Lacey v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 29 April 1896
• Citation: 93 Va. 159,24 S.E. 930
• Parties: LACEY. v. PALMER, Sheriff.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

24 S.E. 930

93 Va. 159

LACEY.

v.PALMER, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

April 29, 1896.

Statutes—Subject and Title—Constitutional Law — Police Power — Regulation of Commerce — Repeal by Implication — Arrest — Warrant—Requisites—Validity.

1. Act Feb. 29, 1896, entitled "An act to prevent pool-selling, and so forth, upon the results of any trials of speed of any animals or beasts taking place without the limits of the commonwealth, " and which, in its body, prohibits the making, or aiding in making, by any means, bets on the results of any trials of speed of any animals without the limits of the state, violates only the latter provision of Const, art, 5, § 15, providing that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title, and violates that provision only in so far as it prohibits the accomplishment of the prohibited acts by other ways or means than pool-selling, and is therefore, so far as it prohibits their accomplishment by pool-selling, valid.

2. Act Feb. 29, 1896, which prohibits the selling of pools on trials of speed of animals to take place without the state, since it is intended to suppress a form of gambling, is a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and does not, therefore, violate Const. U. S. art. 1, cl. 3, § 8, vesting in congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with Indian tribes.

3. Though a warrant of arrest which recites that defendant, with others, is guilty of each and all of the several acts prohibited by a certain statute, will not be held insufficient, it would be better for the warrant to specify the particular offense of which, under the statute, the defendant is guilty.

4. Since Code, § 4106, as amended by Act March 5, 1896, vests in justices of the peace exclusive original jurisdiction of all misdemeanors occurring within their jurisdiction, a warrant of arrest committing a prisoner charged with a misdemeanor for trial by the county court is void.

5. Act Feb. 29, 1896, prohibiting the selling of pools in the state on trials of speed of animals to take place without the state, is not inconsistent with the act of the same date which prohibits gambling and the selling or making books, pools, or mutuals within the state; and neither act, therefore, by implication repeals the other.

Petition by Richard M. Lacey for writ of habeas corpus. Granted.

S. G. Brent, Edmund Burke, F. L. Smith, and R. W. Moore, for plaintiff.

R. T. Scott, Atty. Gen., for defendant.

KEITH, P. This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, addressed to this court by Richard M. Lacey, who alleges that he is detained without lawful authority, and deprived of his liberty, by one William H. Palmer, sheriff, and ex officio jailer, of the county of Alexandria. It seems that he was committed to the custody of the sheriff by virtue of a warrant dated the 31st of March, 1896, charged with violating an act of the legislature approved February 29, 1896, which declares it to be "unlawful for any person or persons, or association of persons, corporation or corporations by any ways, means or devices to make any bet or wager, or receive or record or register, or forward or purport or pretend to forward any money, thing, or consideration of value to be bet or wagered upon the result of any trial of speed or power of endurance or skill of animals or beasts which is to take place beyond the limits of this commonwealth, or by any ways, means, or devices to aid, assist, or abet in making of any bet or wager, or the receiving, recording, or registering, or forwarding or purporting or pretending to forward any money, thing, or consideration of value to be bet or wagered upon the result of any trial of speed or power of endurance or skill of animals or beasts which is to take place beyond the limits of this commonwealth, or to aid or assist or abet in any way or in any manner in any of the acts forbidden by this act. That any person or persons or association of persons or corporation or corporations violating the provisions of this act shall be fined not less than two hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned not less than thirty nor more than ninety days." The warrant of arrest does not charge the defendant with having done any of the specific acts which the statute just quoted makes unlawful, but avers, in general terms, that the defendant, with others named in the said warrant, was guilty of each and all of the acts forbidden therein; and the commitment commands the sheriff to deliver Richard M. Lacey to the custody of the jailer of the county of Alexandria, to answer an indictment for the offense thus described, at the September term of the county court.

The petitioner claims that. this statute is repugnant to article 5, § 15, of the constitution of Virginia; that it is repugnant to article 1, § 8, cl. 3, of the constitution of the United States; that it is inoperative because two laws received the signature of the governor upon the same day which are inconsistent the one with the other, and, as there is no means of determining which of the two is the last expression of the legislative will, that neither can be operative, the one repealing the other by necessary implication; that the warrant in this case is void because it is vague and indefinite, and does not with sufficient certainty recite the offense with which the petitioner is charged, as required by section 3956 of the Code; and, finally, that the commitment is a nullity because, by section 4106 of the Code, as amended by an act of the general assembly of Virginia approved March 5, 1896, it was the duty of the justice to try the prisoner for the offense with which he was charged, instead of committing him for trial by the county court.

The office of the writ of habeas corpus is not to determine the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. The only issue which it presents is whether or not the prisoner is restrained of his liberty by due process of law. A person held, under proper process, to answer for an offense created by a statute enacted within the constitutional power of the legislature, cannot be discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus, however clear his innnocence may be, but must abide his trial in the mode prescribed by law. Is the statute under consideration repugnant to the constitution of the state? Article 5, § 15, of the constitution, declares "that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." This section has been recently construed by this court, which ruled that It was intended to forbid the use of deceptive titles as a cover for vicious legislation; to prevent bringing together in one bill subjects diverse and dissimilar in their nature, and having no necessary connection with each other; and to avoid surprise in matters of which the title gave no intimation. See Com. v. Brown (Va.) 21 S. E. 357; Ingles v. Straus, Id. 490. The title of the act in question is as follows: "An act to prevent pool-selling, and so forth, upon the results of any trials of speed of any animals or beasts taking place without the limits of the commonwealth." A "pool" is defined by the Century Dictionary to be, in horse-racing, ball games, etc., "the combination of a number of persons, each staking a sum of money on the success of a horse in a race, the contestant in a game, etc.; the money to be divided among the successful betters according to the amount put in by each." It is therefore one of the forms of making bets or wagers upon horse races, while the statute makes "unlawful a bet or wager by any ways, means, or devices or the receiving, or recording, or registering, or forwarding or purporting or pretending to forward any money, thing, or consideration of value to be bet or wagered upon the result of any trial of speed or power of endurance or skill of animals or beasts which is to take place beyond the limits of the commonwealth." Without quoting further from the act, which is set out in full in the warrant, it sufficiently appears that it is far broader and more comprehensive than its title. It may be said to embrace the genus, while the title only sets out a particular species. The act makes unlawful almost every conceivable form of making bets or wagers upon the results of trials of speed of horses, while the title only mentions the particular form of wager or bet known as a "pool" or "pool-selling." Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, speaking of the effect of such a constitutional provision as that under consideration, where the act is broader than the title, says, "In such a case it may happen that one part of it can stand, because indicated by the title, while, as to the objects not indicated by the title, it must fail."

We do not consider the act as obnoxious to that part of the clause of the constitution just quoted, which says that "no law shall embrace more than one object." The object of this law is the suppression of gambling, or that form of gambling where the bet or wager is made upon the speed or endurance or skill of animals or beasts; for, as was said in Ingles v. Straus, supra: "If the subjects embraced by the statute, but not specified in the title, have congruity, or natural connection with the subject stated in the title, or are cognate or germane thereto, the requirement of the constitution is satisfied." Were the title sufficiently broad to cover the objects declared in the bill, there would be, in our judgment, no repugnancy to the constitutional provision in question, because all the provisions of the act may fairly be regarded as in furtherance of a single object, —"the suppression of gambling." The constitution, moreover, is to be construed so as to uphold the law, if practicable. All that is required by the constitutional provision is that the subjects embraced in the statute, but not specified in the title, shall be congruous, and have natural connection with, or be...