Labor's Educational and Political Club-Independent v. Danforth
Decision Date | 19 December 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 59806,59806 |
Citation | 561 S.W.2d 339 |
Parties | LABOR'S EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL CLUB INDEPENDENT et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. John C. DANFORTH, Missouri Elections Commission et al., Appellants-Respondents, James C. Kirkpatrick et al., Defendants. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John W. Inglish, Robert M. Heller, Missouri Elections Commission, John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for defendants-appellants-respondents.
Harold L. Fridkin, Richard Rhyne, Albert J. Yonke, Kansas City, for plaintiffs-respondents-appellants.
This appeal is from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, which declared the Missouri Campaign Finance and Disclosure Act (hereinafter Act), sections 130.010 et seq., RSMo Supp.1975, unconstitutional. The various parties, being aggrieved in varying respects, appealed. Jurisdiction is in this court because this case involves the construction of the constitution of Missouri. Art. V, sec. 3, Mo.Const.
The suit was brought by Labor's Educational and Political Club Independent (LEPCI) and other interested parties. They sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity and constitutionality of the Act and a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The defendants in this action are the Missouri Elections Commission and various public officials (hereinafter referred to collectively as defendants).
LEPCI challenged the Act on numerous grounds. Instead of repeating all of the grounds, it is sufficient to set forth the holdings of the circuit court. The circuit court held in pertinent part that:
The Act which is being challenged was passed by the voters of Missouri in 1974 by way of the initiative process. It contains a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of campaign finances and disclosure. The circuit court held that the entire Act was unconstitutional as to all public offices created by the constitution because the Act was in effect a constitutional amendment which did not follow the appropriate procedure set forth in art. III, sec. 50, Mo.Const., dealing with the scope and title of initiative petitions for constitutional amendments. LEPCI asserts, however, that the entire Act is unconstitutional as to all offices regardless of whether they are constitutional offices because art. VII, sec. 8, Mo.Const., provides minimal qualifications for all public offices in this state and this Act proposed to amend this constitutional provision.
Contrary to what either LEPCI asserts or what the circuit court concluded, this Act was not a proposed constitutional amendment and, therefore, any reliance on art. III, sec. 50, Mo.Const., is improper. The Act instead is merely a statute passed by the initiative process repealing certain statutes while at the same time enacting new statutes. The Act never purported to be a constitutional amendment and the court will not consider it as such. As a statute, the Act must, therefore, be judged on the same basis as any statute passed by the legislature regardless of the fact that it was enacted by way of the initiative process.
It is a basic principle of constitutional law that when a statute conflicts with a provision in the constitution the statute must give way. The court must, therefore, determine whether the entire Act conflicts with art. IV, secs. 3, 10, and 13 ( ), art. V, sec. 25 ( ), art. VII, sec. 8 ( ).
In deciding this issue it is necessary to deal with offices created by arts. IV and V first because they create constitutional offices and then separately deal with art. VII, sec. 8. It is quite generally considered that where the constitution lays down specific eligibility requirements for a particular constitutional office the constitutional specification in that regard is exclusive, and the legislature (except where expressly authorized to do so) has no power to require additional or different qualifications for such constitutional office. Whitney v. Bolin, 85 Ariz. 44, 330 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1958). See also Annotation 34 A.L.R.2d at 171 and cases cited therein, and Kirby v. Nolte, 349 Mo. 1015, 164 S.W.2d 1 (banc 1942), where by implication this court held that the legislature could not by statute change the qualification for a constitutional office.
Having decided that additional statutory qualifications for a constitutional office would be invalid, it is necessary to determine whether this Act does impose additional qualifications.
Although the Missouri constitution speaks in terms of qualifications for offices, the cases usually refer to these constitutional requirements as eligibility requirements rather than qualifications. The word "eligibility" will be used to refer to the constitutional requirements and the word "qualification" to mean something which would not contravene the constitution.
The difference between an eligibility requirement and a qualification requirement has been confused by the cases and, even when they are defined, the difference may appear to be both academic and esoteric. The more easily understandable definitions and the ones the court adopts for the purposes of this opinion are contained in State ex rel. Elliott v. Bemenderfer, 96 Ind. 374 (1884). The Indiana Supreme Court said at 376: ...
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