L.R., Matter of, 04-97-01061-CV

• Decision Date: 30 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 04-97-01061-CV,04-97-01061-CV
• Citation: 975 S.W.2d 656
• Parties: In the Matter of L.R.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 656

975 S.W.2d 656

In the Matter of L.R.

No. 04-97-01061-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas San Antonio.

June 30, 1998.

Vincent D. Callahan, San Antonio, for Appellant.

Angela Moore, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, for Appellee.

Before LOPEZ, STONE and DUNCAN, JJ.

STONE, Justice.

L.R. appeals his conviction for the offense of possession of less than 28 grams of cocaine in violation of the Texas Controlled Substances Act. In one point of error, L.R. challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the cocaine was obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure under Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution. Finding that the seizure of cocaine was legal under the "plain feel" doctrine, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The legality of the seizure was raised both at a pre-trial suppression hearing and during a bench trial. Aside from slight variations, the facts at the suppression hearing were the same facts testified to at trial.

On June 1, 1994, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Park Ranger Raul Mendiola heard gun shots fired while patrolling in Brackenridge Park. He notified his dispatcher and began checking the immediate vicinity when he observed a Mercury Bobcat being driven without its headlights. Mendiola followed the Mercury, which by then was operating with its lights. The vehicle approached the intersection of Brackenridge and Wilderness, ignored a posted stop sign, and turned left onto Wilderness Street. Mendiola activated his overhead lights in an attempt to stop the vehicle. The Mercury continued through the park without regard to Mendiola, who by then was intermittently activating his siren. Mendiola radioed the dispatcher that the suspects were not stopping. The Mercury reached the access road to Highway 281 when a patrol car driven by Sergeant Guerrero of the San Antonio Police Department arrived on the scene. The presence of Guerrero's car apparently persuaded the driver of the Mercury to submit to the pursuing officers. By this time, Park Ranger Daniel Martinez arrived as back-up in response to the reported gunshots. Three individuals were in the vehicle. Each officer conducted a pat-down search on one of the individuals. Martinez, while conducting a pat-down search on L.R., found cocaine in L.R.'s front right pocket.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), the Court of Criminal Appeals clarified the appropriate deference that appellate courts should afford to trial court rulings. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Specifically, the court instructed that an appellate court should defer to a trial court's

                determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.  Id. Appellate courts should afford the same deference to a trial court's rulings on the application of law to fact questions, if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.  Id. However, appellate courts may review de novo "mixed questions of law and fact" not falling within this category.  Id. The central issue in the instant case, whether the seizure of the cocaine exceeded the permissible scope of the weapons search, is a mixed question of law and fact.  Because the resolution of this question involved evaluating the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the record applying a deferential abuse of discretion standard of review.  See id.   We still review the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.  Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).  In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.  Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).  Thus, the trial court is free to believe any or all of a witness's testimony.  Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 831, 114 S.Ct. 101, 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993).  When, as in the instant case, the legality of the seizure is re-litigated at trial, consideration of relevant trial testimony is appropriate in our review.  Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 614, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996)
                

LEGALITY OF SEIZURE

L.R. argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress because Martinez exceeded the permissible scope of a weapons search when he manipulated his pocket in order to determine the identity of contraband in his pocket. L.R. relies chiefly upon Flores v. State, 824 S.W.2d 704 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd) and Brown v. State, 830 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) in support of his position. In reply, the State contends the seizure of the cocaine was proper under the "plain feel" doctrine exception recognized in the context of a Terry search. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), an investigatory stop is justified if a police officer, based upon specific and articulable facts, reasonably concludes the detained person may be associated with criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see Davis v. State, 829 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); State v. Simmang, 945 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.). Terry also authorizes a pat-down search of a person for weapons when the officer is justified in believing that the detainee may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Davis, 829 S.W.2d at 221. The purpose of a Terry search is to neutralize a potentially volatile situation and allow an officer to investigate without fear of violence; it is not meant to discover evidence of a crime. Wood v. State, 515 S.W.2d 300, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). A search which continues after the officer determines the detainee is not armed exceeds the permissible bounds of Terry. Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). In the instant case, it is clear that both the investigatory stop and the subsequent Terry search were constitutionally permissible. The vehicle in which L.R. was riding was in the vicinity of gun shots, and it fled the area in spite of police commands to stop. Further, the officers were justified in believing that a weapons search was necessary to protect their safety.

In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), the United States Supreme Court expanded the permissible bounds of a Terry search to include the discovery of contraband which the officer inadvertently, but "immediately," detects through the sense of touch. Specif...