Lackey v. Fuller, 1998-CA-01480-SCT.
| Citation | 755 So.2d 1083 |
| Decision Date | 17 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1998-CA-01480-SCT.,1998-CA-01480-SCT. |
| Parties | Mona Michelle (Fuller) LACKEY v. William Todd FULLER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
Ross R. Barnett, Jr., Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.
William O. Luckett, Jr., Clarksdale, Attorney for Appellee.
BEFORE PITTMAN, P.J., MILLS AND WALLER, JJ.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. This is an appeal from the Coahoma Chancery Court where the appellant, Mona Michelle Fuller Lackey ("Lackey"), sought a modification of child custody. The appellee, William Todd Fuller ("Fuller"), was granted full custody of the two minor children. Lackey appeals from that ruling.
¶ 2. Fuller and Lackey were married on December 5, 1992. Two children were born of this marriage: Rachel Nicole Fuller, born on May 13, 1994, and William Chase Fuller, born on April 21, 1997.
¶ 3. A joint complaint for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences was filed on October 7, 1997. A joint settlement agreement was filed the same day. In the settlement agreement, Fuller and Lackey agreed to joint legal custody of the children, with Fuller having primary physical custody.
¶ 4. Lackey moved the chancery court on November 26, 1997, for leave to withdraw the complaint for divorce and agreement. In the alternative, Lackey petitioned the court to grant a divorce on irreconcilable differences, but conduct a hearing on the issue of child custody. Fuller then filed an amended complaint for divorce on the ground of adultery, or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. Fuller also requested full legal and physical custody of the children.
¶ 5. After months of legal wrangling, Fuller and Lackey filed a marital dissolution agreement with the chancery court on March 20, 1998. Both agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. They also agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of the two children with the children spending half their time with each parent. The agreement also contained visitation schedules regarding holidays.
¶ 6. On March 20, 1998, chancellor Harvey T. Ross signed the final judgment of divorce. The chancellor granted the divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of the children. The chancellor stated in his opinion that both parents were "fit, proper and suitable persons to have the care, custody and control of the minor children, and it is in the best interest of said children that their parents be awarded joint physical and legal custody at this time...."
¶ 7. Lackey filed a motion for modification of the final judgment of divorce on July 29, 1998. In the motion, Lackey stated that she had married Brent Lackey and that he was being transferred to Rochester, New York. Lackey asked the court to grant her primary physical custody of the children with visitation rights being granted to Fuller.
¶ 8. A hearing was held on the motion on September 4, 1998, before the Honorable William H. Bizzell, in the Chancery Court of Coahoma County. Testimony and evidence was offered by both sides. On September 23, 1998, the chancellor filed an order granting full physical and legal custody to Fuller. Lackey appeals to this Court from this decision.
¶ 9. This Court's review of the decision by the court below is limited by the substantial evidence or manifest error rule. Brocato v. Brocato, 731 So.2d 1138, 1140 (Miss.1999); Law v. Page, 618 So.2d 96, 101 (Miss.1993); Polk v. Polk, 589 So.2d 123, 129 (Miss.1991); Phillips v. Phillips, 555 So.2d 698, 701 (Miss.1989). This Court may only disturb the decision of the chancellor to award custody of the children to Fuller if the chancellor committed manifest error in reaching his decision. Id.
¶ 10. This Court reviews a trial judge's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Rushing v. Rushing, 724 So.2d 911, 914 (Miss.1998). "Unless the trial judge's discretion is so abused as to be prejudicial to a party, this Court will not reverse his ruling." Id. (quoting Stewart v. Stewart, 645 So.2d 1319, 1320 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted)).
