LaCoe v. City of Sisseton
| Decision Date | 06 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-CV-01010-CBK |
| Parties | SAMANTHA LACOE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SISSETON, JAMES CROYMANS, INDIVIDUALLY AND CHIEF OF POLICE; BRITTANY APPEL, CITY POLICE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUALLY AND ALDERWOMAN; LEE SOLBERG, CITY POLICE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUALLY AND ALDERMAN; DELRAY GERMAN, CITY POLICE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUALLY AND ALDERMAN; DYLAN KIRCHMEIER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS ROLE AS ROBERTS COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY; TERRY JASPERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR; TREVOR MISHLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND JEREME STAUSS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Plaintiff Samantha LaCoe brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 along with several purported state law claims seeking monetary and injunctive relief against defendants James Croymans, Brittany Appel, Lee Solberg Delray German, Dylan Kirchmeier, Terry Jaspers, Trevor Mishler, Jereme Stauss, and the City of Sisseton for the violation of her constitutional rights arising from her term of employment with the Sisseton Police Department. This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The motion should be granted.
Samantha LaCoe entered into an agreement with the Sisseton Police Department on January 18, 2021, to work as a law enforcement officer. Approximately a year later, LaCoe resigned on Chief James Croymans' request after being placed on a Brady/Giglio impeachment disclosure list.[1] LaCoe alleges that State's Attorney Dylan Kirchmeier placed her on the list, absent any rule or regulation, and that she signed a letter consenting to the Brady/Giglio listing under duress. Kirchmeier put LaCoe onto the list after four total incidents. In August and December of 2021, Kirchmeier did not agree with LaCoe's stated reason for two different traffic stops. In January 2022, Kirchmeier found that LaCoe made a misstatement in one of her reports and a clerical error naming the wrong defendant. LaCoe contends that none of her conduct warranted placement on the Brady/Giglio list, and that she was not given a meaningful opportunity to rebut or defend herself before being placed on the list. She retracted her resignation and consent to the Brady/Giglio listing in an undated affidavit attached to her complaint.
LaCoe further alleges that she was subject to a variety of discriminatory conduct, including failure to train and harassment, because she is a woman. She contends that during her first week on the job, she was given a duty vest that was too large for her body and was given a service weapon too large for her hands. LaCoe claims that between January and April, her Field Training Officer, Sergeant Jereme Stauss, was constantly complaining about his personal life rather than providing training for LaCoe to be successful at her job. Stauss allegedly failed to provide training on how to write reports as well as guidance about the Department's policies and procedures. In late April, LaCoe contends that she was “labeled a ‘snitch'” for reporting Officer Jon Sheehan to Croymans after she learned while helping as a cheer coach at the local high school that Sheehan was inappropriately contacting the girls through social media. She alleges that during a July 2021 law enforcement appreciation event, none of the other officers would speak to her. After the event, LaCoe claims that Croymans brought her into his office and said that LaCoe was “weak and [alienates herself] from people,” that “no one wants to speak with [her] or work with [her] and people see through [her],” and that she should think “long and hard if this career is for [her].” In October 2021, Croymans told LaCoe that he did not believe she would pass the Emergency Vehicle Operations Course and firearms training, and she allegedly never received any additional training from Strauss after Croymans told her to seek assistance. LaCoe contends that Croymans received her complaints of sex discrimination, including Corporal Trevor Mishler's remark that if LaCoe “sucked d---like she sucked the fun out of the room she would be further ahead,” which Croymans dismissed as a misunderstanding.
On January 17, 2022, Croymans called LaCoe into his office to notify her that Kirchmeier determined that statements in one of her reports did not match her body camera footage. Croymans informed LaCoe that she was being placed on the Brady/Giglio list and put on a year of probation, but that the disclosure would stay within Roberts County. Two days later on January 19, Croymans told LaCoe that the Police Commission had lost confidence in her during an emergency meeting and that she had to resign. LaCoe alleges that all the defendants acted together to arbitrarily place her on the Brady/Giglio list and to deny her adequate training so that she would resign from her job. Because of the defendants' actions, LaCoe claims that she has suffered harm to her career as a law enforcement officer, lost job opportunities, and suffered severe depression, anxiety, and economic harm.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court assumes that all facts in the complaint are true and construes any reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jacobson Warehouse Co. v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 13 F.4th 659, 668 (8th Cir. 2021); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive the motion to dismiss. C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 347, 591 F.3d 624, 630 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, the factual contents of the complaint must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Pietoso, Inc, v. Rep. Servs., Inc., 4 F.4th 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2021) ).
Nevertheless, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When assessing the merits of a complaint challenged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” McDonough v. Anoka Cnty., 799 F.3d 931, 945-46 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
“A court generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Porous Media Corp, v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). However, courts may “consider ‘some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.'” Id. (quoting Porous Media Corp., 186 F.3d at 1079).
LaCoe asserts various claims against the defendants. She first claims that the Department violated both her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as under the South Dakota State Constitution. LaCoe claims further that she was constructively discharged based on the Department's pattern of harassment and failure to train. She alleges that all the defendants together acted to conspire to violate her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by placing her on the Brady/Giglio list, as well as providing her with inadequate training so that she would resign from her job. She additionally claims that by placing her on the Brady/Giglio list, the defendants intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress upon her. All of LaCoe's federal claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim or because the particular named defendant is immune from suit, and all of her state law claims should be dismissed because the Court chooses not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when no federal claims remain.
LaCoe argues, in essence, that the defendants violated her procedural and substantive due process rights by placing her on the Brady/Giglio list without giving her an opportunity to defend herself and forcing.her to resign from her job with the Department. For the protections of procedural due process to attach, a plaintiff must first “have a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property.” Mickelson v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 823 F.3d 918, 930 (8th Cir. 2016). Here, LaCoe claims that she had a property interest in her employment and a liberty interest in her reputation and good name.
To establish a property interest in a job, a plaintiff must show that she “had a reasonable and legitimate expectation of continued employment.” Mogard v. City of Milbank, 932 F.3d 1184, 1190 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist, 363 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2004)). “State law and the terms of employment determine whether the plaintiff's interest in his or her job rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property right.” Id. (citing Howard, 363 F.3d at 803). “A plaintiffs...
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