Lacaze v. United States
Decision Date | 22 March 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 23060.,23060. |
Citation | 391 F.2d 516 |
Parties | Joseph Michael LACAZE, Charles William Acevedo, Douglas Arceneaux and Virginia Cain, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
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Robert M. Acevedo, John M. Sekul, Biloxi, Miss., for appellants.
E. Donald Strange, Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert E. Hauberg, U. S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for appellee.
Before RIVES, GOLDBERG and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.
The four appellants, Joseph Michael Lacaze, Charles William Acevedo, Douglas Arceneaux and Virginia Cain, were convicted by a jury of the unlawful sale of narcotic drugs and of conspiracy to sell narcotic drugs in violation of Section 4705(a)1 and Section 7237(b)2 of the Internal Revenue Code. They bring eight separate specifications of error on appeal. Our rejection of all of them will follow a summary of the facts.
On May 11, 1965, Joseph Lacaze met a man known as Jimmy Cortez, a former drug addict who had twice been convicted of crimes, at a bonding company in New Orleans, Louisiana. After exchanging conversational pleasantries the two went for coffee, and Lacaze told Cortez of his desire to sell a quantity of narcotics. Cortez said that he thought he could find a buyer but that he wanted to see the drugs first. The two then left the cafe and went to a motel, where they met Acevedo and Cain. Lacaze informed the latter two that he and Cortez were going to Biloxi, Mississippi, to inspect the narcotics. He then took Cortez to the Travel Inn Motel in Biloxi, to a room occupied by Arceneaux. Lacaze told Arceneaux to get the narcotics because they had a buyer. Arceneaux left the room and was gone for approximately ten minutes, whereupon he displayed the drugs to Cortez who put a $500.00 price on them. Lacaze and Cortez then left Biloxi for New Orleans and a buyer. Cortez, however, went to the Bureau of Narcotics in New Orleans and related the story to narcotics agents. Agent Compton agreed to present himself as a buyer and later met with Lacaze to discuss the types and prices of the drugs. Then Compton, Lacaze, and Cortez drove to the Travel Inn Motel in Biloxi, where they met Arceneaux. They experienced some difficulty in determining the whereabouts of the drugs, but eventually Cain and Acevedo entered the motel room and the former said, "We've got the stuff." Shortly thereafter Acevedo remarked in the presence of all appellants, "We have got it and it is in a safe place. * * *" Agent Compton and Cortez went to a drive-in where the drugs were to be delivered. Lacaze was arrested as he made the delivery, and the other three appellants were arrested a short time later.
The four appellants were tried before a jury and were found guilty on both counts. Lacaze was sentenced to 15 years on each count to run concurrently; Acevedo and Arceneaux, to nine years on each count to run concurrently; and Cain, to six years on each count to run concurrently. From these convictions the appellants now appeal. We find no substantiality to any of the following arguments marshalled for reversal:
(1) Conspiracy.
The foregoing comings, goings, and convergings convince us that a conspiracy was afoot. It is, of course, a settled principle that a showing of association alone is insufficient to establish a conspiracy. Ah Ming Cheng v. United States, 5 Cir. 1962, 300 F.2d 202; Glover v. United States, 10 Cir. 1962, 306 F.2d 594, 595; Evans v. United States, 9 Cir. 1958, 257 F.2d 121, 126, cert. den., 358 U.S. 866, 79 S.Ct. 98, 3 L.Ed.2d 99. However, the prosecution need not establish that all defendants directly handled the drugs. Rodriguez v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 373 F.2d 17, 18. See also United States v. Wright, 7 Cir. 1962, 309 F.2d 735, 737-738, cert. den., 1963, 372 U.S. 929, 83 S.Ct. 873, 9 L.Ed.2d 733; United States v. Rossi, 2 Cir. 1955, 219 F.2d 612, 614, cert. den., 349 U.S. 938, 75 S.Ct. 782, 99 L.Ed. 1266. Nor must the conspiracy be proved by direct evidence. "The proof, by the very nature of the crime, must be circumstantial and therefore inferential to an extent varying with the conditions under which the crime may be committed." Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 1943, 319 U.S. 703, 714, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 1270, 87 L.Ed. 1674, 1683. See also Paoli v. United States, 1957, 352 U.S. 232, 236, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278, 282 ( ).
The respected and revered admonition in Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680, 704, that "the verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it," has added relevance to the case at bar when we consider that the Supreme Court was reviewing a conspiracy conviction. In fact, after expressing the above admonition the Court continued: "Participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a `development and collection of circumstances.'"
In the instant case the involvement of Lacaze and Arceneaux was clearly established by the testimony of Cortez and Agent Compton. Lacaze made the initial approach to Cortez, advised Cain and Acevedo that he had a buyer for their drugs, drove Cortez to Biloxi, led Cortez and Compton back to Biloxi, and made the delivery at the drive-in. Arceneaux had the drugs in his keeping and displayed them to Cortez for the first time. It is obvious that he understood the plan and was taking some action toward the ultimate sale. Acevedo and Cain were less involved, but the conclusion that they had some knowledge of the plan and performed some acts of participation is reasonable if not inescapable. They were apprised of the fact that there was a prospective buyer. They appeared in Biloxi after Compton and Cortez had arrived, and they made statements indicating that they knew where the drugs were. They drove with Lacaze to the drive-in for the purpose of making delivery.
A conspiracy is seldom born of "open covenants openly arrived at." In the majority of instances proof of the existence of a conspiracy must rest upon inferences drawn from relevant and competent circumstantial evidence, including the conduct of the defendants. The evidence here warrants the jury's inferences that all four appellants knowingly participated in the narcotics transaction. Rodriguez v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 373 F.2d 17, 18; Gonzalez-Alonso v. United States, 9 Cir. 1967, 379 F.2d 347, 350. Cf. Rivard v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 375 F.2d 882, 888.
(2) Reprimand of Counsel.
During the trial the judge told counsel for the appellants that he was not making a favorable impression on the jury by his side remarks. The reprimand was not unduly severe; moreover, in his charge to the jury the trial judge told the jurors that they were to draw no inferences against the defendants as a result of the reprimand.
In Lambert v. United States, 5 Cir. 1939, 101 F.2d 960, this Court indicated that the trial judge's reprimands constituted reversible error (the conviction was reversed for insufficiency of evidence), but in that case the reprimands were numerous and severe to the point of ordering the bailiffs to take the lawyer to jail. Further, there does not appear to have been a mitigating instruction to the jury. See also Young v. United States, 1965, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 346 F.2d 793. Likewise distinguishable is Moody v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 377 F.2d 175, 177-180, where we held that a trial court's charge to the jury constituted reversible error because it was "readily susceptible of the inference that the defendants were guilty, and the jury might have concluded that the credibility of witnesses was not its problem." Id. at 179. In the instant case it seems impossible that the reprimand prevented or even hindered a fair trial.
The seminal case of Glasser v. United States, supra, sagely instructs us:
See also Carter v. United States, 9 Cir. 1967, 373 F.2d 911, 913, in which that court stated:
(3) Courtroom Door.
Meritless and vacuous is the contention for reversal that during one session of the trial the judge ordered the back door locked until adjournment. Most likely, the action was taken to keep spectators from entering or leaving while the witness was testifying. There may well have been spectators in the courtroom at the time, and there is no indication that people were kept out over the whole course of the trial. We find no secrecy of the sort condemned in Re Oliver, 1948, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682.
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