L. & N. R. R. Co. v. City of Barbourville

• Decision Date: 05 January 1898
• Citation: 105 Ky. 174
• Parties: Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. City of Barbourville.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

105 Ky. 174

Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. City of Barbourville.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

January 5, 1898.

APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT.

J. W. ALCORN, FOR THE APPELLANT.

S. B. DISHMAN, FOR APPELLEE.

JUDGE Du RELLE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

The appellant obtained an injunction against the councilmen and marshal of the city of Barbourville to prevent the levy and collection of municipal taxes for the years 1892 and 1893 upon appellant's roadway running through the corporate limits of the city. By the agreed statement of facts, it appears that the appellant began construction of its railroad, which runs by and through Barbourville, in April, 1886. Prior to 1890, the land lying west of the railroad, and between it and the city, was farming land but in that year the Barbourville Land & Improvement Company bought such land for city additions, and laid it off for that purpose in streets, avenues, lots, and blocks. In March, 1890, by act of the Legislature, the corporate limits were extended so as to take in about a mile and three-quarters of the railroad, leaving the railroad as the boundary upon that side. By an act adopted in May, 1890, the city boundary was extended a few poles beyond the railroad. In 1892 and in 1895 some persons who had sold lands to the improvement company got them back, and such lands were fenced by the owners, and have been since used as farming land, excepting two streets, which still remain open. The circuit court dissolved the injunction against the members of the council, but adjudged that the marshal could not coerce the payment of taxes by levy and sale of appellant's property, and perpetuated the injunction against him.

We need not consider the act of 1883-84 (Gen. Stat., p. 1029), providing for the exemption from taxation of railroads thereafter built for a period of five years from the date of the beginning of the construction of such railroads, as that period had elapsed before the taxes in question were assessed. The only ground alleged for the injunction — aside from some grounds which are negatived by the agreed statement of facts — is that the railroad was constructed through farming lands, and that the city procured the extension of its boundary for the sole purpose of collecting taxes from appellant for municipal purposes, from which taxes appellant receives no benefit. By a provision of the act of March 26, 1890, extending the boundary (article 3, Sec. 8), lands used for farming purposes were excepted from the power given to the town to tax for municipal purposes; and upon this provision, and the fact, as contended for by appellant, that the lands along the railroad on both sides, and between it and the populous part of the town, have been practically, at all times since they were included in the corporate limits, farming lands, — although during a part of the time they were laid off into town lots and attempted to be sold as such, — appellant relies. It is claimed for appellant that this act was the only law under which the municipality could levy or collect any tax for the year 1892, and that the act remained in force until the enactment of the act for the government of cities of the fifth class on July 3, 1893; and in support of this contention the case of Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Com., (Ky.) 17 R., 178 , is relied on, in...