Labbe v. Pension Com'n of City of Hartford
| Decision Date | 28 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 14696,14696 |
| Citation | 643 A.2d 1268,229 Conn. 801 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Allen J. LABBE, et al. v. PENSION COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF HARTFORD, et al. |
Leon M. Rosenblatt, for appellants-appellees (plaintiffs).
H. Maria Cone, then Deputy Corp. Counsel, with whom was Karen K. Buffkin, Sp. Counsel, for appellees-appellants (defendants).
Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and FOTI, JJ.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff Allen Labbe 1 was excused from exhausting the grievance procedures under a collective bargaining agreement before commencing an action in the Superior Court because using the procedures would have been futile. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because he had failed to exhaust his contractual remedies. The defendants, the Hartford pension commission and the city of Hartford, cross appealed. We transferred the case to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff claims that he was excused from using the grievance procedures established in the collective bargaining agreement because: (1) the procedures were only available to employees, and the plaintiff was no longer an employee when the grievance arose; (2) the procedures applied only to disputes between the parties to the agreement, and the parties to the agreement did not dispute the issue raised by the plaintiff; (3) using the procedures would have been futile; and (4) General Statutes § 31-51bb permits this action without prior recourse to the grievance procedures. In their cross appeal, the defendants claim that res judicata bars the plaintiff's claim in this case. 2 Because we agree with the plaintiff's third claim, namely, that using the grievance procedures in this case would have been futile, we need not address his other claims.
The plaintiff commenced this action in March, 1991. 3 The defendants moved to dismiss claiming that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his contractual and administrative remedies deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. After taking evidence for two days on both the motion and the merits of the case, the trial court, Hon. Robert J. Hale, state trial referee, issued a decision from the bench granting the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The record reveals the following facts. The plaintiff is a retired Hartford police officer and a Vietnam era veteran of the United States armed forces. In 1987, the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the Hartford police union (union) and the city of Hartford (city) was amended to allow police officers to purchase the right to apply military service time to the calculation of their pension benefits. 4 The substantive question underlying this appeal is whether, on one hand, the agreement authorized police officers to use military service time to reduce the time period before which they were eligible to receive their pensions, or whether, on the other hand, it authorized only an increase in pension benefits in proportion to the additional years of military service, without affecting when the officers became eligible. In the parlance of the parties, the former practice is known as using the military time "up front," and the latter practice is known as using the military time "in back."
The agreement also provides a four step procedure for the resolution of disputes. 5 The first three steps of the procedure may be instigated by the employee acting alone or, if the employee wishes, with the assistance of a union representative. These steps, to be taken in order, involve presenting the dispute to: (1) the employee's immediate supervisor; (2) the chief of police; and (3) the city's director of personnel. The fourth step, which the union alone has the authority to invoke, is to submit the grievance to binding arbitration.
In July, 1988, the plaintiff purchased the right to apply approximately three years and ten months of his military service toward his pension benefits. At the time, he had worked as a Hartford police officer for approximately seventeen years, three years less than the twenty years required for normal retirement. On July 13, 1988, the plaintiff submitted his resignation to chief of police Bernard R. Sullivan. The resignation was to be effective on October 11, 1988, which, by the plaintiff's calculations, was the date that his actual service time plus his military service time enabled him to retire with pension. Sullivan discouraged this resignation by advising the plaintiff that he lacked sufficient credit to obtain a pension at that time.
At trial, the plaintiff testified that Sullivan's response had been his first warning that there would be difficulty in using the military time up front. The plaintiff testified that he had discussed this matter with Officer Thomas Grodecki, the union vice-president and a member of the Hartford pension commission, as well as several people in the city treasurer's office. He testified that those discussions had led him to believe that he could retire in October, 1988, and that he had been confused by Sullivan's response. Two other police officers also testified that they had spoken with Grodecki, and that they had been led to believe that military service time could be used up front.
Grodecki testified, however, that he had not told the plaintiff or anyone else that he could use his military service time up front. He testified that he had been involved in the negotiations with the city regarding the collective bargaining agreement and the military buy-back provision, and that it had never been the intention of either party to use the military service time to reduce the twenty years needed for retirement. He testified that the union's goal was to increase the amount of the pension rather than change the time when it came due. Grodecki further testified that after talking to the plaintiff, he had discussed the matter with the city treasurer, who had confirmed his belief that military service time could not be used up front. Grodecki testified that both he and two employees of the city treasury department had independently searched treasury records in search of a Vietnam era veteran 6 who had used his military time up front, and that none of them had uncovered any such precedent.
In July, 1988, the office of the corporation counsel of the city issued an opinion stating that police officers could not use their military service time to advance the date of pension eligibility. Grodecki testified that although he had put little credence in the opinion because union and corporation counsels tend to be adverse to one another, he believed that it was correct.
Thereafter, the city and the union entered into discussions in order to clarify ambiguities in the collective bargaining agreement. On August 5, 1988, the city and the union entered into an agreement (August agreement) that amended the collective bargaining contract by stating, inter alia, that military service time could not be used up front. 7 Grodecki testified that he had represented the union in these discussions and that he had not objected to this interpretation of the military buy-back provision because "that's what we had [originally] negotiated." Immediately following the meeting, Grodecki posted notices throughout the police department that reported the agreement with the city, stating that military service time could not be used up front. 8
Grodecki further testified that he had discussed the matter with the plaintiff several times thereafter. He testified that he had advised the plaintiff that military service time could not be used up front and that, if the plaintiff attempted to resign, Sullivan would accept the resignation, but the plaintiff would not begin to receive his pension until his normal retirement date.
On September 26, 1988, the plaintiff resubmitted his letter of resignation to Sullivan. The effective date of resignation was again October 11, 1988. Sullivan accepted this resignation.
Prior to the effective date of resignation, the plaintiff attempted to rescind the letter. Sullivan rejected the plaintiff's rescission. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and with the support of the union, the plaintiff pursued through arbitration a grievance challenging Sullivan's refusal to permit the plaintiff to rescind his resignation. The arbitration panel ruled against the plaintiff. The plaintiff was released from service on October 11, 1988, but his pension application was not forwarded to the Hartford pension commission.
In December, 1988, the plaintiff sent an application for pension directly to the pension commission. On April 12, 1989, after a hearing on the plaintiff's application, the commission denied the application on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked the requisite twenty years of service and that his military time could not be used to supplement his actual service in order to advance his date of pension eligibility. 9
The plaintiff testified that after his release from service, he had approached both Grodecki and James Quiggley, president of the union, and had asked the union to back his effort to gain his pension. The plaintiff testified that they had refused. A similarly situated police officer testified that he had proposed to Grodecki and Quiggley that the union file a grievance, and that they had refused.
In May, 1989, the plaintiff and twelve other Hartford police officers commenced an action in the Superior Court against the city, the commission, and the union, seeking the right to use military service time up front. In October, 1990, the trial court, Freed, J., granted the motion to dismiss filed by the city and the commission, on the ground that the plaintiffs had...
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