Labor's Educational and Political Club-Independent v. Danforth

• Decision Date: 19 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59806,59806
• Citation: Labor's Educational and Political Club-Independent v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1977)
• Parties: LABOR'S EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL CLUB INDEPENDENT et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. John C. DANFORTH, Missouri Elections Commission et al., Appellants-Respondents, James C. Kirkpatrick et al., Defendants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 339

561 S.W.2d 339

LABOR'S EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL CLUB INDEPENDENT et al Respondents-Appellants, v.John C. DANFORTH, Missouri Elections Commission et al Appellants-RespondentsJames C. Kirkpatrick et al., Defendants.

No. 59806.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Dec. 19, 1977.

Dissenting Opinion Feb. 1, 1978.

Rehearings Denied Feb. 1, 1978.

John W. Inglish, Robert M. Heller, Missouri Elections Commission, John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for defendants-appellants-respondents.

Harold L. Fridkin, Richard Rhyne, Albert J. Yonke, Kansas City, for plaintiffs-respondents-appellants.

BARDGETT, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, which declared the Missouri Campaign Finance and Disclosure Act(hereinafter Act), sections 130.010 et seq., RSMoSupp.1975, unconstitutional.The various parties, being aggrieved in varying respects, appealed.Jurisdiction is in this court because this case involves the construction of the constitution of Missouri.Art. V, sec. 3, Mo.Const.

The suit was brought by Labor's Educational and Political Club Independent (LEPCI) and other interested parties.They sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity and constitutionality of the Act and a permanent injunction against its enforcement.The defendants in this action are the Missouri Elections Commission and various public officials (hereinafter referred to collectively as defendants).

LEPCI challenged the Act on numerous grounds.Instead of repeating all of the grounds, it is sufficient to set forth the holdings of the circuit court.The circuit court held in pertinent part that:

"1.One or more of the plaintiffs have a sufficient personal stake in a determination of the constitutional validity of each of the challenged provisions of the Act to present a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief, through a decree of this Court, of a conclusive character.

"2.The Court denies the relief requested by plaintiffs in Count I of plaintiffs' Petition but does rule that the entire Act is unconstitutional, invalid and void as it applies to all public offices, created by the Constitution, for which minimum qualification is stated.Therefore, the Court holds that the Act cannot apply to the offices of Governor, Lt. Governor, Auditor, Supreme Court Judges, Appellate Judges, all Circuit Court Judges and Judges of the Probate and Magistrate Courts.

"3.Section 130.020.5, V.A.M.S., is constitutional and does not violate any of plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, and does not violate any of plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 8 of the Missouri Constitution.Therefore, plaintiffs are denied the relief requested in Count III of plaintiffs' Petition.

"4.Sections 130.015.1,130.015.2and130.015.5, V.A.M.S., violate rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional.

"5.Section130.010(4), V.A.M.S., is in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States ConstitutionandArticle I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, and is unconstitutional.

"6.Section 130.020.7, V.A.M.S., is in violation of the First Amendment to the United States ConstitutionandArticle I, Section 8 of the Missouri Constitution, and is unconstitutional.

"7.Section 130.020.8, V.A.M.S., constitutes a restraint of freedom of speech which is violative of the First Amendment guarantees of the United States ConstitutionandArticle I, Section 8 of the Missouri Constitution, and is unconstitutional.

"8.Sections 130.025.5and130.025.7, V.A.M.S., are in violation of the freedom of expression and speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States ConstitutionandArticle I, Section 8 of the Missouri Constitution, and are unconstitutional.

"9.Section 130.070.1, V.A.M.S., violates equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States ConstitutionandArticle I, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional.

"10.Those sections of the Act not declared unconstitutional herein cannot stand alone, are unenforceable and unworkable to accomplish the intent of the Initiative Petition and the Act, and the entire Act is unconstitutional, invalid and void.Relief requested by plaintiffs in Count II of plaintiffs's (sic) Petition is hereby granted.

"11.Sections 129.070, 129.075, 129.100, 129.110, 129.120, 129.130, 129.140, 129.150, 129.160, 129.170, 129.180, 129.190, 129.200, 129.210, 129.220, 129.240, 129.250, 129.260, 129.270, R.S.Mo. 1969, andSection 129.230, R.S.Mo. Sub. 1973, repealed by enactment of this Act, are hereby reinstated and declared to be the existing law of the State of Missouri.

