Laber v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union

• Decision Date: 27 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 5:15–cv–55.,5:15–cv–55.
• Citation: 126 F.Supp.3d 934
• Parties: Donald LABER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

126 F.Supp.3d 934

Donald LABER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al., Defendants.

No. 5:15–cv–55.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed Aug. 27, 2015.

Timothy J. Puin, Janik, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Jeremiah A. Collins, Joshua B. Shiffrin, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, DC, David M. Fusco, Schwarzwald McNair Fusco, Cleveland, OH for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SARA LIOI, District Judge.

Before the Court is a series of motions that were filed shortly after this lawsuit was removed from state court. Plaintiffs have filed a motion to remand (Doc. No. 7 ["Mot. to Remand"] ), to which defendants have responded (Doc. No. 11 ["Opp'n"] ), and plaintiffs have replied (Doc. No. 12 ["Reply"] ). Plaintiffs have also filed a motion to stay proceedings pending a ruling on the motion to remand (Doc. No. 13), which stands unopposed. Defendants, in turn, have moved for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 9), which is also unopposed. Because the Court finds that this matter must be remanded to state court for want of federal jurisdiction, it need not (and, at least with respect to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, cannot) address the other pending motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The removal of this action from state court marks the second time the parties have been before this Court. For the sake of clarity, the first case, Case No. 5:13cv640, shall be referred to as "Laber I," while the present case shall be denoted as "Laber II." To fully appreciate the current factual and procedural posture of this case, however, it is necessary to go back to the very beginning, before the filing of Laber I.

A. The VSA and Subsequent Bankruptcy Proceedings

In 2006, plaintiffs, Donald Laber and Douglas Whack, terminated their employment with HLI Commercial Highway, Inc. ("HLI"), a subsidiary of Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. ("Hayes Lemmerz"), by taking advantage of a one-time voluntary separation agreement ("VSA") entered into between HLI and defendants, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (the "International") and Local 21 (the "Local"). (Laber I, Doc. No. 1–2, Compl. at ¶¶ 6–11.)¹ Plaintiffs had been members of the Local and were covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") entered into between HLI and the Local. (Compl.¶¶ 1, 8.) In exchange for their voluntary separation from HLI, plaintiffs received certain benefits, including a cash award and extended healthcare benefits. (Laber I, Doc. No. 1–2, VSA at 19–20.)²

On May 11, 2009, Hayes Lemmerz filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (FAC ¶ 7.) The FAC provides that, beginning in July, 2009, and unbeknownst to plaintiffs, Hayes Lemmerz and the International entered into negotiations to modify retiree benefits. (Id. ¶ 9.) On November 18, 2009, the parties reached an agreement, which was ultimately approved by the bankruptcy court. The effect of the agreement was a reduction of the medical benefits of all retirees of Hayes Lemmerz and its affiliates, including those who—like plaintiffs—had exercised their rights under the VSA. (Compl. ¶¶ 19–26; see FAC ¶¶ 9, 12, 30, 41, 60, 72.)

B. Laber I

On February 25, 2013, plaintiffs brought suit against defendants in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The original complaint contained two claims, one for breach of contract and a second claim for tortious interference with contractual and business relations, with the VSA serving as the foundation for both claims. It was plaintiffs' position that defendants wrongfully deprived them of their rights under the VSA when they compromised those rights in bankruptcy. On March 25, 2013, defendants removed the action to this Court, maintaining that plaintiffs' claims were completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, "which provides federal jurisdiction over suits for ‘violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.’ " (Laber I, Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal, at 3, quoting DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir.1994) ).

Plaintiffs subsequently moved to remand, insisting that their claims fell outside the reach of § 301 preemption as they did not rely upon, or even reference, the CBA. In a memorandum opinion, dated January 31, 2014, the Court denied the motion to remand. While the complaint was devoid of reference to the CBA, the Court found that the VSA, itself, qualified as a "labor contract" under § 301. (Laber I, Doc. No. 14 ["Memo. Op."] at 172.) In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that the VSA was the result of labor negotiations that addressed "an important issue arising out of the employment relationship," and "had the effect of redefining rights under the collective bargaining agreement ... in favor of specific benefits gained through the one-time opportunity to retire early." (Id., citing Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 618 (5th Cir.1994) ). Because plaintiffs' state law claims were entirely dependent upon an interpretation of the VSA, and the rights claimed by plaintiffs arose solely from that labor contract, the Court determined that the state law claims were completely preempted by federal law. (Id. at 172–73, citing, among authorities, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) ).