¶ 11. Lackey asserts that the chancellor erred when he allowed into evidence testimony regarding events that occurred before the granting of the original divorce decree. At the hearing, Fuller attempted to cross-examine Lackey about an extramarital affair she had with Brent Lackey, her present husband. Lackey objected on the grounds that the divorce was a no-fault divorce and that the particulars of the divorce had no relevance in the present hearing. The chancellor held that while the divorce decree was res judicata, information about Brent Lackey, including any pre-divorce conduct with Lackey, was not. Lackey asserts that any pre-divorce conduct, including pre-divorce conduct with Brent Lackey, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
¶ 12. The doctrine of res judicata stands for the premise that a judgment is final on all matters which might have been litigated and determined in a previous suit, as well as matters which were actually litigated and decided. Childers v. Childers, 717 So.2d 1279, 1280 (Miss.1998). The doctrine of res judicata has been applied equally in divorce actions as in any other. Newman v. Newman, 558 So.2d 821, 823 (Miss.1990) (citing Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So.2d 793, 794 (Miss.1990); Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 417 (Miss.1983); Brocato v. Walker, 220 So.2d 340, 343 (Miss.1969)).
¶ 13. Mississippi case law is clear on issues of child custody and res judicata:
A decree fixing the custody of a child is, however, final on the conditions then existing and should not be changed afterward unless on altered conditions since the decree * * * and then only for the welfare for the child.
Brocato v. Walker, 220 So.2d 340, 342 (Miss.1969) (quoting Cassell v. Cassell, 211 Miss. 841, 846, 52 So.2d 918, 921 (1951))(emphasis added). A modification of an original decree granting custody should only occur if there has been a material change in circumstances, subsequent to the original decree, that adversely affects the child. Marascalco v. Marascalco, 445 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Miss.1984), Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1143 (Miss.1983). In Bowe this Court held:
We begin with the principles of res judicata which command that a final judgment preclude thereafter all claims that were or reasonably may have been brought in the original action.... The familiar rule that a judgment for alimony, custody or support may be modified only upon a showing of a post-judgment material change of circumstances is a recognition of the force of res judicata in divorce actions. Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 417 (Miss.1983); Brocato v. Walker, 220 So.2d 340, 343 (Miss. 1969).
Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So.2d 793, 794 (Miss. 1990) (emphasis added).
¶ 14. The original divorce decree found that both parties were "fit, proper and suitable persons to have the care, custody and control of the minor children...." The decree granted joint legal and physical custody of the children to the parents. Because the chancellor specifically found that both parents were fit, predivorce conduct is res judicata as to the hearing regarding the modification of child custody. The chancellor clearly abused his discretion in revisiting that which had already been laid to rest.
¶ 15. The decree then went on to grant Fuller and Lackey a divorce on irreconcilable differences. As noted earlier, Fuller had sued for a divorce on the ground of adultery but later agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Fuller had the option of pursuing a divorce on the ground of adultery. He chose not to do so. Pre-divorce conduct regarding any extra-marital affair by Lackey with Brent Lackey is also res judicata.
¶ 16. Fuller asserts that because Lackey knew before the divorce that Brent Lackey was being transferred to Delaware or possibly New York and she did not inform the chancellor, the pre-divorce conduct was not res judicata. Fuller seems to imply that if the chancellor had known of the possible relocation, he might have initially granted full custody to Fuller.
¶ 17. Fuller's argument has one fatal flaw: Fuller himself knew before the final divorce that there was a possibility that Brent Lackey would be transferred. Fuller had taped his wife's phone conversations wherein she discussed with Brent Lackey and her mother the possibility that Brent would be transferred and that Lackey would accompany him. Whether the chancellor took this into consideration during the original divorce is irrelevant: Fuller had knowledge of the possible relocation and could have brought it to the court's attention if he wished. As such, Lackey's pre-divorce knowledge of a relocation is res judicata as to the modification.
¶ 18. The final judgment of divorce is res judicata as to the issue of the fitness of both Fuller and Lackey at the time of the divorce. As such, the only evidence the judge should have admitted at the hearing was evidence of post-judgment conduct. Evidence regarding Lackey leaving her husband and children in the marital home, as well as any extra-marital affair with Brent Lackey, is res judicata.
¶ 19. Lackey suffered severe prejudice as a result of the admission of the above...
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