Laabs v. City of Victorville
Decision Date | 12 June 2008 |
Docket Number | No. E040778.,E040778. |
Citation | 163 Cal.App.4th 1242,78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | AMANDA LAABS, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF VICTORVILLE, Defendant and Appellant. |
Plaintiff Amanda Laabs was injured in an automobile collision. She sued various parties, including the County of San Bernardino (the County) and the City of Victorville (the City). As against these governmental entities, she alleged that her injuries were caused by a dangerous condition of public property for purposes of Government Code sections 830 and 835.1 The City moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. The court subsequently denied the City's motion for defense costs (pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1038) and expenses incurred in proving matters that plaintiff had denied (pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420). Following the denial of plaintiff's motion for new trial and the entry of judgment, plaintiff appealed. The City appealed from the court's denial of its motion for defense costs and expenses.
We affirm both the trial court's grant of summary judgment as well as its denial of the City's motion for defense costs and expenses.
The following facts are, in essence, uncontroverted and taken from the evidence submitted by the parties in support of, and in opposition to, the motion for summary judgment.2
Ridgecrest Road is a four-lane north/south roadway with a posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. It intersects with Pebble Beach Drive, a two-lane east/west roadway. Westbound Pebble Beach has a stop sign, a painted limit line, and "STOP" painted on the roadway.
Pebble Beach, which has no centerline delineation, passes through a portion of the Spring Valley Lake residential area. Ridgecrest runs along the west side of the Spring Valley Lake development. There is a block wall along the east side of Ridgecrest, just to the south of Pebble Beach. The block wall is about 10 feet east of the curb and runs parallel with Ridgecrest; at its north end, it turns easterly to run along a small portion of the south side of Pebble Beach.
The subject automobile accident occurred when a northbound vehicle on Ridgecrest collided with a westbound vehicle turning left from Pebble Beach onto southbound Ridgecrest. The northbound vehicle, a Porsche Carrera, was driven by James Dimeo. The left-turning vehicle, a Mitsubishi, was driven by Dorothy Specter. The impact occurred within the northbound lanes of Ridgecrest.
In 1996, Ridgecrest was widened to the west. Added were the southbound lanes of Ridgecrest consisting of two 12-foot lanes and a 12-foot-wide two-way left turn lane. The County retained ownership, control, and responsibility for the northbound lanes of Ridgecrest; the City annexed the west side and acquired control and maintenance responsibility for the southbound lanes. The as-built plans show the northbound lanes as being County property and the southbound lanes as being owned and controlled by the City.
At its intersection with Ridgecrest, Pebble Beach has a 6 to 8 percent uphill grade in a westerly direction and a 5 percent downgrade to the north. South of its intersection with Pebble Beach, Ridgecrest is an undulating roadway with a 280-foot vertical curve just to the south of the intersection.
At the time of the accident, the driver of the northbound Porsche, James Dimeo, was accompanied by Jason Moffett and plaintiff. Just before the accident, they planned to go to In-N-Out Burger. Initially, Dimeo proceeded southbound on Ridgecrest towards Bear Valley Highway. His vehicle at times reached a speed of 100 miles per hour. At some point near a church parking lot, Dimeo made a U-turn and began proceeding northbound on Ridgecrest.
Witness Kevin Vidana-Barda testified that as he was proceeding northbound on Ridgecrest, south of the accident site, the Porsche passed him, traveling anywhere from 100 to 120 miles per hour.3
Dimeo testified in his deposition that the Mitsubishi "pulled out right in front of" him. The Mitsubishi was crossing Ridgecrest from westbound Pebble Beach. He did not know how much time passed between the time he first saw the Mitsubishi and the time of impact. He was in the right-hand lane just before the impact. He was able to move his foot to the brake and steer the car into the left-hand lane before impact. He did not know the positions of the vehicles at the time of impact.
Dorothy Specter, the driver of the Mitsubishi, indicated that she stopped at the stop sign, looked both ways and saw nothing coming. She eased forward and again looked both ways and saw nothing coming. She pulled into the intersection to make a left-hand turn to go south on Ridgecrest. Suddenly, a vehicle came in front of her and struck the front of her vehicle. She never saw the other car coming. In a statement to the investigating officer, Specter gave no indication that her line of sight was obstructed.
Dimeo said that he had driven this part of Ridgecrest "every day," and "hundreds of times." He normally drives an elevated truck and never had difficulty seeing cars at the Pebble Beach intersection. In the lower Porsche, however, he said he could not see the westbound car at the intersection.
Keith Friedman, an expert, opined that based on his preliminary analysis, the Porsche was going 74 miles per hour at impact. After this initial impact, the Porsche spun around 270 degrees moving in a northwesterly direction. The Porsche partially jumped the western curb of Ridgecrest and slid northerly along the curb, striking and knocking over a light pole; the pole was located on the sidewalk adjacent to the southbound lanes. It had been installed within the City right-of-way, approximately one foot west of the western curb face of Ridgecrest.
Other evidence submitted by way of lay witnesses and expert declarations will be discussed within the context of our analysis.
In her first amended complaint, plaintiff asserts a cause of action for "premises liability" based on the theory, among others, that her injuries were caused by a dangerous condition of public property for purposes of sections 830 and 835. Specifically, plaintiff alleged:
The City moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: The City did not own or control northbound Ridgecrest, the Ridgecrest-Pebble Beach intersection was not in a dangerous condition as a matter of law, the City is entitled to design immunity under section 830.6, and the City is entitled to immunity for failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings, or devices under section 830.8.
In addition to opposing the City's asserted grounds for summary judgment, plaintiff argued that the placement of the light pole, or luminaire, on the west side of Ridgecrest constituted a dangerous condition that contributed to the severity of plaintiff's injuries.
Following a hearing, the court granted the motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, the court denied the City's motion for defense costs and expenses.
A moving party defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it establishes a complete defense to the plaintiff's cause of action, or shows that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493].) The moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact. Additionally, the moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that no triable issue of material fact exists. Once the initial burden of production is met, the burden shifts to the responding party to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Id. at pp. 850-851.) (Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1261 .) " (Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225, 234 .)
On appeal, "our review is de novo, and we independently review the record before the trial court." (Riverside County Community Facilities...
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