LaChance v. Ross Mach. & Mill Supply, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. 13203,13203
• Citation: 633 P.2d 570,102 Idaho 505
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Harry L. LaCHANCE and Vivian F. LaChance, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROSS MACHINE & MILL SUPPLY, INC., aka R & M Machine & Mill Supply, Inc., a dissolved Oklahoma corporation; Blount, Inc., a successor in interest of Ross Machine & Mill Supply, Inc., and R & M Machine & Mill Supply, Inc., a corporation; Doe I through X, Defendants-Respondents.

Page 570

633 P.2d 570

102 Idaho 505

Harry L. LaCHANCE and Vivian F. LaChance, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROSS MACHINE & MILL SUPPLY, INC., aka R & M Machine & Mill Supply, Inc., a dissolved Oklahoma corporation; Blount, Inc., a successor in interest of Ross Machine & Mill Supply, Inc., and R & M Machine & Mill Supply, Inc., a corporation; Doe I through X, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 13203.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Aug. 26, 1981.

Patricia G. Young of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & Gillespie, Boise, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Ben Peterson of Baum & Peterson, Pocatello, for defendants-respondents.

BAKES, Chief Justice.

This is a products liability action for personal injuries sustained by Harry LaChance. The complaint was premised on theories of negligent design, strict tort liability and breach of warranty. LaChance was injured in 1975 while performing maintenance on a roller mill manufactured by defendant respondents and sold to LaChance's employer, Ralston Purina. Upon motion, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. We affirm.

The roller mill was manufactured by respondents and sold to Ralston Purina in 1969. The mill is used in the animal feed industry to flake or crimp steamed grain between two heavy cast iron rollers. The rollers are situated within a housing which has several hinged inspection doors located above and below the rollers. There were no apparent safety devices. When the doors were open, there was direct access to the rollers.

The accident complained of occurred when LaChance, in his employment as maintenance man for Ralston Purina, knelt to reach the inspection door located below the rollers in order to clean out clogs of wet grain. He used an 18-inch screwdriver to break the clogs and rake out the material. In his deposition, LaChance stated that he was not aware the mill was in operation. Finishing his task, he started to raise himself from the kneeling position and, screwdriver in hand, reached into an open inspection door to give himself support. This inspection door was located above the rollers. The blade of the screwdriver, passing through this open door and pointing toward the nip point of the rollers, became caught between them. The rollers then pulled the screwdriver and LaChance's hand inward, severely injuring his hand.

LaChance received worker's compensation benefits for his job-related injuries. He also commenced the instant suit. During discovery, the defendant manufacturer deposed the plaintiff LaChance. The testimony was revealing. LaChance indicated that, shortly after the machine was received, Ralston Purina had installed a grate above the rollers and behind the upper inspection door. The grate was installed both for purposes of safety and to prevent debris such as sticks, straws and stones from going into the rollers. Several days before the accident, the rollers were removed for re-corrugation. The grate was also removed. The rollers were replaced, and the gap between the rollers was properly adjusted with a feeler gauge. When the work was completed, LaChance himself replaced the grate.

The grate was not in place, however, when the accident took place several days later. It had apparently been removed by other employee or employees of Ralston Purina, most probably the operator of the roller mill. LaChance was unaware that the grate had been removed. According to his deposition testimony, he specifically relied upon the grate's presence in using the open inspection door to give himself support. ¹ LaChance candidly admitted that the removal of the grate and his reliance on its presence caused his injuries.

Based upon the plaintiff's deposition testimony, the defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued that the removal of the grate which Ralston Purina had designed and installed, together with the plaintiff's mistaken and unfortunate reliance upon its presence, was either the sole proximate cause of the accident or an intervening and superseding cause. The district court granted the motion, holding that there were no issues of material fact and that the removal of the homemade grate from the roller mill by unknown Ralston Purina employees was a superseding act of negligence which insulated the defendant manufacturer from any liability.