"12.Plaintiffs are excused from complying with any and all provisions of Chapter 130, V.A.M.S., and defendants are all, and each of them, personally enjoined from enforcing, administrating, investigating, or in any way compelling compliance with said chapter and from instituting criminal prosecuting or civil proceeding to compel compliance with the Act."

The Act which is being challenged was passed by the voters of Missouri in 1974 by way of the initiative process.It contains a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of campaign finances and disclosure.The circuit court held that the entire Act was unconstitutional as to all public offices created by the constitution because the Act was in effect a constitutional amendment which did not follow the appropriate procedure set forth in art. III, sec. 50, Mo.Const., dealing with the scope and title of initiative petitions for constitutional amendments.LEPCI asserts, however, that the entire Act is unconstitutional as to all offices regardless of whether they are constitutional offices because art. VII, sec. 8, Mo.Const., provides minimal qualifications for all public offices in this state and this Act proposed to amend this constitutional provision.

Contrary to what either LEPCI asserts or what the circuit court concluded, this Act was not a proposed constitutional amendment and, therefore, any reliance on art. III, sec. 50, Mo.Const., is improper.The Act instead is merely a statute passed by the initiative process repealing certain statutes while at the same time enacting new statutes.The Act never purported to be a constitutional amendment and the court will not consider it as such.As a statute, the Act must, therefore, be judged on the same basis as any statute passed by the legislature regardless of the fact that it was enacted by way of the initiative process.

It is a basic principle of constitutional law that when a statute conflicts with a provision in the constitutionthe statute must give way.The court must, therefore, determine whether the entire Act conflicts with art. IV, secs. 3,10, and13(qualifications for governor, lieutenant governor, and state auditor), art. V, sec. 25(qualifications for supreme court judges, appellate court judges, circuit court judges, and judges of the probate and magistrate courts), art. VII, sec. 8(general qualifications for all public offices).

In deciding this issue it is necessary to deal with offices created by arts. IV and V first because they create constitutional offices and then separately deal with art. VII, sec. 8.It is quite generally considered that where the constitution lays down specific eligibility requirements for a particular constitutional office the constitutional specification in that regard is exclusive, and the legislature(except where expressly authorized to do so) has no power to require additional or different qualifications for such constitutional office.Whitney v. Bolin, 85 Ariz. 44, 330 P.2d 1003, 1005(1958).See alsoAnnotation34 A.L.R.2d at 171 and cases cited therein, and Kirby v. Nolte, 349 Mo. 1015, 164 S.W.2d 1(banc 1942), where by implication this court held that the legislature could not by statute change the qualification for a constitutional office.

Having decided that additional statutory qualifications for a constitutional office would be invalid, it is necessary to determine whether this Act does impose additional qualifications.

Although the Missouri constitution speaks in terms of qualifications for offices, the cases usually refer to these constitutional requirements as eligibility requirements rather than qualifications.The word "eligibility" will be used to refer to the constitutional requirements and the word "qualification" to mean something which would not contravene the constitution.

The difference between an eligibility requirement and a qualification requirement has been confused by the cases and, even when they are defined, the difference may appear to be both academic and esoteric.The more easily understandable definitions and the ones the court adopts for the purposes of this opinion are contained in State ex rel. Elliott v. Bemenderfer, 96 Ind. 374(1884).The Indiana Supreme Court said at 376: "Eligible means capable of being chosen; while qualified means the performance of the acts which the person chosen is required to perform before he can enter into office.Searcy v. Grow, 15 Cal. 117.Abbott, in defining the word 'qualify,' says: 'It means to take the oath and give the bond required by law from an administrator, executor, public officer or the like, before he may enter on the discharge of his duties.'L.Dict.In Steinback v. State, ex rel., 38 Ind. 483, it was said: 'The term qualified was not used in its ordinary or popular signification, as possessed of endowments or accomplishments, or intellectual capacity, or moral worth to discharge the duties of an office, but the framers of the Constitution intended thereby that a person who had been...