LaBarbera v. Millan Builders, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 November 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. H--145,H--145 |
| Citation | 191 So.2d 619 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Joe T. LaBARBERA et ux., Appellants, v. MILLAN BUILDERS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee. |
Richard W. Kreidler, of Howell, Kirby, Montgomery, Sands & D'Aiuto, Jacksonville, for appellants.
Dawson, Galant, Maddox & Sulik, Jacksonville, for appellee.
Plaintiffs appeal a final judgment setting aside a jury verdict rendered in their favor; adjudging that plaintiffs take nothing by their suit; and dismissing the cause at plaintiffs' cost. The judgment further provides that in the event it is reversed on appeal, the defendant be granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict should have been directed in defendant's favor at the conclusion of the evidence. In essence it is plaintiffs' contention that the evidence creates genuine issues of fact on the legal issues of liability and damages, and that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict and resolving all issues in favor of defendant.
By their complaint plaintiffs allege that their dwelling constructed by defendant suffered smoke and fire damage as a result of a malfunctioning of the central heating equipment. One count of the complaint alleges a breach of an implied warranty of fitness by defendant in failing to construct plaintiffs' residence in a manner safe for human habitation. The remaining count charged defendant with negligence in failing to provide proper ventilation to the furnace room, which failure proximately caused the heating unit to malfunction in such way as to cause the fire and smoke damage for which judgment was prayed. Upon the issues formed by defendant's general denial of the material allegations of the complaint, the cause was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. Defendant's post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted and the cause dismissed.
It is the theory of plaintiffs' case that in constructing their home defendant negligently placed insulating materials over the louver located in the ceiling of the furnace room thereby causing it to be so clogged, and the openings thereof so obstructed, as to prevent air from entering the furnace room from the attic. It is plaintiffs' position that because of such negligence, it was impossible for a sufficient amount of air to enter the furnace room and reach the burner of the fuel oil heater as to permit proper combustion of the flame and proper operation of the heating unit. As a result of such starvation of combustion air into the furnace, a 'puffback' was created in the mechanism causing a wild flame to surge out of the combustion chamber which ignited flammable materials in the room causing the interior thereof to become burned and charred and smoke to permeate the remainder of the house.
Although disputed by the competent and substantial direct evidence to the contrary, the circumstantial evidence introduced by plaintiffs at the trial supports the inference that the louver installed in the ceiling of the furnace room was clogged and obstructed by insulating materials prior to the outbreak of the fire. Such inference was sufficient to create a jury question on this issue of fact. Based partially upon this inference, plaintiffs' expert witness testified unequivocally that in his opinion the fire was started by what is known in the trade as a 'puffback' in the heating unit which set up a wild surge of flame from the combustion chamber of the furnace that ignited the flammable materials in the furnace room, and that the sole and only cause of the 'puffback' was a lack of adequate combustion air within the combustion chamber of the furnace.
In considering defendant's post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court held that in order to prevail on the issue of liability, the burden rested on plaintiffs to establish two essential facts, to wit: (1) that defendant negligently permitted the louver constructed in the ceiling of the furnace room to become clogged and obstructed by insulating materials, which condition prevailed prior to and at the time of the occurrence of the fire; and (2) that the clogged and obstructed condition of the ceiling louver prevented sufficient combustion air to reach the furnace, resulting in the creation of a 'puffback' which caused a wild surge of flame to escape from the furnace into the furnace room causing the fire and smoke damage suffered by plaintiffs. In this conclusion we think the trial court was eminently correct.
In its order granting defendant's motion, the trial court found that although all of the direct evidence introduced at the trial was to the contrary, that nevertheless the circumstantial evidence introduced by plaintiffs was sufficient to...
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Lord v. State
... ... Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 371 So.2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (To use one inference as a basis for ... See LaBarbera v. Millan Builders, Inc., 191 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). An expert is ... ...
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Scott v. Midyette-Moor, Inc.
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