Following the Court's denial of reconsideration, plaintiffs revived an earlier alternative motion to amend the complaint to bring a fraudulent misrepresentation claim under Ohio law. (Laber I, Doc. No. 22 ["Renewed Mot. to Amend"] at 202; Doc. No. 17 ["Consol. Mot."].) According to plaintiffs, they intended to replace their preempted contract-based claims with a single claim that they were deliberately misled by defendants to believe that their rights would be protected in bankruptcy. The Court granted plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint that contained the proposed fraud claim, provided the resolution of this new claim would not require interpretation of the VSA and the rights sought by the claim did not emanate from that labor agreement. (Laber I, Doc. No. 25 ["Op. & Order"] at 244.)

On October 2, 2014, plaintiffs filed the FAC. Through this pleading, plaintiffs allege that statements made by defendants' representatives led them to believe that their rights would be represented in bankruptcy, and caused them to forego pursing certain legal remedies. Plaintiffs aver that they had two meetings with Jack Hefner, the "manager" of the Local. (FAC ¶¶ 18, 31.) During the first meeting, in May of 2010, plaintiffs allege that Hefner promised to put plaintiffs in touch with the International's lawyer, David Jury, "who would be able to help them protect their healthcare benefits in the bankruptcy case." (Id. ¶¶ 18, 21.) Hefner dialed Jury's office and gave the phone to Don who left a detailed message asking Jury to contact him. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs claim that defendants knew, at the time of this meeting, that the International had already reached an agreement with Hayes Lemmerz about retirement benefits, and that plaintiffs' rights had not been brought to the attention of the bankruptcy court. (Id. ¶ 23.)

The second meeting between plaintiffs and Hefner took place in June of 2010, at which time Hefner was joined by certain employees of Hayes Lemmerz. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs allege that—before, during and after the meeting—Hefner made statements to plaintiffs promising that defendants, "and David Jury in particular, were committed to helping maintain [plaintiffs'] healthcare benefits and would take care of the problem." (Id. ¶ 32.) According to plaintiffs, this was a lie, as defendants "had no intention of helping [plaintiffs] maintain their healthcare benefits." (Id. ¶ 34.)

Plaintiffs also allege that they had multiple communications between May and October of 2010 with Jury, who was, in fact, the associate general counsel for the International. (Id. ¶¶ 42–60.) Plaintiffs aver that Jury repeatedly assured them that he would "take care" of their benefits, and even wrote a letter to Hayes Lemmerz purporting to request that plaintiffs' healthcare benefits be fully restored. These oral and written communications had the effect of misleading plaintiffs into believing that Jury represented them as their attorney with respect to the bankruptcy case when in fact his only professional loyalties were with the International. (Id. ¶¶ 50–54.)

Plaintiffs allege that they reasonably relied, to their detriment, on the misrepresentations of Hefner and Jury, causing them to fail to diligently protect their rights. (Id. ¶¶ 67–69.) Specifically, plaintiffs insist that they would have:

acted differently if they had been told the truth, including by retaining counsel; seeking leave to file a late claim in the bankruptcy case while it was still pending; seeking leave to bring a hybrid 301 claim within the six-month statute of limitations; or, at the very least, dealing with the local and the international more as adversaries than allies in seeking to protect their healthcare benefits.

(Id. ¶ 70.) Plaintiffs further allege that they have "sustained actual and consequential damages in that they made financial commitments relying on these misrepresentations and concealments which they otherwise would not have made, including but not limited to purchases of consumer goods. Further, as a result of these misrepresentations and concealments, [plaintiffs] have incurred debts they otherwise would not have incurred; have lost legal and financial opportunities they otherwise would have had; have lost healthcare coverage; and have been induced by the [I]nternational and the [L]ocal into sleeping on their rights." (Id. ¶¶ 71–72.) The FAC makes no mention of the CBA or the VSA. Finding no basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court remanded the matter to state court.

C. Laber II

The parties...