Lacy v. Arvin

• Decision Date: 10 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1498,1498
• Citation: 780 A.2d 1180,140 Md. App. 412
• Parties: Reno Edward LACY, Sr. v. Laura Maureen ARVIN.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

780 A.2d 1180

140 Md. App. 412

Reno Edward LACY, Sr. v. Laura Maureen ARVIN.

No. 1498, Sept. Term, 2000.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

September 10, 2001.

Monica L. Scherer (Silverman & Thompson, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Joseph Spillman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Mary C. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before HOLLANDER, DEBORAH S. EYLER, and JAMES S. GETTY (Ret'd, specially assigned), JJ. DEBORAH S. EYLER, Judge.

In this case, we must determine whether a contractual agreement between separated parents by which the non-custodial parent pays child support without the compulsion of a court order can be a "preexisting reasonable child support obligation," under Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) section 12-201(d)(1) of the Family Law Article ("FL"), so as to be subtracted from the paying parent's actual income in calculating a child support award for another of his children, by a different mother. We conclude that it can be.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Laura Maureen Arvin, the appellee, sued Reno Edward Lacy, Sr., the appellant, to establish paternity and for child support. After the parties stipulated to paternity, the child support issues were tried by the court. From an amended order establishing paternity and awarding child support, Lacy appeals, presenting four questions for review, which we have reworded:

I. Did the trial court err in failing to incorporate the appellant's preexisting reasonable child support obligations in calculating child support under the guidelines?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to deviate downward from the child support guidelines?

III. Did the trial court err by including in the child support award a day care expense that the appellee was not actually incurring at the time of trial?

IV. Did the trial court err in calculating child support by failing to credit the appellant for the health insurance expense of the minor child?

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In March of 1994, Arvin and Lacy had a brief relationship. Nine months later, on December 21, 1994, Robin Nicolette Lacy, the child in this case, was born.

On May 24, 2000, when Robin was five years old, Arvin brought suit against Lacy in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, to establish paternity and for child support. The parties consented to genetic testing, which showed that there was a 99.99% likelihood that Lacy was Robin's biological father.

Trial commenced on July 24, 2000. At the outset of the proceedings, the parties stipulated to paternity and to their gross monthly incomes. The court then took testimony from Lacy, Arvin, and two witnesses called by Lacy.

Arvin testified that her work schedule necessitates day care services for Robin from Monday through Saturday morning. At the time of trial, she was paying a relative who is not a licensed day care provider $90 per week to watch Robin. She previously had been paying for Robin to attend a licensed day care program called Open Door. She had to remove Robin from that program when the school year ended, however, because the program's fee had increased to $110 per week for the summer and she already was behind in her payments to the facility. Arvin explained that if she had kept Robin at Open Door, which operates Monday through Friday, she still would have had to employ her relative on Saturdays, at a rate of $20, and her total day care expense thus would have been $130 per week. Arvin further testified that if she were awarded child support, she would re-enroll Robin at Open Door.

Lacy testified that he is married to Catherine Lacy, but they have been separated since 1994. He and Catherine have three minor children who are older than Robin and who live with their mother.¹ Ever since he and Catherine separated, Lacy has been paying Catherine $400 every other week for support for the children. The sum is paid in cash, which Lacy withdraws from an ATM machine after depositing his paycheck. According to Lacy, he and Catherine agreed to the $400 figure because that is the amount that Catherine estimated was necessary to pay her bills. There is no court order directing Lacy to pay that sum or any sum in child support for his three children with Catherine.

Lacy further testified that he and a woman named Dawn M. Griffin Hess have a minor child for whom he pays support of $100, every other week. He also makes that payment in cash, after withdrawing the sum from an ATM machine. Lacy has been paying child support to Dawn every other week for 11 years. There also is no court order directing Lacy to pay the $100 bi-weekly sum, or any sum, for child support for that child.

