L.V. v. City of Maryville & Maurice Kelly Dixon
| Decision Date | 15 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:16-cv-508,3:16-cv-508 |
| Parties | L.V., a minor, by and through his parent and guardian, LENARD VANDERHOE F, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MARYVILLE and MAURICE KELLY DIXON, in his individual capacity as an Officer for the Maryville Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On May 19, 2016, plaintiff L.V., a minor, was involved in an automobile accident in Blount County, Tennessee, with defendant Maurice Kelly Dixon, who is a Reserve Officer with the City of Maryville Police Department. Immediately following the accident, Mr. Dixon detained L.V. and his two passengers at gunpoint for approximately one minute. L.V. claims that Mr. Dixon and the City of Maryville, Tennessee ("the City") violated his constitutional rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable seizure and other state law claims.
Mr. Dixon and the City of Maryville have filed motions for summary judgment [Docs. 22, 26], with thorough briefs and exhibits in support [Docs. 23, 24, 27, 39, 41] and the plaintiff has responded in opposition [Docs. 31, 32, 42]. For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Dixon's motion will be granted in part and denied in part, and the City's motion will be granted.
Mr. Dixon is employed full-time as an SPO, security police officer, at the Y-12 nuclear plant [Doc. 24-2 at p. 2]. He also works part-time as a reserve police officer with the City of Maryville Police Department [Id.]. On the afternoon of May 19, 2016, Mr. Dixon was not on duty with the Maryville Police Department, nor was he wearing a police uniform, traveling in a police vehicle, or carrying a department-issued firearm [Id.at pp. 29—30]. Just prior to the accident, Mr. Dixon had mowed his son's lawn and was traveling to his own home in his personal truck towing a lawn mower on a trailer [Doc. 24-2 at pp. 3—5].
At the time of the accident, plaintiff L.V. was 16 years old and driving his first car, a 2000 Ford Mustang [Doc. 26-1 at pp. 2—3]. His friends, brothers N.N. and M.N., also minors at the time, were riding with him [Id. at p. 5]. A third friend, D.H., was following L.V. in his own Mustang [Id. at p. 7].1 As the cars approached the intersection of Keener Road and Cunningham Road, L.V. came around a curve too fast and swerved into the oncoming lane of traffic [Id. at pp. 9—10]. Mr. Dixon was traveling in the opposite direction [Id. at pp. 9—11; Doc. 24-2 at p. 5]. L.V. swerved into the left-hand ditch, hit atelephone pole, and then swerved back across the road, hitting the front fender of Mr. Dixon's truck in the process [Doc. 26-1 at pp. 9—10].
After the impact and both cars came to a stop, Mr. Dixon exited his truck and approached L.V.'s car about 100 feet away, "[p]robably [at a] fast walk" but he "might have ran" [Doc. 24-2 at p. 8; Doc. 31-3 at p. 5]. As he reached the back of the Mustang, the front passenger, N.N., jumped out and said "Come on, get out, let's go, let's go" [Doc. 24-2 at pp. 10—11].2 Mr. Dixon observed N.N. reach into the back seat, but he could not see what N.N. was reaching for [Id. at p. 11]. Mr. Dixon feared that the passenger was reaching for a gun or other weapon or preparing to flee the scene [Id.]. In light of his police training and experience, Mr. Dixon drew his personal handgun and repeatedly directed the three teenagers, [Id. at pp. 11—12].3 The teenagers complied and got on the ground [Doc. 26-2 at p. 11].
L.V. testified that Mr. Dixon had his gun pointed at L.V.'s head, he told L.V. to put his hands behind his head, and the teenagers were held at gunpoint for about one to two minutes [Doc. 26-1 at pp. 13—14; Doc. 31-5 at p. 4].4 Ms. Keller estimated the teenagers were on the ground for about five minutes [Doc. 31-2 at p. 7]. Mr. Dixon claims he never had his gun pointed at anyone's head; rather, he had his gun at "low ready" . He describes this as aiming at a 45-degree angle, waist-level or lower, and ready to engage if the subject is reaching for something [Doc. 31-3 at pp. 20—21].
Mr. Dixon claims he did not identify himself as a police officer initially, but he did so when talking to Ms. Keller [Doc. 24-2 at p. 14]. Mr. Dixon states that Ms. Keller told him to calm down and that it was just an accident [Id. at p. 15]. He believes that he holstered his weapon "about the time" Ms. Keller initially spoke to him [Id. at p. 25]. Mr. Dixon admits he "finally told her to shut up and mind her own business and get back in the car" [Id. at p. 14]. Ms. Keller refused his instruction to get back in her car [Doc. 31-2 at p. 6]. When Ms. Keller stated she was going to call the police, Mr. Dixon responded, [Doc. 24-2 at p. 14].5 Mr. Dixon explained, "I told her I was a police officer so she would understand that I knew what I was doing and was handling the situation" [Doc. 31-3 at p. 28]. Ms. Keller asked Mr. Dixon if he was with the City or the County, but she did not understand his answer [Doc. 31-2 at p. 22]. While Ms. Keller was on the phone with 911, Mr. Dixon put his gun away and retrieved his police badge from his vehicle [Doc. 24-2 at pp. 18—19, 42]. After her 911 call, Ms. Keller claims that Mr. Dixon told her she could leave because she did not see the accident [Doc. 31-2 at p. 8]. However, she refused to do so because [Doc. 31-2 at p. 8].
Mr. Dixon claims he told the three teenagers they could get up after he put his gun away [Doc. 26-2 at p. 14]. Per Maryville Police Department policy, Mr. Dixon does not have arrest authority when he is not on duty or working in an official capacity [Doc. 24-2 at p. 31].
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). All facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 2002). "Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations." Curtis Through Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. 317). To establish a genuine issue as to the existence of a particular element, the non-moving party must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine issue must also be material; that is, it must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.
The Court's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper question for the factfinder. Id. at 250. The Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249. Nor does the Court search the record "to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479—80 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, "the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
Plaintiff has alleged two violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of his due process rights and a violation of his right to be free from unreasonable seizure.6 In order to establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or law of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Neuens v. City of Columbus, 303F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2002). Both defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish a § 1983 claim because Mr. Dixon was not acting under color of law at the time of the incident. Whether Mr. Dixon was acting under color of law is a legal issue for resolution by the Court. Neuens, 303 F.3d at 670.
A state actor's conduct occurs under color of law in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office or if the conduct is such that the actor could not have behaved as he did without the authority of his office. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49—50 (1988) (); Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2001). "The key determinant is whether the actor intends to act in an official capacity or to exercise official responsibilities pursuant to state law." Waters, 242 F.3d at 359 (emphasis added) (citing West, 487 U.S. at 50). The state actor's conduct must relate "in some meaningful way either to the actor's governmental status or to the performance of his duties." Id. "[A] defendant's private conduct, outside the course or scope of his duties and unaided by any indicia of actual or ostensible state authority, is not conduct occurring under color of state law." Id.; see Massey v. Hess, No. 1:05-CV-249, 2007 WL 2725890, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. ...
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