Lacee L. v. Stephanie L., 95

• Decision Date: 18 October 2018
• Docket Number: No. 95,95
• Citation: 32 N.Y.3d 219,89 N.Y.S.3d 655,114 N.E.3d 123
• Parties: In the Matter of LACEE L., an Infant. v. STEPHANIE L., Appellant; Administration for Children's Services, Respondent, et al., Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

32 N.Y.3d 219

114 N.E.3d 123

89 N.Y.S.3d 655

In the Matter of LACEE L., an Infant.

v. STEPHANIE L., Appellant;Administration for Children's Services, Respondent, et al., Respondent.

No. 95

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 18, 2018

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York City (Alan E. Schoenfeld, Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux and Alicia Berenyi of counsel) and Washington, D.C. (Samuel M. Strongin of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), and The Bronx Defenders, Bronx (Saul Zipkin and Mary Anne Mendenhall of counsel), for appellant.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Scott Schorr, Carolyn Walther and Richard Dearing of counsel), for Administration for Children’s Services, respondent.

Andrew J. Baer, New York City, Attorney for the Child.

Human Rights and Gender Justice Clinic, City University of New York School of Law, Long Island City (Cynthia Soohoo and Farah Diaz-Tello of counsel), and Women Enabled International, Brooklyn (Suzannah Phillips and Anastasia Holoboff of counsel), for Human Rights and Gender Justice Clinic of the City University of New York School of Law and others, amici curiae.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York City (Audra J. Soloway of counsel), and Brooklyn Defender Services, Brooklyn (Lauren Shapiro and Jessica Marcus of counsel), for Brooklyn Defender Services and others, amici curiae.

Disability & Civil Rights Clinic, Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn (Amy Mulzer of counsel), for The Arc and others, amici curiae.

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, New York City (Gilana R. Keller, Claude G. Szyfer and Beth A. Norton of counsel), and Center for Reproductive Rights, New York City (Hillary Schneller, Pilar Herrero and Leah Wiederhorn of counsel), for SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective and others, amici curiae.

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, San Francisco, California (Claudia Center and A. Elaine Lewis of counsel), for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and another, amici curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WILSON, J.

Stephanie L. seeks to raise this question: can Family Court find that the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) made "reasonable efforts" toward family reunifications, as required by Family Court Act § 1089, if ACS failed to provide "reasonable accommodations" required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires that governmental agencies make "reasonable accommodations" to ensure disabled persons have access to their services ( 42 USC § 12131 [2] )? However, Stephanie L. has not identified any services allegedly required by the ADA that are not also required under New York law. Applying section 1089, Family Court ordered ACS to provide the services Stephanie L. claimed as "reasonable accommodations" under the ADA. Stephanie appears generally to have received those services; as Family Court noted, ACS did not provide its services eagerly or promptly, and provided some only because of stern admonitions from Family Court and vigorous follow up from Stephanie's counsel. The Appellate Division determined that Family Court "look[ed] to the ADA's standards ... evaluat[ed] the agency's efforts in that light, [and] found that the agency tailored its efforts to the mother's needs" ( Matter of Lacee L. (Stephanie L.—Dekodia L. ), 153 A.D.3d 1151, 60 N.Y.S.3d 164 [1st Dept. 2017] ). Family Court's determination – affirmed by the Appellate Division – that ACS had made "reasonable efforts" is supported by the record; we therefore affirm.

I.

Article 10 of the Family Court Act was "designed to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being" and to "provide a due process of law for determining when the state, through its family court, may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that [the child's] needs are properly met" ( Family Court Act § 1011 ). An article 10 proceeding "is originated by the filing of a petition in which facts sufficient to establish that a child is an abused or neglected child ... are alleged" ( Family Court Act § 1031 ). "Article 10 erects a careful bulwark against unwarranted state intervention into private family life" and "[n]eglect findings cannot be casually issued, but require proof of actual or imminent harm to the child as a result of a parent's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care" ( Matter of Jamie J., 30 N.Y.3d 275, 284, 67 N.Y.S.3d 78, 89 N.E.3d 468 [2017] [internal quotation omitted]; see Family Court Act § 1012 [f] ).

