Labiosa-Herrera v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 January 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No. 11–1651 (FAB)
• Citation: 153 F.Supp.3d 541
• Parties: Mayra L. Labiosa–Herrera, Plaintiff, v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

153 F.Supp.3d 541

Mayra L. Labiosa–Herrera, Plaintiff,

v.Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Defendant.

Civil No. 11–1651 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed January 5, 2016

Manuel Duran–Rodriguez, Manuel Duran Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Alicia Figueroa–Llinas, Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, P.S.C, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

BESOSA

, District Judge

Plaintiff Mayra L. Labiosa–Herrera (“Labiosa”) brought suit against her employer Puerto Rico Telephone Company (“PRTC”), alleging that PRTC violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq,

and Puerto Rico Laws 100 and 115. (Docket No. 27.) Plaintiff roots her age discrimination claims in defendant PRTC's act of transferring her to a different department, failing to assign her appropriate tasks, creating a hostile work environment, and temporarily suspending her in retaliation for filing age discrimination claims. Id. Before the Court is defendant PRTC's unopposed motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 33), and PRTC's statement of uncontested material facts, (Docket No. 33–1). After considering defendant PRTC's arguments, the Court GRANTS PRTC's motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On October 26, 2010, plaintiff Labiosa filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that she “ha[d] been assigned tasks that [she could] not perform and [had been transferred] to a position [for which she was] not qualified” in an attempt to force her to resign. (Docket No. 57–9 at p. 7.) On April 20, 2011, the EEOC issued a Right to Sue letter. (Docket No. 27 at ¶ 5(c).)

In July 2011, she filed a complaint with the Court which included an age discrimination claim based on a departmental transfer and subsequent lack of reclassification of work and a hostile work environment claim. (Docket No. 1.) On November 15, 2011, Labiosa filed an amended complaint providing additional details to support her existing claims. (Docket No. 14 at ¶¶ 15–21.)

On December 13, 2011, she moved to dismiss the age discrimination claims related to the 2008 departmental transfer voluntarily, but sought to continue to litigate the hostile work environment claim and the age discrimination claim regarding her lack of reclassification. (Docket No. 20.) The court granted plaintiff's motion and dismissed the age discrimination claims based on the 2008 departmental transfer. (Docket No. 21.)

On June 6, 2012, Labiosa filed a second amended complaint in which she removed information about her hostile work environment claim and her emotional condition caused by PRTC's allegations that she had falsified payroll documents. Compare Docket No. 14 at ¶¶ 15–21, with Docket No. 27 at ¶¶ 15–21. She also introduced a retaliation claim based on her March 2012 suspension. (Docket No. 27 at ¶ 21.) Defendant PRTC answered the second amended complaint on June 19, 2012, (Docket No. 28), and moved for summary judgment on September 19, 2012, (Docket No 33).

Due to the parties indication that they had reached an agreement to settle, (Docket No. 38), the Court dismissed the case on October 24, 2012, (Docket No. 42). The case was reopened on November 20, 2012, (Docket No. 53), however, following a motion by Labiosa, (Docket No. 44). She then filed an untimely response to defendant PRTC's motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 51), which the court struck from the record, (Docket No. 63). As a result, the Court now evaluates defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 33).

B. Factual Background

Because plaintiff Labiosa failed to oppose PRTC's motion for summary judgment timely, the Court accepts as true all of defendant PRTC's properly supported, uncontested facts.¹ See Fontañez–Nuñez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 447 F.3d 50, 52–53 (1st Cir.2006)

; Local Civil Rule 56(e).

1. Departmental Transfer & Lack of Reassignment

On September 4, 1996, plaintiff Labiosa began working for PRTC, an employer of more than fifteen employees. (Docket Nos. 57–7 at p. 10, 27 at ¶ 9.) In April 2005, Labiosa was transferred from the Drug Use Prevention and Control Department to the Occupational Health and Security Department, where she worked as an inspector. (Docket No. 57–1 at ¶ 8.)

As part of an internal reorganization in 2008, plaintiff Labiosa, the inspector with the least seniority in her position, was transferred to the position of Officer of Project Management In–Training. (Docket Nos. 57–1 at ¶¶ 10–12, 57–7.) Her pay and benefits were unaffected by this transfer. (Docket Nos. 57–2 at p. 67; 57–16 at p. 5.) At the time of the transfer, PRTC employed five inspectors in the Occupational Health and Security Department. (Docket Nos. 57–1 at ¶ 11, 57–7.) One of the inspectors was older than plaintiff Labiosa, one was the same age, and two were younger, but all were over forty years of age. (Docket No. 57–7.) Plaintiff Labiosa's inspector position was eliminated and her duties reassigned to the remaining four inspectors in the Occupational Health and Security Department. (Docket No. 57–2 at pp. 52–53.) Other employees were affected by this reorganization, including employees under forty years of age. Id. at pp. 50–51; Docket No. 57–15. Plaintiff speculates that her transfer, and the overall reorganization, were caused by PRTC's loss in a legal suit. (Docket No. 57–2 at pp. 49–50.)

