Lacey v. Me. Media Collective, LLC
Decision Date | 30 January 2019 |
Docket Number | SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-18-227 |
Parties | JESSIE LACEY, Plaintiff v. MAINE MEDIA COLLECTIVE, LLC, and KEVIN THOMAS, Defendants |
Court | Superior Court of Maine |
CUMBERLAND, ss.
Before the court is defendants Maine Media Collective, LLC, and Kevin Thomas's motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
Plaintiff Jessie Lacey is a resident of Portland. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Defendant Kevin Thomas is a resident of Yarmouth and was the owner and CEO of defendant Maine Media Collective, LLC (MMC), a Maine corporation with its principal place of business in Portland. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 7.) Plaintiff worked for defendants from 2006 to November 2010. (Compl. ¶ 10); (Defs.' Ex. C.)
On April 26, 2018, plaintiff published a blog post detailing her experience as an employee of MMC and described incidents of sexual harassment, abuse, retaliation, and bullying. (Compl. ¶ 50); (Defs.' Ex. A.) In response to this blog post and a story published in the Bollard detailing similar incidents, (Defs.' Ex. B), both defendant Thomas and defendant MMC made statements relating to the accusations levied against them. (Compl. ¶¶ 51, 55-67, 72, 74-80.) Plaintiff alleges that many of these statements were defamatory and were intended to cause her emotional distress. (See Compl. ¶¶ 84-99.)
When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court "examine[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." In re Wage Payment Litig. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 3, 759 A.2d 217. "Dismissal is warranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001 ME 169, ¶ 5, 785 A.2d 1244.
Generally, the court considers only the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true. Nadeau v. Frydrych, 2014 ME 154, ¶ 8, 108 A.3d 1254; Moody v. State Liquor & lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 8, 843 A.2d 43. A court may, however, consider official public documents, documents that are central to a plaintiff's claim, and documents referred to in the complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Moody, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 11, 843 A.2d 43; see also M.R. Civ. P. 12(b). Defendants attached three exhibits to their motion to dismiss pursuant to Moody. The court has considered the exhibits, which include plaintiff's blog article about defendants, a Bollard article about the defendants, and plaintiff's termination letter from MMC, because all three are "documents referred to in the complaint." 2004 ME 20, ¶ 8, 843 A.2d 43.
The court notes that the defamation cases on which defendants rely for the motion to dismiss involved motions for summary judgment, judgments after trial, or case law from other jurisdictions. See McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2017) (Michigan law); Pan Am Sys. v. Atl. Ne. Rails & Ports, Inc., 804 F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 2015) (summary judgment); Gray v. St. Martin's Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 247 (1st Cir. 2000) ( ); Flotech, Inc. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775, 776-77 (1st Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; Massachusetts law); Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 124 (D. Mass. 2015) (California and Florida law); Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 777 F. Supp. 2d 181, 189 (D. Me. 2011) (federal court procedure); McNamee v. Clemens, 762 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599-600 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (New York law); Stark v. Zeta Phi Beta Sorority, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (D.D.C. 2008) (summary judgment); Levesque v. Doocy, 557 F. Supp. 2d 157, 159 (D. Me. 2008) (summary judgment); Norris v. Bangor Publ'g. Co., 53 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498 (D. Me. 1999) (summary judgment); Novecon, Ltd. v. Bulgarian-American Enter. Fund, 977 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D.D.C. 1997) (summary judgment); Ballard v. Wagner, 2005 ME 86, ¶ 9, 877 A.2d 1083 (judgment after trial); Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ¶ 1, 791 A.2d 932 (judgment after trial); Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1996) (summary judgment); Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 66 (Me. 1991) (summary judgment); Bakal v. Weare, 583 A.2d 1028, 1029 (Me. 1990) (summary judgment); Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 833 (Me. 1973) (judgment after trial); Brown v. Guy Gannett Pub. Co., 147 Me. 3, 5, 82 A.2d 797, 798 (1951) ( ). The standard of review for a motion to dismiss differs from that for a motion for summary judgment or a judgment after trial. M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 56(c); Ballard, 2005 ME 86, ¶ 11, 877 A.2d 1083 (). Further, no analysis has been presented with regard to whether Maine law and the law from other jurisdictions are similar.
For her defamation claim, plaintiff must allege:
Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 26, 941 A.2d 447. Plaintiff alleges the following instances constituted defamation by defendant Thomas:
Plaintiff alleges the following instances constituted defamation by defendant MMC:
The court agrees with defendants that the statements made by CEO King that concern MMC's current work culture and status are not defamatory with regard to plaintiff because they do not concern plaintiff. See Gaudette v. Davis, 2017 ME 86, ¶ 25 n.10, 160 A.3d 1190; (Mot. Dismiss at 6 n.2.)
Defendants argue next that the other alleged defamatory statements are opinions not statements of fact. (Mot. Dismiss at 7-9.) Plaintiff argues that the statements are not opinions andthat she did not allege that the statements are merely opinions. (Opp'n to Defs.'s Mot. Dismiss at 9-12.) If an alleged defamatory statement is an opinion, the statement is not actionable. Ballard, 2005 ME 86, ¶ 10, 877 A.2d 1083. "If the average reader could reasonably understand the statement as either fact or opinion, the question of which it is will be submitted to the [fact-finder]." Id. at ¶ 11 (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] statement of opinion may be actionable if it implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts." Id. at ¶ 12.
Statement three, above, made by CEO King on behalf of defendant MMC about MMC being "stunned" by the allegations represents an opinion about the state of the company. Any defamatory claim connected to this statement is dismissed. The remaining alleged defamatory statements, the alleged statements by defendant Thomas and the alleged statements of Dr. Belisle, made by defendants are capable of being either fact or opinion and must be submitted to the fact finder or are statements that imply further undisclosed defamatory facts and survive this motion to dismiss.
Defendant further argues that the alleged defamatory statements are not in fact defamatory. (Mot. Dismiss at 9-11.) "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter...
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