Article 10–A of the Family Court Act "establish[es] uniform procedures for permanency hearings for all children who are placed in foster care ... [in order] to provide children placed out of their homes timely and effective judicial review that promotes permanency, safety and well-being in their lives" ( Family Court Act § 1086 ). The Act provides for an initial permanency hearing within 8 months of a child's removal from home, and subsequent permanency hearing every six months thereafter ( Family Court Act § 1089 [a] [2–3] ). Prior to the permanency hearing, ACS must prepare a permanency hearing report, which must include, among other things, the child's current "permanency goal" ( Family Court Act § 1089 [b], [c] [1] ). The permanency plan must include a "description of the reasonable efforts to achieve the child's permanency plan that have been taken by [ACS] since the last hearing" and when the permanency goal is reunification, the description "shall include ... the reasonable efforts that have been made by [ACS] to eliminate the need for placement of the child and to enable the child to safely return home, including a description of any services that have been provided" ( Family Court Act § 1089 [c] [4] [i] ).

At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, Family Court "shall, upon the proof adduced, and in accordance with the best interests and safety of the child, including whether the child would be at risk of abuse or neglect if returned to the parent or other person legally responsible, determine and issue its findings, and enter an order of disposition in writing" ( Family Court Act § 1089 [d] ). If the child is not returned to the parent, the order must state, among other things, "whether reasonable efforts have been made to effectuate the child's permanency plan" ( Family Court Act § 1089 [d] [2] [iii] ).

Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in part, "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities" ( 42 USC § 12101 [b] [1] ). Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity" ( 42 USC § 12132 ). ACS falls within the definition of a "public entity" (see 42 USC § 12131 [1] [B] ). An agency, like ACS, that is subject to Title II of the ADA must make "reasonable accommodations" to allow "meaningful access" to government services ( Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 548 [2d Cir. 2000] [per curiam] ).

A disabled individual who has been denied access to government services can seek redress by commencing a private cause of action under Title II of the ADA.¹ "In order to establish a violation under the ADA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) they are ‘qualified individuals’ with a disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to the ADA; and (3) that [the] plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants' services, programs, or activities, or were otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of [the] plaintiffs' disabilities" ( Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 [2d Cir. 2003] ).

II.

It is undisputed that Stephanie L. is intellectually disabled. She has cognitive limitations that make it difficult for her to understand instructions and follow through on tasks. When she does understand her obligations, she has difficulty thinking through options to overcome obstacles that emerge.

Before Lacee's birth, Family Court entered a finding of neglect against Stephanie as to a different child of hers in May of 2014. When Lacee was born, ACS removed her from Stephanie's care and filed a petition under Article 10 of the Family Court Act alleging that Lacee was a neglected child because, among other things, Stephanie had not completed the mental health and drug treatment required in the case involving her prior child. Lacee was placed in kinship care, with her paternal grandmother.

At a hearing five days after Lacee's birth, Stephanie's counsel notified Family Court of her client's cognitive limitations and asked that ACS make reasonable accommodations towards the agreed-upon permanency plan goal of reunification of mother and child. Initially, Stephanie requested two accommodations: a referral for psychological and cognitive testing so that ACS could better understand Stephanie's condition, and a referral for homemaking services. The parties disagree whether the requests were clearly made, but Stephanie did not then receive those accommodations. ACS did enroll Stephanie in programs at the Family Resource Center, though unsure whether that organization was equipped to address Stephanie's disability. A few months later, ACS notified Stephanie that it was trying to find an appropriate program but had not yet found one that would accept Stephanie's insurance.

On October 27th, 2014, ACS issued a permanency hearing report reiterating that "Return to Parent" remained Lacee's permanency planning goal and outlining the efforts made by ACS towards achieving that goal. The report stated that Stephanie had not complied with certain aspects of the service plan that was devised in furtherance of the reunification goal,...