Lacey v. Beck
Decision Date | 29 April 1960 |
Citation | 161 A.2d 579,2 Storey 526,52 Del. 526 |
Parties | , 52 Del. 526 Beatrice B. LACEY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Sadie R. BECK, Administratrix of the Estate of Louis E. Beck, deceased, Defendant. |
Court | Delaware Superior Court |
On defendant's motion for a remittitur or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Robert C. O'Hora and John P. Delay, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.
John P. Sinclair of Berl, Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, for defendant.
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, Richard W. Lacey, in the total amount of $12,500. Although not requested to do so, the jury brought in the verdict in two parts. The Foreman stated that the jury awarded $2,500 to the plaintiff for scars, pain and suffering, and $10,000 for permanent injuries. The defendant has no quarrel with the jury's award of $2,500 for the scars, pain and suffering. However, the defendant complains that the verdict in the amount of $10,000 for permanent injuries to plaintiff was so grossly excessive that it should shock the conscience of the Court. Defendant, therefore, requests that this Court, under its power, order a remittitur, or in the alternative, grant a new trial.
The power of this Court to order a remittitur, or in the alternative, grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is excessive is well established in this state. Winkler v. Philadelphia and Reading Railway Company, 4 Pennewill 80, 53 A. 90; Rudnick v. Jacobs, 7 W.W.Harr. 348, 183 A. 508-509.
However, our courts are highly reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict on the ground of excessiveness where the damages are unliquidated, as in a tort action for personal injuries, and where there is no fixed measure of mathematical certainty. Fundamentally, the jury is the part of our judicial system which is entrusted with the determination of the facts; and the amount of damages is a question of fact. The jury's view, consisting of the combined views of a number of persons who have seen and heard the evidence and the witnesses, generally expresses the view of the community, and such a view should not be set aside unless it clearly is in error. Oleck, Damage to Persons and Property, Chapter 9, page 142.
Consequently, a verdict is presumed to be correct and just and will not be set aside as excessive by the trial court or on appeal unless it is so clearly excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, or it is clear that the jury disregarded the evidence or the rules of law. Bennett v. Barber, 7 Terry 132, 79 A.2d 363, 365; 3 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 893, page 452; 15 Am.Jur., Damages, Sec. 205, pages 621, 622. The rule was ably cited by Chancellor Kent in 1912 in the New York case of Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 52:
The test clearly establishes that the disturbance of a jury's findings is not a matter to be lightly taken, and when the Court indulges in such practice, its action must be well founded. Draper, Remittitur, Vol. 24, Tenn.L.Rev., 1155, 1157.
A verdict should not be set aside simply because it is excessive in the mind of the Court, but only when it is so grossly excessive as to shock the Court's sense of justice and the impropriety of allowing it to stand is manifest. Rudnick v. Jacobs, supra, 183 A. at page 510; Bennett v. Barber, 7 Terry 132, 79 A.2d 363. When there is any margin for a reasonable difference of opinion in the matter, the Court should always yield to the verdict of the jury rather than to the contrary. Smith v. Pittsburgh, & W. Ry. Co., C.C.Ohio, 90 F. 783.
In Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., D.C.E.D.Pa., 55 F.Supp. 17, 20, the Court stated:
It is obvious that the determination of whether or not a verdict is excessive is difficult. Each case must rest upon its own facts; consideration must be...
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