Lacy v. Gabriel, Civ. A. No. 82-1010-G.
Decision Date | 27 July 1983 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 82-1010-G. |
Parties | Leonard LACY, Petitioner, v. Harold F. GABRIEL, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Michael B. Roitman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., for petitioner.
Benjamin Hiller, Goldstein, Pressman, Stern & Hiller, Cambridge, Mass., for respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
Leonard Lacy was convicted of first degree murder in December of 1974. During the trial the government introduced into evidence two jail cards, each bearing a photograph of defendant, for the purpose of proving his appearance at particular times. The picture on Exhibit 4 showed the defendant wearing jail clothes with a jail identification number across his chest. That number was ordered excluded and masked. Exhibit 20 bore references to "Brighton District Court" and "$25,000 bail" on the front of the card, and references to "Walpole, yes" and "Norfolk, yes" on the back.1 Upon defendant's objection that these entries were prejudicial, the trial judge ordered them also excluded and masked. Six years later, in October of 1980, one of the jurors for Lacy's trial revealed that during deliberations he had unmasked those excluded portions of Exhibits 4 and 20, and that he and other jurors had discussed the excluded information prior to reaching their verdict. Based upon that juror's representations, Lacy filed a motion for a new trial. The Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts denied Lacy's motion, finding that although the juror did unmask those excluded portions of Exhibits 4 and 20, and although the jury did discuss that information, the unmasked information was "merely cumulative" of information properly admitted with other exhibits.
The matter is now before this court on Lacy's petition for habeas corpus. The petitioner has argued that the juror's misconduct in unmasking excluded portions of a trial exhibit rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the federal constitution. The court has also heard and considered arguments on the issue of whether the juror's misconduct denied petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront evidence against him as made applicable to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 If petitioner meets his burden of demonstrating constitutional error,3 the petition must be granted unless the government can prove that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 1967, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; Morgan v. Hall, 1 Cir.1978, 569 F.2d 1161, 1166; United States v. Bruscino, 7 Cir.1981, 662 F.2d 450, 458.
The constitutional error in this case is more properly analyzed in terms of petitioner's right of confrontation rather than his right of due process. This latter right raises the question of whether the entire proceedings were rendered "fundamentally unfair" by the challenged event, Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 1974, 416 U.S. 637, 645, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 40 L.Ed.2d 431, and serves as an appropriate mode of analysis only when a specific constitutional right, such as that of confrontation, is not implicated. Id., at p. 643, 94 S.Ct. at 1871; see also Davis v. Campbell, 8 Cir.1979, 608 F.2d 317, 319 ()4
The court finds that the juror's unmasking of Exhibits 4 and 20, and the jury's consideration of evidence excluded at trial, violated petitioner's constitutional right to confront evidence against him. Once a defendant proves that a jury has considered information not admitted as evidence during the trial and properly developed by the adversarial process, courts have generally found that the constitutional right of confrontation has been abridged. Parker v. Gladden, 1966, 385 U.S. 363, 364, 87 S.Ct. 468, 470, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 ( ); United States v. Bruscino, 7 Cir. 1981, 662 F.2d 450, 458 ( ); Gibson v. Clanon, 9 Cir.1980, 633 F.2d 851 ( ). It is particularly clear that Lacy's right of confrontation was violated in this case because it was upon his objection at trial that the judge excluded the evidence in question, and because that evidence related to prior criminal involvement, the presentation of which before a jury is intricately regulated by the Federal Rules of Evidence. At a minimum, petitioner lost his opportunity to argue to the jury about the evidence so as to minimize its prejudicial impact.
Having found constitutional error, the court must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, supra, at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. at p. 828. It is, of course, the government's burden to disprove any reasonable possibility of prejudice. Id. In determining whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Morgan v. Hall, supra, at p. 1166. The prejudicial effect must be evaluated in the context of the "average" juror, or a "reasonable" juror, rather than attempting to measure the actual effect on the jurors who were involved. This reflects the fundamental policy that jurors may not impeach their verdicts subjectively; their thought processes in reaching a verdict are not properly matters for judicial review. See Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). "Objective facts, therefore, become the focus of the inquiry." United States v. Castello, W.D.Tex.1981, 526 F.Supp. 847, 850.
In state court proceedings regarding Lacy's motion for a new trial, the judge found after hearing the offending juror's testimony that at the time he unmasked the excluded portions of the jail cards, eleven of the jurors had voted for conviction, while only he, the juror who unmasked the exhibits, was holding out for acquittal. The state judge further found that after the excluded evidence was unmasked, the jury discussed it, and subsequently voted unanimously for conviction. The court presumes these factual findings to be correct and adopts them. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 1981, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722.
Despite these findings of fact, the state court concluded that the unmasked evidence was "merely cumulative" of evidence properly admitted and implicitly found that the jury's consideration of the extraneous information, beyond a reasonable doubt, did not affect the verdict. See Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 201, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519 () . Harmlessness, however, is a conclusion of law, and therefore not entitled to the presumption of correctness required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), see Sumner v. Mata, 1982, 455 U.S. 591, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (Sumner II). This court must conduct a de novo inquiry into the issue of harmlessness.
The court has reviewed the entire transcript of Lacy's trial, and finds copious evidence of his guilt. George Cross, resident of the victim's apartment building, testified that a black man, approximately thirty years old and wearing tan or mustard-colored high heel boots, came to the front door of the building, showed him what appeared to be a senior citizen's identification card for the MBTA bearing his picture, and claimed to be conducting a survey of senior citizens. Mr. Cross identified that man as the defendant, Leonard Lacy. Believing that he did not have the authority to let Lacy into the building, Cross then summoned the building's caretaker, Arthur Redgate, from his third...
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