Quintana-Dieppa v. Dep't of the Army

• Decision Date: 30 September 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL 19-1277 (ADC)
• Parties: CARMEN QUINTANA-DIEPPA, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

CARMEN QUINTANA-DIEPPA, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 19-1277 (ADC)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

September 30, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

S/AIDA M. DELGADO-COLON, United States District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant the Department of the Army's (“the Army” or “defendant”) motion for summary judgment and plaintiff Carmen Quintana-Dieppa's (“Quintana” or “plaintiff”) opposition thereto. ECF Nos 93, 110. For the reasons below, the Army's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. Background

Quintana a 62-year-old female, filed suit against the Army on March 28, 2019. She lodged claims of age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), sex and racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).^[1] ECF No. 1. See also 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Quintana also alleged she was subjected to a hostile work environment due to her gender in violation of Title VII. ECF No. 1 at 11.

Quintana's suit stems from seven alleged incidents that are purportedly adverse actions suffered by her and taken by the Army out of a discriminatory or retaliatory animus in violation of ADEA, Title VII and the FLSA. These are:

1. An e-mail sent to Quintana by a supervisor recommending she apply for an open position at a different Army base. ECF No. 1 at 8.

2. A performance evaluation given to Quintana by a supervisor in which she received a lower grade than she had in previous evaluations. Id.

3. Quintana's supervisor's failure to provide her with performance standards. Id.

4. Denial of a promotion Quintana had requested. Id.

5. Placing Quintana on leave and transferring her to another position. ECF No. 1 at 9.

6. A text message sent to Quintana by a supervisor questioning her absence from work on a specific date. Id.

7. An incident in which Quintana was asked to report to work while on leave and then told to go home once she arrived. Id.

Now, the Army moves for summary judgment, maintaining inter alia that Quintana cannot establish - even in a prima facie manner - that the Army acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory animus in any of the above-mentioned incidents.^[2]

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Through summary judgment, courts “pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court encourages employing summary judgment in federal courts - it “[avoids] full blown trials in un winnable cases, ... [conserves] parties' time and money, and [permits] the court to husband scarce judicial resources.” McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1995). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

A court may grant summary judgment only when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See also Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660 (1st Cir. 2000). A factual dispute is “genuine” if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). The court must review the record “taken as a whole,” and “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Anderson Plumbing Productions Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are functions of a jury, not of a judge. See id.

In short, when there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, and when a court would be required to make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or draw legitimate inferences from the facts in order to adjudicate a controversy, summary judgment will not be granted. While no legitimate inferences can be drawn, the court will construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Stoutt v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 158 F.Supp.2d 167, 171 (D.P.R. 2001). Still, the nonmoving party is required to demonstrate “through submissions of evidentiary quality that a trial worthy issue persists.” Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 108 (1st Cir. 2006).

III. Preliminary Matters

At the threshold, the Court must stop to address some fatal shortcomings in Quintana's opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 110. When responding to a motion for summary judgment, parties must abide by certain rules. For example, parties must set forth any proposed uncontested material facts (or rebukes thereto) in numbered paragraphs neatly containing the facts in question, devoid of argumentation and accompanied by specific citations to record materials of evidentiary value that either prove a proposed fact or disprove an opposed one. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; D.P.R. L. R. 56. Quintana has glaringly failed to comply with this rule, and others as well.

Under Local Rule 56(c):

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment. Unless a fact is admitted, the opposing statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule...

D.P.R. L. R. 56(c). If a party improperly controverts the facts, the court may treat those facts as uncontroverted. See Natal Perez v. Oriental Bank & Tr., 291 F.Supp.3d 215, 219 (D.P.R. 2018). Litigants who ignore the rule do so “at their peril.” Puerto Rico American Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vazquez, 603 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 2010). Furthermore, the Court “shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts.” D.P.R. L.R. 56(e). See also Advanced Flexible Circuits, Inc. v. GE Sensing & Inspection Techs. GmbH, 781 F.3d 510, 521 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that failure to comply with the standards of Local Rule 56 by the nonmovant allows the district court to accept the moving party's facts as stated).

Quintana opposed or qualified defendant's statements of uncontested material fact (“DSUMFs”) 8, 14, 28, 29, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 46, 47, 51, 54, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 75, 76, 85, 89, and 90. See ECF No. 110-1, Plaintiff's Opposing Statement of Facts (“POSF”). However, the only qualification that comes close to succeeding (albeit partially) is that to DSUMF 60, in which the Army posits that plaintiff was not functionally denied a promotion and Quintana responds that she requested a promotion, but her request was denied, and submits deposition testimony to that effect. See PSOF 60. All other oppositions refer to record citations that do not lend support to Quintana's propositions (POSF 8, 28, 29, 31, 33, 38, 47, 51, 57, 61, 62, 63, 67, 85), include propositions that do not contradict the Army's DSUMFs (POSF 8, 29, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 51, 54, 57, 61, 67), or forego citations to the record altogether (POSF 14, 46, 75, 76, 89, 90).

For example, DSUMF 8 states that Quintana was the subject of an investigation. However, Quintana's opposition at PSOF 8 states only that Quintana “did not know” she was one of the subjects of the investigation and then cites six record materials that neither support that position nor contradict the underlying premise of DSUMF 8. Similar problems permeate Quintana's entire opposition. As far as the Court can tell, Quintana copy-pasted the same four record citations throughout most of her oppositions without regard to the matters asserted. To boot, in PSOFs 31 and 33, Quintana egregiously mischaracterizes a witness's testimony.^[3] Such a transgression, be it by design or out of carelessness and ignorance, is beyond the pale.

For all the foregoing, Quintana fails to properly contest the Army's proposed uncontested material facts (except DSUMF 60, and then only partially).

Furthermore, Quintana attempts to add facts by way of her oppositions, and even admissions, of the Army's DSUMFs. For example, Quintana admits DSUMF 1, and then includes a full paragraph with additional - and unsupported - facts. PSOF 1. Quintana attempts to include similar additional facts throughout her opposition. However, additional facts must be put forward in a separate section, and “set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a record citation as required by subsection (e) of this rule.” D.P.R. L. R. 56(c). “This separate section containing additional facts is necessary to allow the moving party to reply to those additional facts and to allow the court to easily determine the disputed facts.” Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F.Supp.2d 198, 207 (D.P.R. 2013). A party thus may not include numerous additional facts within its opposition to the moving party's statements of uncontested facts. See Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d 128, 137 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting argument that Local Rule 56(c) does not require separate section for additional facts)). See also Malave-Torres, 919 F.Supp.2d at 207 (nonmoving party “may not include numerous additional facts within its opposition to the moving party's statements of uncontested facts.”). As such, per Local Rule 56, all additional facts set forth within plaintiff's opposition of the Army's DSUMF shall be disregarded.

Quintana did include additional facts in a...