Catherine corroborated Lacy's testimony about his child support payments to her. She stated that she and Lacy had been separated for five years continuously and that he had been paying the $400 bi-weekly sum throughout that period. Dawn also testified and corroborated the $100 bi-weekly payments that Lacy makes to her for their child.

At the close of the evidence and after hearing argument of counsel, the trial court ordered Lacy to pay $615.39 per month to Arvin for child support for Robin. The court calculated that sum using the child support guidelines and the stipulated gross monthly earnings figures of the parties. The court ruled that Lacy's payments to Catherine and Dawn for support for his other four children constitute voluntary payments, not "obligations" to be subtracted in calculating his adjusted actual income under the guidelines. Also, in arriving at its child support award, the court did not deviate downward from the guidelines on account of those payments.

The court included a day care expense of $110 per week in its child support award. When the court was calculating the child support award, it asked Lacy whether he was making any payments for health insurance premiums for Robin. (Lacy, who was unrepresented at trial, had not given any testimony about health insurance.) In response, Lacy produced a pay stub showing that he was paying $25 per pay period for health insurance for his entire family, including all his children. Lacy then stated, in further response to questions from the court, that he did not incur any additional charge for including Robin on his health insurance policy. The court did not credit Lacy for any health insurance costs for Robin in calculating the child support award.

On July 27, 2000, the court issued an earnings withholding order for the monthly child support award of $615.34. The court then issued an "Amended Order" setting forth in detail the rulings it made at the conclusion of the July 24, 2000 trial. Lacy noted a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

I

When determining child support, the circuit court must use the child support guidelines set forth in sections 12-201 et seq. of the Family Law Article. FL § 12-202(a)(1).² The law recognizes a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support resulting from application of the guidelines "is the correct amount of child support to be awarded." FL § 12-202(a)(2)(i). That presumption may be rebutted, however, "by evidence that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case." FL § 12-202(a)(2)(ii). The statute recites factors that the court may consider in making that determination. See FL § 12-202(a)(2)(iii). One such factor is "the presence in the household of either parent of other children to whom that parent owes a duty of support and the expenses for whom that parent is directly contributing." FL § 12-202(a)(2)(iii)(2). The presumption of correctness of the amount of child support under the guidelines may not be rebutted solely on the basis of evidence of that factor, however. FL § 12-202(a)(2)(iv).

If the court finds that in the case before it application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, it must make that finding in writing or in a specific on-the-record statement. FL § 12-202(a)(2)(v). In addition, the court must state the amount of support the guidelines would have required; how its child support order deviates from the guidelines; and "how the finding serves the best interests of the child." FL § 12-202(a)(2)(v)(2). In cases in which items of value are conveyed in lieu of a portion of support presumed under the guidelines, the court must state the value of those items. Id.

A schedule that appears in FL § 12-204(e) provides the means to calculate the support obligation under the guidelines. Section 12-204(a) directs that "[t]he basic child support obligation [for the child or children in question] shall be divided between the parents in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes." FL § 12-204(a). A parent's "adjusted actual income" means:

[A]ctual income minus: (1) preexisting reasonable child support obligations actually paid; (2) except as provided in § 12-204(a)(2) ... alimony or maintenance obligations actually paid; and (3) the actual cost of providing health insurance coverage for a child for whom the parents are jointly and severally responsible.

FL § 12-201(d).

According to Lacy, the payments totaling $1,000 per month that he makes to the mothers of his four children other than Robin are "preexisting reasonable child support obligations actually paid" under FL § 12-201(d)(1), notwithstanding that they are made without the compulsion of a court order. He argues, therefore, that the court should have subtracted $1,000 from his actual income in calculating his adjusted actual income. Because the court did not do so, its child support calculation under the guidelines was too high.

Arvin responds that the trial court properly construed FL § 12-201(d)(1) to mean that child support payments made without the compulsion of a court order are voluntary payments that are not "obligations" to be subtracted from actual income in determining a parent's adjusted actual income.

The meaning of the...