L.W. v. State
| Decision Date | 23 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-JV-1138 |
| Citation | 199 N.E.3d 1225 |
| Parties | L.W., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Jon A. Keyes, Allen Wellman McNew Harvey, LLP, Greenfield, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Courtney L. Staton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] The State of Indiana filed a petition alleging seventeen-year-old L.W. was a delinquent in connection with a vehicle accident that resulted in a fatality. After the accident, a police officer obtained a sample of L.W.’s blood. L.W. subsequently moved to suppress all evidence obtained in connection with the blood draw, claiming the officer had infringed on her statutory right to consult with her mother prior to agreeing to the procedure. The juvenile court denied L.W.’s motion.
[2] In this interlocutory appeal, L.W. reiterates that the blood draw, absent an opportunity for parental consultation, violated her federal and state constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure. We reverse the juvenile court's denial of L.W.’s motion to suppress and remand with instructions.
[3] On April 6, 2021, Officer Matt Fox of the Fortville Police Department was dispatched to investigate a serious motor vehicle crash. Upon arrival at the scene, he learned L.W., who had been driving a sport utility vehicle, had collided with Guy Washburn, who had been riding a motorcycle. Washburn later died from severe injuries sustained in the crash, but L.W. was unhurt. Officer Fox found L.W. sitting on a curb, crying. L.W.’s mother, who L.W. had called to the scene, sat next to her. Officer Fox was wearing a body camera, which recorded his interactions with L.W. and her mother.
[4] Officer Fox asked L.W.’s mother to speak with him alone, so they walked a short distance away from L.W. L.W.’s mother told Officer Fox L.W. was seventeen. In turn, he told L.W.’s mother that whenever there is a crash with serious injuries, Defendant's Ex. A, File FOX305_9C00629_1626490, at 3:12. The officer further stated he would read L.W. an implied consent advisement and transport her to the hospital for the blood draw. Officer Fox further stated L.W. was not under arrest, and "it's all a formality." Id. at 3:32. He further stated his investigation would not necessarily result in "criminal charges" being filed. Id. at 4:59.
[5] Officer Fox and L.W.’s mother then walked back to L.W. He told L.W. she was not under arrest, but he needed to read her something. Officer Fox then produced an implied consent advisement, which he told her he had discussed with her mother, and read the following:
I have reason to believe you operated a motor vehicle that was involved in a fatal or serious bodily injury crash and must now offer you the opportunity to submit to a chemical test and inform you that your refusal to submit to a chemical test will result in your driving privileges [sic] for one year and is punishable by a Class C infraction. If you have at least one previous conviction for Operating While Intoxicated, your refusal to submit to a chemical test will result in your driving privileges [sic] for two years and is punishable as a Class A infraction.
Id. at 16:20.
[6] L.W. indicated she agreed to the blood draw. Officer Fox then explained to L.W. that he would transport her to the hospital for the procedure, with her mother driving separately. He said the blood draw was "required by state law." Id. at 7:52.
[7] At that point, Officer Fox asked L.W. to explain what happened, and she stated, while crying, that she did not remember the details of the accident, did not see the motorcycle, and may have fallen asleep while driving. He returned to the subject of the blood draw, stating "it's just a formality," all parties to the crash have to undergo the blood draw, and no one was accusing L.W. "of being impaired." Id. at 10:56, 11:10. Officer Fox then stated that after the blood draw was done, L.W. would be able to go home with her mother.
[8] Officer Fox put L.W. in his marked police vehicle and drove to a nearby hospital, with L.W.’s mother following. He did not activate his lights or siren, and he drove at a regular speed. Over the course of the twenty-four-minute drive, Officer Fox asked L.W. several questions about the crash but generally remained silent or communicated with his supervisor. L.W. did not volunteer any information.
[9] Upon arriving at the hospital, Officer Fox escorted L.W. and her mother to a room, where they waited for approximately fifteen minutes until a phlebotomist arrived. The phlebotomist had L.W.’s mother review and sign a form stating:
Tr. Vol. III, p. 4 (State's Ex. 2). Next, the phlebotomist took a blood sample from L.W. The State alleges subsequent testing of the sample revealed the presence of a metabolite of THC, a controlled substance.
[10] Officer Fox later admitted he had not advised L.W. at the crash site, or in the police vehicle, or at the hospital, that she had a right to consult with her mother before agreeing to a blood draw. He further agreed it would have taken only "ten seconds" at most to provide that advisement. Tr. Vol. II, p. 8. L.W. and her mother both subsequently testified that if they had been advised they could have spoken privately before agreeing to the blood draw, they would have had a private discussion.
[11] On November 23, 2021, the State filed with the juvenile court a request for leave to file a delinquent child petition against L.W. The court granted the State's request. The State ultimately filed an amended delinquency petition alleging L.W. was a delinquent child for acts that, if they had been committed by an adult, would have amounted to causing death when operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood, a Level 4 felony;1 and reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony.2
[12] On March 10, 2022, L.W. filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw, claiming the evidence was obtained in violation of her federal and state constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure. In a subsequent brief, she argued she had not been given an opportunity to speak privately with her mother prior to consenting to the blood draw, in violation of Indiana law. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 101.
[13] The State filed a response to L.W.’s motion, and the juvenile court presided over an evidentiary hearing. On April 18, 2022, the court denied L.W.’s motion. The juvenile court and this Court granted L.W. permission to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's ruling, and this appeal followed.
[14] L.W. argues the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Generally, our review of a denial of a motion to suppress is similar to our review of other sufficiency matters. Wright v. State , 766 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). That is, we will disturb the trial court's ruling only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Id. But where, as in this case, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of a search or seizure via a motion to suppress, that challenge raises a "pure question of law that we review de novo." Tigner v. State , 142 N.E.3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
[15] The act of drawing a person's blood by the State, or at the direction of the State, in furtherance of a police investigation is a type of search that is subject to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment3 and article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.4 See Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (); see also Clark v. State , 175 Ind. App. 391, 398, 372 N.E.2d 185, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) ().
[16] The State did not obtain a warrant for L.W.’s blood draw. Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, and the State must prove one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. M.O. v. State , 63 N.E.3d 329 (Ind. 2016).
[17] "A warrantless search based on lawful consent is consistent with both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions." Campos v. State , 885 N.E.2d 590, 600 (Ind. 2008). The State points out that, by statute, drivers impliedly consent to blood draws in connection with accidents involving serious injury or death. Ind. Code § 9-30-7-2 (2001) (). A driver may refuse to consent, and if consent is not given, the driver is guilty of an infraction and will experience suspension of driving privileges for at least a year. Ind. Code § 9-30-7-5 (2013). But the police may not simply require a driver to submit to a blood draw if the driver refuses consent. See Hannoy v. State , 789 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (), on reh'g , 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied....
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