We agree with the district court's decision, mindful of course that upon motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences are to be construed most favorably toward the party against whom judgment is sought, and if any genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved, summary judgment is inappropriate. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 625 P.2d 417 (1981); Palmer v. Idaho Bank & Trust of Kooskia, 100 Idaho 642, 603 P.2d 597 (1979). Conversely, if uncontroverted facts lead to a definite disposition as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., supra. This case is controlled by principles set forth in Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d 54 (1975). In Mico, we adopted criterion found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts for determining whether an intervening act should be considered a superseding cause of harm to another. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 440-453 (1965). As we recognized in Mico, the key inquiry is whether the intervening acts were foreseeable. We stated, "Ordinarily, the question of foreseeability is a question of fact.... However, when the undisputed facts can lead to only one reasonable conclusion, this court may rule upon the issue of foreseeability as a matter of law." Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho at 412-13, 546 P.2d at 58-59. See Gamble v. Kinch, 102 Idaho 335, 629 P.2d 1168 (1981).

Applying those principles to the instant case, we conclude that uncontroverted facts, particularly those established by plaintiff's deposition testimony, lead to but one conclusion: the intervening acts of employees of Ralston Purina were unforeseeable as a matter of law. The defendant manufacturer should not be expected to foresee the occurrence of each of the following four events: Ralston Purina's alteration of the roller mill by addition of the grate; the removal of the grate by an unknown Ralston Purina employee; the failure of that employee either to replace the grate or warn other employees of its removal; and, finally, the conduct of the plaintiff in inserting a handheld 18-inch screwdriver into an open door, without looking, while relying mistakenly upon the grate's presence. To hold otherwise would stretch the concept of foreseeability much too far.

Accordingly, we uphold the district court's conclusion that the intervening acts of employees of Ralston Purina were a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries, thus relieving the defendant respondents of any and all liability. The summary judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondents.

McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.

BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.

The issue here is straightforward: Can a reasonable mind find it to be foreseeable that a purchaser of an unreasonably dangerous machine will install a safety device and subsequently an employee will remove that device without warning to other employees. ¹ I believe the answer to this question is "yes." Some evidence that such is true is the Court's split in answering this question. A holding that a reasonable mind could not so find will suggest to some members of the trial bench and bar that a majority of this Court intimates that other members of this Court do not have reasonable minds a conclusion which all members of the bench and bar may rush to endorse.

I.

It is essential initially to clarify what this case involves and what it does not involve. The trial court granted summary judgment because "the acts and conduct of the Ralston Purina employees in removing the grate or screen was, in fact, a superseding act of negligence which insulates any negligence of defendants." The sole issue raised and argued by both parties on this appeal is whether the trial court was correct in this finding. Whether the product was "unreasonably dangerous" and whether LaChance was so negligent as to bar his recovery as a matter of law are not questions presently before the Court, and it must be assumed for purposes of this appeal that the machine was unreasonably dangerous and that LaChance's negligence, if any, was not such as to bar his recovery. ²

The issue here, then, is whether the acts of employees of Ralston Purina in installing and removing this grate were so highly extraordinary as to be unforeseeable as a matter of law, i. e., whether no reasonable mind could find these acts to be foreseeable. See generally Mico Mobile Sales and Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d 54 (1975); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442 (1965). Put another way, the question is whether the subsequent acts affecting the machine's condition were so extraordinary and unforeseeable as to relieve the manufacturer from liability for manufacturing a defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous machine where LaChance suffered his injuries because of that defective design. ³

Since I disagree with both the method and result of the Court's analysis, I will first present my own analysis, to be followed by a critique of the Court's opinion.

II.

At the outset, it should be emphasized that well reasoned cases dealing with a manufacturer's duty to install safety devices hold that such duty is non-delegable. As stated in Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972):

"Where a manufacturer places into the channels of trade a finished product which can be put to use and which should be provided with safety devices because without such it creates an unreasonable risk of harm, and where such safety devices can feasibly be installed by the manufacturer, the fact that he expects that someone else will install...