Plaintiff Labiosa felt that she was unqualified and unable to perform tasks assigned to her in her new position as an Officer of Project Management In–Training. (Docket No. 57–2 at p. 66.) In this new position, she received over seventy-two hours of formal training. (Docket No. 33–14.) She received a good performance evaluation in March 2009 and performed all duties assigned, some of which did not fully utilize her skills. (Docket Nos. 57–10; 57–2 at pp. 90–91.)

Labiosa requested additional duties within her new department because she felt she was underutilized. (Docket No. 57–2 at p. 108.) Despite being dissatisfied with her new position, Labiosa never formally requested a transfer through PRTC's official transfer process. (Docket No. 57–2 at p. 35.)

2. Hostile Work Environment

In 2009, plaintiff Labiosa filed an internal complaint with PRTC alleging that her then-supervisor, Jaime Sierra (“Sierra”), had committed work-related ethical violations. (Docket No. 57–2 at pp. 105–06.) Following this complaint, Sierra decreased the amount of time he spent with Labiosa and provided her less instruction on tasks. Id. Sierra also made at least one age-related comment regarding Labiosa's verbal requests to transfer, stating “stay calm, you are an elderly lady and they are going to put you to run around, so that [sic ] it is better if you stay calm and continue earning your salary.” (Docket No. 57–2 at p. 89.)

Additionally, plaintiff Labiosa reports four to five age-related comments were made by PRTC's contractors between 2009–2012.² (Docket No. 57–2 at pp. 95–102.) One comment was by a contractor named Rosa who stated that “the old lady is complaining again....” Id. at p. 100.

Finally, plaintiff Labiosa claims that in January 2012, she heard her new supervisor, Juan Espinoza (“Espinoza”), call her a “stupid old lady.” (Docket No. 57–2 at p. 91.) Aside from this comment, Labiosa and Espinoza had a respectful, professional relationship. (Docket No. 57–3 at p. 119.)

3. Unpaid Suspension

Also in January 2012, PRTC opened an investigation into plaintiff Labiosa's attendance on January 12–13, 2012. (Docket No. 57–23.) On January 16, Labiosa reported experiencing errors when attempting to “punch” her timecard when departing from work on Thursday, January 12 and when entering work on Friday, January 13. (Docket No. 57–19; 57–3 at pp. 164–67.) On January 17, Espinoza asked Juan Ruiz–Garcia (“Ruiz”), PRTC's Payroll Manager, if the timecard system had experienced any defect on January 12 or 13. (Docket Nos. 57–23; 57–18 at p. 2.) Ruiz replied that the timecard system registers all attempts to “punch” the card even if no actual “punch” is completed. (Docket Nos. 57–24; 57–18 at p. 2.) Ruiz stated that the timecard system showed that plaintiff Labiosa attempted to punch her timecard on Thursday but did not attempt to punch her timecard on Friday. (Docket No. 57–18 at p. 2.) Sierra then requested that plaintiff Labiosa report the hours that she had worked on Friday, January 13. (Docket Nos. 57–20; 57–18 at pp. 1–2.) In two text messages, plaintiff Labiosa reported working from 7:50 a.m.–5:00 p.m. (Docket Nos. 57–21; 33–26; 57–18 at pp. 1–2.)

Upon reviewing the timecard system data, security camera footage for the entrances and parking areas, and employee computer access, defendant PRTC concluded that plaintiff Labiosa had not been present or performed work at the PRTC office on January 13. (Docket Nos. 57–24; 57–18 at p. 2.) Plaintiff Labiosa explained that she worked with a supplier located on highway number 2 in Bayamon, evaluating chairs from 8:00 a.m.–1:00 p.m., and visited several other providers that day. (Docket No. 57–3 at pp. 143–46.) Espinoza requested evidence of these appointments, but Plaintiff Labiosa did not provide any supporting document or corroborating testimony. (Docket Nos. 57–28; 57–3 at pp. 187–88.)

In response to a second request for this information on March 6, 2012, plaintiff Labiosa referred to Espinoza as a “güey”.³ (Docket No. 33–33.) Defendant PRTC suspended plaintiff Labiosa on March 13, 2012 for insubordination to a supervisor, failure to properly record “start and quit times to work,” and falsification of payroll documents. (Docket Nos. 57–18 at pp. 3–4; 57–3 at pp. 143–46.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56

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