Lache v. Bal Harbour Hotel, LLC

• Decision Date: 12 May 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:14–cv–23328–KMM.
• Citation: 104 F.Supp.3d 1379
• Parties: Juan LACHE, and his wife, Angie Castillo, Plaintiffs, v. BAL HARBOUR HOTEL, LLC d/b/a “The St. Regis Bal Harbour Resort,” and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. d/b/a “The St. Regis Resort and Residences,”, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

104 F.Supp.3d 1379

Juan LACHE, and his wife, Angie Castillo, Plaintiffs,

v.BAL HARBOUR HOTEL, LLC d/b/a “The St. Regis Bal Harbour Resort,” and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. d/b/a “The St. Regis Resort and Residences,”, Defendants.

Case No. 1:14–cv–23328–KMM.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed May 12, 2015.

Samuel Mark Spatzer, Samuel M. Spatzer, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Asa Biehl Groves, III, Groves & Verona, Miami, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

K. MICHAEL MOORE, Chief Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants Bal Harbour Hotel, LLC and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 20). Plaintiffs Juan Lache and Angie Castillo filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion (the “Response”) (ECF No. 25), and Defendants filed a Reply (the “Reply”) (ECF No. 54). With the Court's leave, Defendants filed a Supplemental Reply to Plaintiff's Response. The Motion is now ripe for review.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Bal Harbour Hotel, LLC, d/b/a The St. Regis Bal Harbour Resort (“The St. Regis Bal Harbour” or the “Resort”), is a full-service, luxury resort in Miami Beach, Florida. The St. Regis Bal Harbour consists of hotel accommodations and privately-owned condominiums. See, e.g.,Hirsch Dep. 99:4–21, March 17, 2015, Defs.' Supplemental Reply (“Defs.' Supp. Reply”) Ex. C (ECF No. 86–3). Defendant Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., d/b/a The St. Regis Resort and Residences (together with the Resort, “Defendants”), is the Resort's sole member and owner.

As part of its amenities package, The St. Regis Bal Harbour offers patrons valet parking services. See, e.g.,Hirsch Dep. 16:10–16. Valet parking is the exclusive means of parking at the Resort; no self-parking is permitted. See, e.g.,Hirsch Dep. 97:11–98:21, 99:4–21; Sgarbi Dep. 64:17–25, Feb. 20, 2015, Defs.' Supp. Reply Ex. D (ECF No. 86–4). The Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for the Bal Harbour Resort (the “Declaration of Covenants”) provides:

Parking. All of the parking areas for the use of the Hotel Lot, the Center Lot, the North Lot and the Commercial Lot are located within the Base Shared Facilities. In accordance with the terms of the Development Agreement, there will be no self parking within The Properties and all parking within The Properties will be by valet service.¹

Declaration of Covenants, Defs.' Supp. Reply Ex. B § 4.4 (ECF No. 86–2).

In November 2011, the Resort contracted with USA Parking Systems, Inc. (“USA Parking”) to provide valet services on its premises.²SeeProperty Agreement (ECF No. 24–1). A little over two years later, USA Parking hired Plaintiff Juan Lache as a valet parking attendant at the Resort. Interrogs. ¶ 18, Defs.' Mot. J. Pleadings and Alternative Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2 (ECF No. 20–2). Shortly after being hired, on his way to retrieve a car, Lache slipped on water and injured himself. Compl. ¶ 10 (ECF No. 1). Lache applied for and received almost $100,000.00 in workers' compensation benefits through USA Parking. Interrogs. ¶ 18.

In addition to receiving workers' compensation, Lache, together with his wife, Plaintiff Angie Castillo (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought this action against Defendants. The three-count Complaint asserts claims for negligence (Counts I and II) and a claim for loss of consortium on the wife's behalf (Count III). SeeCompl. ¶¶ 11–20. Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that they are immune from tort liability under Florida's workers' compensation law.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 56. An issue of fact is “material” if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Id.(citation omitted). In deciding whether the moving party has met this burden, the court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Tyson Foods, Inc.,121 F.3d at 646(citations omitted). But if the record, taken as a whole, cannot lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and summary judgment is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment rises and falls on whether Florida's workers' compensation law bars Plaintiffs' tort claims. This issue, in turn, depends on whether the Resort had a contractual obligation to provide valet parking services, which it delegated to USA Parking, Plaintiff Lache's employer. If so, Defendants are immune from suit, and summary judgment is appropriate. If not, they are subject to tort liability, and this Court must allow Plaintiffs' claims to proceed. Based on the evidence, the Court finds that no rational trier of fact could find that the Resort did not delegate to USA Parking its contractually-required valet parking services. Accordingly, because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A. Legal Framework

Florida's Workers' Compensation Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 440.01 et seq.(the “Act”), is a quid pro quo statute—the employee foregoes the right to sue in exchange for the employer's assumption of liability without fault. Fitzgerald v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist.,840 So.2d 460, 462 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003)(citation omitted). Under the Act's statutory employee provision, if a contractor “sublets”³or delegates part of its contract work, then the contractor's and subcontractor's employees are “deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establishment,” and the contractor is liable for the payment of workers' compensation to the subcontractor's employees, except to those who have secured compensation. Fla. Stat. § 440.10(1)(b). In other words, a contractor is responsible for compensation payments to a subcontractor's employees where the subcontractor fails to provide coverage for its employees, Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Abernathy,442 So.2d 953 (Fla.1983), either by carrying insurance through an authorized carrier or by qualifying as a self-insurer, Allison Devs., Inc. v. Rudasill,202 So.2d 752, 752–55 (Fla.1967). Thus, where an entity assumes the legal status of a contractor, it becomes the “statutory employer” of the subcontractor's employees, and is liable for the payment of workers' compensation benefits if the subcontractor does not secure payment. Orama v. Dunmire,552 So.2d 924, 925 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989). This liability requires only that a contractor securethe payment of workers' compensation benefits; it does not impose a duty to actually pay those benefits.See, e.g., Mena v. J.I.L. Constr. Grp. Corp.,79 So.3d 219, 225 n. 1 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012).

The liability, moreover, is “exclusive” and “in place of all other liability of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death.” Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1). So, because the liability to secure compensation is the exclusive form of liability under the Act, once a contractor does so, it becomes immune from suit. Motchkavitz v. L.C. Boggs Indus., Inc.,407 So.2d 910, 912–13 (Fla.1981)overruled on other grounds by Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Abernathy,442 So.2d 953 (Fla.1983)(citation omitted) (“[A] contractor who sublets part of its work to a subcontractor, being liable to secure coverage for employees of its subcontractor, is also immune from suit by such employees when such coverage has been secured. It is the liability to secure coverage for such employees in the event the subcontractor does not do so that immunizes a contractor from suit by such employees.”). A subcontractor employee's recovery for injury or death sustained in the course of the contract work is exclusively for worker's compensation. Brickley v. Gulf Coast Constr. Co.,153 Fla. 216, 14 So.2d 265, 266 (1943).

A statutory employer immune from suit is a contractor that sublets any part of its contract work to a subcontractor. Green v. APAC–Florida,935 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006). To be regarded as a “contractor,” the entity's primary obligation in performing a job or providing a service must arise out of a contract. Dunlap v. CSR Rinker Transport,978 So.2d 817, 819 (Fla.Dist.Ct...