtful if such slight increase of explosives in such holes materially or otherwise increased the hazard or danger to those engaged in the work — a matter which we will hereafter refer to.

The explosion was effected by means of an electric battery with a wire running from it to the nearest hole containing the explosives,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • American Savings L. Ins. Co. v. Riplinger
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 2, 1933
    ...& O.R. Co. v. Cooper, 168 Ky. 137, 181 S.W. 933; Pullman Company v. Pulliam, 187 Ky. 213, 218 S.W. 1005; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Morgan's Adm'r, 225 Ky. 447, 9 S.W. (2d) 212; Park Circuit & Realty Co. v. Coulter, 233 Ky. 1, 24 S.W. (2d) 942), or where the petition contains a charge of gene......
  • American Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Riplinger
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • May 2, 1933
  • Stacy v. Williams
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • March 13, 1934
  • Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. McCracken
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • June 13, 1933
    ... ... Co., 203 Ky. 81, 261 S.W. 878, ... 881; and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Morgan's ... Administrator, 225 Ky. 447, 9 S.W.2d 212. In the latter ... case it was held that a member of a construction ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT